K. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, 03-25-00823-CV, February 25, 2026.
On appeal from the 33rd District Court of Llano County.
Synopsis
The Third Court of Appeals rejected an Anders brief in a parental rights case, finding that an indefinite permanent injunction prohibiting all contact between a mother and child presents an arguable ground for appeal. Under recent Supreme Court precedent, such restrictive orders require clear-and-convincing evidence, mandating the appointment of new appellate counsel to brief the issue rather than dismissing the appeal as frivolous.
Relevance to Family Law
This decision signals a heightened level of appellate scrutiny for “no-contact” orders and permanent injunctions issued within the context of SAPCR and termination litigation. For practitioners, it emphasizes that any order effectively severing the parent-child bond—even if falling short of formal termination—must meet the clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard if it lacks a definite duration. This affects not only Department cases but also high-conflict custody and enforcement actions where permanent injunctions are sought as a remedy for parental misconduct or safety concerns.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
The case originated from a suit filed by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services to terminate the parental rights of K.F. (Mother) to her child, A.E. Following a final hearing, the trial court signed an order that denied Mother conservatorship, possession, and access rights. Crucially, the order also permanently enjoined Mother from having any contact with the child. This injunction was indefinite, containing no specified end date or conditions for dissolution. Mother’s court-appointed counsel filed a motion to withdraw supported by an Anders brief, asserting that the appeal was wholly frivolous and without merit. The Department filed a response stating its intention not to file an appellate brief.
Issues Decided
The central issue was whether an indefinite permanent injunction prohibiting all contact between a parent and child constitutes an arguable ground for appeal, thereby precluding the use of the Anders procedure and requiring the appointment of new counsel to brief the merits.
Rules Applied
The court applied the Anders v. California framework, which requires an independent record review to ensure an indigent appellant’s rights are protected. In the context of parental rights, the court looked to In re P.M. (Tex. 2016), which approves Anders procedures for indigent parents. Most significantly, the court relied upon the recent holding in Stary v. Ethridge (Tex. 2025). Stary establishes that “lengthy protective orders” or injunctions banning all communication for more than two years are functionally similar to the government’s termination of parental rights. Consequently, due process demands that such orders be supported by clear-and-convincing evidence and a specific evaluation of whether a total prohibition of contact is in the child’s best interest.
Application
In conducting its independent review of the record, the Third Court of Appeals looked beyond the assertions in the Anders brief to evaluate the legal sufficiency and constitutional implications of the trial court’s permanent injunction. The court noted that because the injunction contained no end date, it appeared to protect the child from Mother indefinitely. Following the logic of Stary, the court reasoned that such an extreme restriction on the parent-child relationship cannot be treated as a routine ancillary order. Because the injunction effectively operated as a lifetime ban on contact, it required a clear-and-convincing evidentiary foundation. Since the Anders brief failed to address whether the record met this heightened standard or whether the total prohibition was the least restrictive means to serve the child’s best interest, the court determined the appeal was not wholly frivolous.
Holding
The court held that the propriety of an indefinite no-contact order presents an arguable ground for appeal under Stary v. Ethridge. An Anders brief is inappropriate when the record contains a permanent injunction that restricts parental rights without a definite end date and without clear evidence justifying such a broad restriction under the clear-and-convincing standard.
The court granted the current counsel’s motion to withdraw but abated the appeal, remanding the case to the trial court for the appointment of new appellate counsel. This new counsel is tasked with addressing the propriety of the permanent injunction and any other arguable issues identified in the record.
Practical Application
Trial counsel must be wary of “boilerplate” injunctions in final orders. If you are representing a party seeking an indefinite no-contact order, you must ensure the record contains clear-and-convincing evidence to support it, as if you were litigating a termination. Conversely, if you represent the parent being enjoined, the absence of an end date or the lack of specific “best interest” findings regarding the total prohibition of contact provides a powerful hook for appellate reversal. The Stary standard effectively moves the goalposts for long-term protective orders and permanent injunctions in family law, treating them with the same constitutional gravity as the “death penalty” of parental rights.
Checklists
Challenging Indefinite Injunctions
- Review the final order for the absence of a “sunset” provision or specific end date for no-contact provisions.
- Analyze whether the trial court applied the “clear-and-convincing” standard rather than “preponderance of the evidence” in its findings.
- Determine if the record contains specific evidence showing that a total prohibition of contact—rather than supervised or restricted contact—is the least restrictive means to protect the child’s best interest.
- Object to the lack of specific findings of fact regarding the necessity and duration of the injunction during the final hearing or in post-judgment motions.
Defending Restrictive Orders on Appeal
- Ensure the trial court’s findings of fact explicitly reference the “clear-and-convincing” standard of proof for any injunction exceeding two years or having no end date.
- Document the specific harm that necessitates an indefinite duration, linking it directly to the child’s ongoing safety and welfare.
- Be prepared to argue why less restrictive alternatives (e.g., supervised visitation, therapeutic transition, or electronic-only contact) were considered and found insufficient.
- Avoid the Anders trap: if a permanent injunction is involved, treat the appeal as a merit-based challenge from the outset to avoid the delay of abatement and remand.
Citation
K. F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, No. 03-25-00823-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 25, 2026, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
The full opinion can be found here: Full Opinion Link
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