Memorandum Opinion by Justice Yarbrough, 07-25-00146-CV, February 06, 2026.
Synopsis
The Court of Appeals affirmed a permanent injunction issued under the Texas civil stalking statute, holding that a defendant’s cessation of harassing behavior does not moot the necessity of injunctive relief. Critically, the court dismissed the challenge to a contempt order for lack of jurisdiction, reiterating that contempt is only reviewable via original proceeding and highlighting a dangerous jurisdictional trap: a transferee court in a docket-equalization transfer lacks the power to hear a related mandamus.
Relevance to Family Law
In high-conflict family law litigation, contempt is the primary sword for enforcing SAPCR and property orders, yet practitioners frequently err by attempting to include contempt challenges in a direct appeal. This case serves as a stark reminder that even when a final judgment is being appealed, a contemporaneous contempt order must be challenged by a petition for writ of mandamus (or habeas corpus if the client is confined). Furthermore, the application of the Texas civil stalking statute (CPRC Chapter 85) provides a potent alternative to the Family Code’s protective order provisions for victims of post-divorce or non-domestic harassment.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
Bharti Mishra, a former employee of Citibank, engaged in a years-long campaign of harassment against her former supervisor, Shadman Zafar. Following her termination, Mishra sent thousands of emails containing non-specific threats to Zafar and his colleagues and posted disparaging videos on YouTube in a mixture of Hindi and English. Despite a cease-and-desist letter, the conduct persisted, prompting Citibank and Zafar to seek a permanent injunction under the Texas civil stalking statute (CPRC §§ 85.001–85.006). A temporary injunction was granted, which Mishra allegedly violated, leading the trial court to find her in contempt during the same hearing in which it granted summary judgment for a permanent injunction. Mishra, proceeding pro se after her counsel withdrew, failed to appear at the final hearing despite notice from the court clerk. Following the entry of a final judgment and the denial of her motion for new trial, Mishra attempted to challenge the discovery rulings, the contempt finding, and the permanent injunction via direct appeal.
Issues Decided
The Court of Appeals addressed three primary jurisdictional and substantive issues: (1) whether a trial court retains authority to rule on discovery motions filed after the expiration of its plenary power; (2) whether an appellate court has jurisdiction to review a contempt order through a direct appeal; and (3) whether a trial court abuses its discretion by granting a permanent injunction under the civil stalking statute when the defendant claims the harassing conduct has ceased.
Rules Applied
The court relied on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b to define the limits of a trial court’s plenary power, noting that once the thirty-day window following the denial of a motion for new trial closes, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to rule on pending motions. Regarding contempt, the court applied the long-standing rule from In re Janson that contempt orders are reviewable only by writ of mandamus or habeas corpus. In the context of docket-equalization transfers, the court applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 41.3 and Texas Government Code § 22.221(b), which restricts an appellate court’s mandamus power to judges within its own geographic district. Finally, for the permanent injunction, the court applied the Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 85.001–85.006, which provides a civil cause of action for stalking.
Application
The court’s analysis began with a jurisdictional housekeeping matter, disposing of Mishra’s complaints regarding discovery and protective orders because they were filed months after the trial court’s plenary power had expired. Moving to the contempt order, the court engaged in a dual-layered jurisdictional analysis. First, it held that a direct appeal is never the proper vehicle for reviewing contempt. Second, it addressed a nuance of Texas appellate procedure: because this case was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) to the Seventh Court of Appeals (Amarillo) for docket equalization, the Amarillo court lacked the statutory authority to even treat the appeal as a mandamus petition. Under Government Code § 22.221(b), only the court with geographic jurisdiction over the trial judge can issue a writ of mandamus.
Regarding the permanent injunction, the court rejected Mishra’s argument that her recent lack of contact with the appellees rendered the injunction unnecessary. The court found that the history of thousands of harassing emails and videos provided substantial and probative evidence to support the trial court’s exercise of discretion. The court emphasized that a defendant’s self-serving statement that they have stopped harassing the plaintiff does not strip the trial court of the power to ensure that cessation becomes permanent through an injunction.
Holding
The Court of Appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the contempt order. Because the challenge was brought as a direct appeal rather than an original proceeding, it was dismissed. Furthermore, the court noted that even if it were to consider the challenge, as a transferee court, it lacked the power to issue a writ of mandamus against a Tarrant County judge.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the permanent injunction. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the evidence of past harassment justified a permanent injunction under the Texas civil stalking statute, regardless of the appellant’s claims of recent compliance.
The Court of Appeals overruled the challenges to the discovery orders. It held that the trial court’s failure to rule on motions filed after its plenary power expired was not error, as the court lacked the legal authority to act on those motions.
Practical Application
For the Family Law practitioner, this case highlights the “Transfer Trap.” When the Supreme Court transfers a case from a busy metro court (like Fort Worth or Dallas) to a more rural appellate court, that transferee court handles the appeal, but it cannot handle a mandamus. If you need to challenge a contempt order or a temporary order in a transferred case, you must file your original proceeding in the origin court, not the one currently holding the appellate file. Additionally, when seeking to enjoin a harasser in a divorce or custody battle, look beyond the Family Code. CPRC Chapter 85 allows for the recovery of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, and as Mishra demonstrates, it is a robust tool that survives a defendant’s “I’ve changed” defense.
Checklists
Navigating the Contempt Challenge
- Identify the Remedy
- File a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus if the client is in jail.
- File a Petition for Writ of Mandamus if the client is not confined (e.g., a fine or a suspended commitment).
- Verify Geographic Jurisdiction
- In a transferred appeal, identify the “Origin Court” (the court covering the county where the trial judge sits).
- Ensure the Mandamus is filed in the Origin Court, not the Transferee Court.
- Preserve the Record
- Ensure the contempt order is signed and includes the specific findings of the underlying acts.
Civil Stalking Injunctions (CPRC Ch. 85)
- Establish the Elements
- Prove the defendant on more than one occasion engaged in conduct that constitutes the offense of stalking under Penal Code 42.072.
- Show the defendant violated a previous court order or cease-and-desist.
- Defeat the “Mootness” Defense
- Document the volume and frequency of past behavior.
- Argue that cessation of conduct after the lawsuit was filed is a tactical delay, not a permanent change.
- Request Ancillary Relief
- Seek attorney’s fees under Section 85.002.
- Evaluate the availability of exemplary damages.
Citation
Mishra v. Citibank, N.A. and Shadman Zafar, No. 07-25-00146-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 6, 2026, no pet. h.).
Full Opinion
Family Law Crossover
The Texas civil stalking statute is an underutilized weapon in the family law arsenal. While Chapter 71 Protective Orders are the standard for domestic violence, they often expire or have strict relationship requirements. CPRC Chapter 85 offers a permanent solution that can be weaponized in a final decree or a separate civil suit against a former spouse or a “paramour” who is harassing the client. Because Mishra confirms that a trial court can issue these injunctions even if the harasser claims to have stopped, litigators can use this to secure long-term protection for clients in “scorched earth” custody cases where the harassment is digital or stalking-based rather than physical. Moreover, the reminder on plenary power is critical: if you discover an error in the final decree, the clock starts at the denial of the Motion for New Trial. Once that 30-day window closes, the trial court is powerless to “fix” discovery or protective order issues, necessitating a bill of review or a complex appeal.
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