Memorandum Opinion by Justice Hart, 14-24-00243-CV, February 03, 2026.
On appeal from the Probate Court No. 3 of Harris County, Texas.
Synopsis
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment in an informal marriage dispute, clarifying that a claimant’s own affidavit asserting a direct agreement to be married constitutes legally sufficient direct evidence to survive a summary judgment challenge. The court held that the “self-serving” nature of such testimony goes to its weight and the witness’s credibility—matters reserved for the factfinder—rather than its admissibility or its capacity to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
Relevance to Family Law
This decision serves as a critical reminder for practitioners involved in “common-law” marriage litigation, whether in the context of divorce or probate. It underscores that the “agreement to be married” element can be satisfied for summary judgment purposes through the client’s own testimony, even in the absence of corroborating documents or third-party witnesses. For litigators, this reinforces the difficulty of disposing of informal marriage claims via Rule 166a motions when the claimant is willing to swear to a specific agreement, shifting the battleground from pretrial dismissal to the cross-examination of the claimant at trial.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
Terry Mooneyham and George Knapp maintained a long-term romantic relationship that spanned nearly two decades. Mooneyham alleged that in 2004, the couple reached a specific agreement to be married, leading her to relocate from Missouri to Texas to cohabitate with Knapp. According to Mooneyham, the couple lived as husband and wife for seventeen years, sharing a joint account and celebrating an anniversary every October 1st. The relationship’s legal status became a central issue after Knapp was diagnosed with dementia and his adult children began exercising control over his affairs via power of attorney. Mooneyham filed suit for a declaratory judgment to establish the informal marriage. Following Knapp’s death, the litigation moved to probate court. The Appellees (Knapp’s estate and daughters) moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment, arguing there was no evidence of an agreement to marry. They pointed to Knapp’s wills and various third-party statements identifying the couple as unmarried to rebut Mooneyham’s claims. The probate court granted the summary judgment, but Mooneyham appealed, relying on her affidavit as evidence of the agreement.
Issues Decided
The primary issue decided was whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the existence of an informal marriage. Specifically, the court addressed whether a claimant’s affidavit, asserting an express agreement to be married and the existence of a shared anniversary, is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the “agreement” element of an informal marriage under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2).
Rules Applied
The court applied Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2), which requires a proponent of an informal marriage to prove that the parties (1) agreed to be married, (2) lived together in Texas as husband and wife, and (3) represented to others in Texas that they were married. Regarding the “agreement” element, the court looked to Russell v. Russell, 865 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. 1993), which establishes that an agreement to be married may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. The court further relied on Small v. McMaster, 352 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied), which holds that the testimony of one of the purported spouses is considered direct evidence of the agreement. Finally, the court applied the standard summary judgment review under Rule 166a, requiring that all evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Application
The court’s analysis focused on whether Mooneyham’s affidavit met the “more than a scintilla” threshold required to defeat a no-evidence summary judgment. Mooneyham’s affidavit was explicit; she stated that she and Knapp “agreed to be a married couple” and specifically identified an anniversary date they both recognized. The Appellees attempted to characterize these statements as “self-serving” and urged the court to disregard them based on a reading of Russell that suggested such testimony should be disbelieved in certain contexts. However, the Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation, noting that the language the Appellees relied upon was merely commentary on legislative history, not the Supreme Court’s holding. The court reasoned that in a summary judgment proceeding, the trial court cannot weigh the credibility of the affiant or decide that a witness is likely to be disbelieved at trial. Instead, the court must credit the nonmovant’s evidence. Because Mooneyham testified to a direct agreement, she provided direct evidence of the first element of informal marriage, thereby necessitating a trial on the merits.
Holding
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Mooneyham’s affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the agreement to be married. The court emphasized that the testimony of one party to the alleged marriage is sufficient direct evidence to satisfy the first prong of the Texas Family Code’s requirements for an informal marriage.
The court further held that the “self-serving” nature of a party’s affidavit does not render it incompetent summary judgment evidence. Such a characterization relates strictly to the witness’s credibility and the weight a factfinder might assign to the testimony, neither of which are appropriate considerations for a court when deciding a motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Practical Application
For family law litigators, this case highlights a significant hurdle in defending against common-law marriage claims. If a claimant is prepared to provide a detailed affidavit asserting an agreement, a “no-evidence” motion for summary judgment is unlikely to succeed on the first element. Defense counsel should focus discovery on the “holding out” (public representation) element, which is often harder for a claimant to manufacture through testimony alone, as it requires evidence of the couple’s reputation in the community. Conversely, for those representing the alleged spouse, this case confirms that your client’s own testimony is your most potent tool to survive a pre-trial challenge, provided it is specific as to the agreement and the timeframe.
Checklists
Surviving Summary Judgment on Informal Marriage
- Draft a Specific Affidavit: Ensure the client’s affidavit goes beyond “we were married.” It should state that there was a specific “agreement to be married” and, if possible, identify a date or event where that agreement was solidified.
- Identify Conduct Consistent with Agreement: Include facts regarding the shared household, joint financial responsibilities (like the joint account mentioned in Mooneyham), and shared milestone celebrations.
- Distinguish Credibility from Competency: If the opposition labels testimony “self-serving,” argue that under Mooneyham, credibility is a jury issue, not a summary judgment issue.
Defending Against a Common-Law Claim
- Attack the “Public Representation” Element: While the claimant’s testimony might satisfy the “agreement” element, it is much harder for them to personally testify away a “single” status on tax returns, employment records, or loan applications.
- Documentary Contradictions: Gather “will” signatures, “single” designations on health insurance, and social media evidence where the party represented themselves as unmarried to the public.
- Deposition Strategy: In the claimant’s deposition, pin them down on the exact words used in the “agreement.” Vague assertions of “we just felt married” may fall short of the statutory “agreement” requirement compared to the “we agreed to be a married couple” language used in Mooneyham.
Citation
Terry Mooneyham v. David F. Knapp, Lauren Kenneally, and Jennifer Berridge, No. 14-24-00243-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 3, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
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