1 Coventry Court, LLC v. The Downs of Hillcrest Residential Association, Inc., 24-1047, January 09, 2026.
On appeal from Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas
Synopsis
When an appellee moves to dismiss based on a settlement’s appellate-waiver, and the appellant disputes that it validly consented (and argues the resulting “consent” judgment is void), the court of appeals cannot simply dismiss. The appellate court must first determine whether the waiver is valid and whether the judgment was rendered without consent—because those questions bear directly on jurisdiction and the court’s authority to dismiss.
Relevance to Family Law
Texas family cases routinely end in mediated settlement agreements, Rule 11 agreements, and agreed decrees containing broad releases and, occasionally, appellate waivers. This decision is a reminder (and a litigation tool) that an appellate-waiver is not self-proving when the other side challenges assent, capacity/authority, duress, or whether an “agreed” judgment was actually rendered without consent. For family-law litigators, the opinion reinforces two strategic points: (1) if your appeal is met with a “you waived it” motion, you can force factual development on waiver validity; and (2) if you’re enforcing a settlement, you must build a record that will survive the inevitable “no consent/void judgment” attack—especially where the decree requires future execution of documents or incorporates “agreement-to-agree” terms.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
A property owner (Coventry) and a residential association litigated a dispute and, on the trial date, signed a short, partly printed/partly handwritten document the association characterized as a binding settlement. Coventry claimed it was only a tentative “agreement to agree,” expressly contemplating a later “full and final settlement agreement and release.”
After the association advised the trial court that the parties were “working on finalizing a formal agreement,” it circulated a draft formal settlement. Coventry refused to sign, asserting the draft differed in material ways and omitted key terms. At a later docket management hearing, Coventry’s counsel described the settlement as “tentative” pending a survey; the association insisted the document was enforceable. The trial court asked for the courthouse document to be attached to a proposed judgment so it could decide enforceability.
The trial court signed the association’s proposed judgment—one that required the parties to execute a “full and final settlement agreement and release.” Coventry sought new trial/relief to modify the judgment, maintaining no meeting of the minds existed on final terms. After judgment, the parties exchanged competing “final” agreements with multiple differences. When Coventry still refused to sign the association’s version, the association pursued contempt. The trial court found Coventry in contempt, imposed a $15,000 fine, and ordered execution of the association’s draft, with the specter of incarceration for managers.
Coventry’s managers signed under that pressure and Coventry then pursued appellate review. The court of appeals dismissed, reasoning Coventry had waived its appeal by signing the final settlement agreement. The Texas Supreme Court reversed.
Issues Decided
The Court addressed whether a court of appeals may dismiss an appeal based on a purported settlement agreement waiver when the appellant disputes that it validly consented and argues the consent judgment is void for lack of consent—and, relatedly, what the appellate court must do before treating the waiver as dispositive.
Rules Applied
The Court reaffirmed the general principle that parties may waive appellate review by agreement. It relied on longstanding authority that when waiver validity is contested, the court of appeals should not summarily dismiss but must ascertain the facts necessary to determine whether its jurisdiction over the appeal has been terminated by a valid waiver. See Seiter v. Marschall, 147 S.W. 226 (Tex. 1912).
The Court also grounded its analysis in the appellate court’s affirmative obligation to ensure subject-matter jurisdiction exists—an obligation that persists regardless of party positions. See City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. 2013); In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2010). And it reiterated the inherent authority of courts to assess their own jurisdiction. See Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1979); Smirl v. Globe Labs., 188 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1945).
Application
The Supreme Court treated the dispositive flaw as procedural and jurisdictional: the court of appeals accepted the waiver at face value and dismissed without first resolving the predicate dispute—whether Coventry validly waived appellate rights at all. Coventry was not merely attempting to evade a clear waiver; it was asserting the waiver’s invalidity and, critically, that the trial court’s “consent” judgment was rendered without consent and thus void. Those assertions required the court of appeals to do what Texas law has long required in contested-waiver scenarios: determine the relevant facts necessary to decide whether jurisdiction was terminated by waiver.
That matters in settlement-driven litigation (including family law) because the line between (a) an enforceable settlement with a binding waiver and (b) an incomplete or coerced “agreement” later converted into an “agreed” judgment can be outcome-determinative. Where the appellant plausibly contests assent/authority/consent, dismissal short-circuits the appellate court’s obligation to decide whether it can dismiss at all. The Court therefore required the appellate court to engage the dispute rather than treat the waiver as an automatic jurisdiction-killer.
Holding
The Texas Supreme Court held the court of appeals erred by dismissing the appeal without first determining whether Coventry validly waived its appellate rights. Because waiver validity was disputed, the court of appeals had to ascertain the relevant facts and could not summarily dispose of the case on the waiver alone.
The Court further held that the court of appeals should have addressed Coventry’s contention that the consent judgment was rendered without consent and thus potentially void. That allegation, if borne out, undermines reliance on a purported waiver embedded in the very process Coventry claims lacked valid consent.
The Court reversed the dismissal and remanded for the court of appeals to consider the merits in the first instance.
Practical Application
For Texas family-law litigators, the immediate takeaway is strategic: Appellate-waiver enforcement is not purely a paper exercise when the other side contests consent. If you represent the appellee seeking dismissal, you should expect the appellate court to require factual resolution (through the available procedural mechanisms) when the appellant raises a colorable challenge that the waiver was not voluntary, not authorized, or is bound up with a void “agreed” decree.
Conversely, if you represent the appellant facing a dismissal motion predicated on a mediated settlement agreement or post-judgment “settlement,” this case is a roadmap to resist a summary dismissal by framing the dispute correctly: challenge the validity of the waiver itself and tie it to any lack-of-consent/voidness arguments concerning the decree. That approach is particularly potent in family cases involving (1) decrees requiring later execution of QDROs, special warranty deeds, or entity-transfer documents; (2) “agreements to agree” on future parenting provisions, geographic restrictions, or possession details; and (3) post-decree enforcement pressure that can look like coercion when the record is thin.
Finally, this opinion should influence how you paper settlements. Family settlements often include broad releases and may include “no appeal” language—yet the enforceability of those provisions rises or falls on clear mutual assent, authority, and a record showing the agreement was complete and not contingent on later negotiation of material terms.
Checklists
Gather a waiver-enforcement record (for appellees seeking dismissal)
- Ensure the settlement instrument is complete on material terms (avoid open-ended “to be finalized later” language on core provisions).
- Establish authority: confirm the party and counsel had authority to bind (and that any entity/guardian/representative authority is documented).
- Build evidence of voluntary assent: mediation recitals, acknowledgments, and an on-the-record prove-up where feasible.
- If relying on an agreed judgment, confirm the judgment’s terms match the settlement and were consented to at rendition.
- Preserve clean execution proof: signatures, dates, notary/acknowledgments when needed, and delivery/acceptance evidence.
Defending against a dismissal motion based on an appellate-waiver (for appellants)
- Plead and brief waiver invalidity expressly (not just “unfair”): no meeting of the minds, lack of authority, duress/coercion, conditional assent, or material variance.
- Tie the waiver dispute to jurisdiction: argue the appellate court must ascertain facts before concluding jurisdiction is terminated.
- Develop the “no consent at rendition” theory if supported: identify where the record shows continued negotiation, conditional terms, or objections to the proposed judgment.
- Highlight material differences between drafts if the “final” agreement post-dated judgment or was compelled by enforcement pressure.
- Request appropriate procedural handling (e.g., remand for fact development where needed), rather than letting the issue be treated as purely legal.
Drafting family-law settlements to minimize contested-waiver risk
- Use an MSA that is unmistakably final: all material terms included; no “agreement to agree” on core conservatorship/property support terms.
- Include explicit appellate-waiver language, but pair it with acknowledgments of informed, voluntary agreement and representation by counsel.
- If future documents are required (QDROs, deeds), specify objective standards and attach forms where possible; avoid leaving material discretion to later negotiation.
- Ensure the agreed decree is rendered with clear consent on the record; confirm both sides announce approval as to form and substance at the time of rendition.
- Avoid contempt-driven “sign this settlement” scenarios by ensuring the decree precisely identifies what must be signed and that it is already agreed, attached, and incorporated.
Citation
1 Coventry Court, LLC v. The Downs of Hillcrest Residential Association, Inc., No. 24-1047 (Tex. Jan. 9, 2026) (per curiam).
Full Opinion
http://docs.texasappellate.com/scotx/op/24-1047/2026-01-09.pc.pdf
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