Hill v. State, 10-24-00276-CR, March 12, 2026.
On appeal from the 369th District Court of Leon County, Texas.
Synopsis
The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a motion to recuse in a high-stakes sex-offense prosecution, holding that (1) a judge’s response to counsel’s request for “what deal will you take,” and (2) routine courtroom administration (including removing a disruptive spectator) did not establish bias or partiality under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b. The court also treated an ex parte text seeking a status update as a scheduling communication—not evidence of prejudgment or inability to be impartial—reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard.
Relevance to Family Law
Family-law litigators routinely confront recusal/disqualification disputes in SAPCRs, divorces involving protective orders, and cases with parallel criminal allegations. Hill supplies a practical appellate roadmap for what will—and will not—constitute “personal bias” or an “impartiality [that] might reasonably be questioned” under Rule 18b in judge-shopping environments. The opinion is especially useful where one side attempts to bootstrap (1) the judge’s hard line on settlement terms, (2) enforcement of courtroom decorum against a party’s supporters, or (3) a questionable communication into a recusal narrative.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
Milton Coster Hill faced ten felony counts alleging sexual abuse offenses against two children. After trial, he was convicted on seven counts and acquitted on three; the court imposed stacked sentences including a 45-year term on continuous sexual abuse, plus additional prison terms and fines.
Before trial, Hill moved to recuse the trial judge (Judge Davis). The motion centered on two incidents.
First, Hill’s wife attended an unrelated criminal trial in Judge Davis’s courtroom. Judge Davis enforced a courtroom policy prohibiting note-taking and banned her from the proceedings after she violated the policy. The recusal record reflected that Judge Davis referred to her as “the woman taking notes,” and there was no showing he knew she was affiliated with Hill or any pending matter when the removal occurred.
Second, shortly before Hill’s trial setting, the parties conducted plea negotiations by conference call with Judge Davis. The State and defense presented proposed plea agreements; Judge Davis indicated he would not accept two successive proposals. Defense counsel then asked what terms Judge Davis would accept, and Judge Davis provided plea parameters he would be comfortable with (the parties agreed that the terms included ten years’ imprisonment followed by ten years’ deferred adjudication). Later that day, Judge Davis sent an ex parte text message to the District Attorney asking whether an agreement had been reached. The DA responded that no agreement was reached and disclosed the communication to defense counsel.
The presiding judge on the recusal motion (Judge Charles, Presiding Judge of the Tenth Administrative Judicial Region) held an evidentiary hearing and denied recusal, characterizing the ex parte text as a scheduling/status inquiry and viewing the plea discussion as counsel-invited guidance on accept/reject parameters—conduct that was “not advisable,” but not recusal-worthy.
Issues Decided
- Whether the presiding judge abused his discretion by denying recusal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(b)(1) and (2) based on:
- the trial judge’s involvement in plea negotiations (including stating acceptable plea terms when asked);
- the trial judge’s removal/banning of the defendant’s spouse from an unrelated proceeding for courtroom policy violations; and
- an ex parte text message to the prosecutor requesting a status update on whether a plea agreement had been reached.
Rules Applied
- Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(b)(1)–(2) (recusal required when a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned or the judge has personal bias/prejudice concerning a party or subject matter).
- Recusal rules apply in criminal cases: Gaal v. State, 332 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
- Standard of review: denial of a motion to recuse is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 455.
- Courtroom administration: ordinary courtroom-administration efforts generally do not support recusal. Gaal, 332 S.W.3d at 454.
- Plea agreements:
- A trial judge has discretion to reject a particular plea agreement or all plea agreements. Rhodes v. State, 357 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
- Rejection of plea terms, without more, is generally not evidence of bias. See Free v. State, No. 08-11-00024-CR, 2012 WL 651638 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
- Caution on plea participation: trial judges should avoid appearance of coercion or prejudgment in plea discussions, but participation does not automatically equate to disqualifying bias. See Perkins v. Court of Appeals for Third Supreme Judicial Dist., 738 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
Application
The appellate court framed the question the way family-law appellate courts often do: not whether the judge’s conduct was ideal, but whether the presiding judge’s decision to deny recusal fell outside the “zone of reasonable disagreement” under abuse-of-discretion review.
On the spectator-removal incident, the court treated the ban as routine courtroom control. The critical evidentiary gap was causation and knowledge: nothing in the record showed Judge Davis knew the spectator was Hill’s spouse or tied to any pending case when he enforced the no-note-taking policy. Without that link, the incident looked like neutral administration, not personal animus—exactly the type of fact pattern appellate courts refuse to convert into recusal.
On the plea negotiations, the court emphasized context and “who invited what.” Judge Davis did not spontaneously dictate terms; he rejected two proposals, and only after defense counsel pressed—“what terms will you accept?”—did he provide acceptable parameters. The court analogized this to Gaal and Free: advising whether the court will accept or reject a plea bargain is not the same thing as announcing how the court would punish after a contested hearing. The court also noted the severity and quantity of allegations (ten felonies; one offense with a minimum of 25 years without parole), making the judge’s reluctance to accept lenient terms less indicative of bias and more indicative of an assessment of the case posture and statutory ranges.
Finally, the ex parte text was treated as a limited status inquiry tied to scheduling/setting management. The court credited the presiding judge’s characterization that the text did not reflect prejudgment, substantive coordination, or favoritism—particularly where the prosecutor disclosed it promptly. For recusal purposes, the opinion signals that not every one-off, arguably improper communication morphs into “impartiality reasonably questioned” absent evidence of substance, strategizing, or one-sided advantage.
Holding
The court held that the denial of Hill’s motion to recuse was not an abuse of discretion. Under Rule 18b, a judge’s statement of acceptable plea terms—when prompted by counsel in the course of determining whether the court would accept or reject a plea—and the court’s routine enforcement of courtroom policies (including removing a spectator for violations) did not establish personal bias or partiality requiring recusal.
The court further held that the ex parte text requesting a status update on whether a plea agreement had been reached did not, on this record, demonstrate partiality or inability to remain fair and impartial, and thus did not require recusal.
Practical Application
In family cases, recusal fights often arise at precisely the same friction points as in Hill: settlement posture, courtroom-control decisions involving family members, and informal communications with court staff or one side. The strategic lesson is that Rule 18b arguments win (or fail) on disciplined record-building—showing that the complained-of act was tethered to the party, not merely to docket control or courtroom rules.
For SAPCRs and protective orders, Hill is particularly helpful when opposing counsel tries to repackage the judge’s settlement “guardrails” as bias—e.g., “the court said it won’t sign an agreed order unless it includes X” (supervised visitation, no overnights, counseling, alcohol restrictions, firearm surrender language, etc.). Appellate courts routinely distinguish between a judge (1) managing what orders they will approve as “best interest” compliant and legally enforceable, versus (2) prejudging disputed facts after evidence.
The opinion is equally useful when your client’s supporters become part of the recusal narrative. If the judge removes a party’s parent/new spouse/friend from the courtroom for outbursts, recording, gestures, note-passing, or harassment in the hallway, Hill supports the position that enforcement measures—without proof of targeted animus or unequal enforcement—are administration, not disqualifying bias.
And on communications: family lawyers see ex parte problems more often than we would like (texts about “are y’all settling,” staff emails about settings, informal coordinator outreach). Hill suggests that “status-only” communications, especially when disclosed and not substantive, are less likely to carry a recusal appeal—though they can still create avoidable risk and should be handled with immediate disclosure and a clean record.
Checklists
Building a Record That Supports Recusal (When You Need It)
- Tie the judge’s conduct to knowledge of the party/relationship (who knew what, and when).
- Elicit specific statements showing prejudgment (not “tone,” not “vibes”—verbatim or near-verbatim).
- Prove unequal treatment compared to similarly situated parties/supporters.
- Establish the substance and consequence of any ex parte contact (what was said, what changed afterward).
- Preserve error with a clear Rule 18a/18b-compliant motion, verified where required, and obtain a ruling on the record.
- Request findings or make a record of the presiding judge’s rationale at the recusal hearing.
Defending Against Recusal in SAPCRs / Divorce (Using Hill)
- Frame the complained-of conduct as courtroom administration (decorum, safety, no-contact directives, recording prohibitions).
- Emphasize lack of knowledge/connection at the time of the incident (e.g., spectator treated as any other spectator).
- Characterize settlement comments as accept/reject parameters, not adjudicative factfinding.
- Highlight that any “hard line” is case-driven (statutory ranges; child-safety facts; history of violence; prior orders).
- If an ex parte contact occurred, ensure prompt disclosure, confirm it was status/scheduling only, and invite the court to memorialize that on the record.
- Argue the proper lens: abuse of discretion and “zone of reasonable disagreement.”
Safe Practices for Judges’ Settlement/Agreement Discussions (For Lawyers Advising the Court Process)
- Keep settlement discussions on the record when possible, or in a documented conference with both sides present.
- Avoid asking the judge, “What terms will you accept?” unless you are prepared for that answer to be used as a weapon.
- If the court is asked about acceptability, confine it to: “will/won’t accept this agreement,” not “here’s what I think happened.”
- Treat any off-channel communication (text/email) as discoverable: disclose immediately and confirm no substantive content.
Citation
Hill v. State, No. 10-24-00276-CR (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 12, 2026) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
Family Law Crossover
Although Hill is a criminal appeal, it can be weaponized—both offensively and defensively—in family litigation where one side wants a new judge (or wants to keep the current one). Offensively, a movant in a SAPCR or protective order will cite the general propositions in Rule 18b (“impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” “personal bias”), then argue that the judge’s settlement posture, credibility commentary during temporary orders, or friction with a party’s new partner mirrors “prejudgment.” Hill helps the respondent reframe: the appellate court drew hard boundaries between (1) administration of proceedings, (2) acceptable gatekeeping of agreed orders, and (3) true bias.
Defensively, when you anticipate a recusal attempt after the court (a) rejects an agreed parenting plan, (b) signals it will not sign a no-supervision agreement in a case with violence/abuse allegations, or (c) removes a disruptive family member from the courtroom, Hill is strong authority for the proposition that these are not, without more, evidence of personal bias. The practice pointer is to build the record contemporaneously: articulate neutral reasons (policy, safety, statutory best-interest constraints, docket control), avoid personalized commentary, and ensure any questionable communications are disclosed and characterized accurately as non-substantive. That record posture is exactly what allowed the State to survive the recusal attack in Hill—and it is what will protect a temporary-orders judge in the next high-conflict custody fight.
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