Amarillo Court Affirms Schooling and Counseling Provisions in SAPCR Modification

In the Interest of C.G.H. and C.H.H., Children, 07-25-00255-CV, April 23, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 of Randall County, Texas

Synopsis

The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR modification requiring the children to attend public school rather than private school or homeschooling and upholding counseling provisions tied to conservatorship management. The court held that, under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the record contained sufficient evidence of material and substantial change and of best interest, and it refused to revisit the trial court’s resolution of competing testimony about academic delay, school quality, and co-parenting concerns.

Relevance to Family Law

This is a useful modification case for Texas family-law litigators handling disputes over educational decision-making, school choice, and therapeutic conditions in conservatorship orders. It reinforces three recurring points in custody litigation: first, educational placement disputes are best-interest questions reviewed with heavy deference to the trial court; second, evidence of academic underperformance, institutional concerns, and parental interference can support targeted modifications without changing primary residence; and third, constitutional complaints about educational autonomy must be preserved in the trial court or they are lost on appeal. For practitioners in divorce and post-divorce custody litigation, the case is a reminder that a narrowly tailored modification on schooling or counseling may be easier to defend than a broader attempt to rework the entire conservatorship structure.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The parents were divorced in 2017 and appointed joint managing conservators, with the mother retaining the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence. In 2023, the father filed to modify the parent-child relationship, seeking, among other things, changes relating to residence and educational decision-making. By the time of the final hearing in spring 2025, the children were in second grade and attending Accelerate Christian School.

After a bench trial, the trial court left the mother’s primary-residence right intact but entered a modification order addressing education and counseling. On schooling, the order required that the children finish the current school year where they were enrolled, but thereafter attend public school and not be homeschooled. The order also included a restriction that the children could not attend a school employing a registered sex offender, permitted the father to attend lunch at school, and required each parent to notify the other of school events. On counseling, the order required the children to begin counseling with the Jennings Group until discharged by the counselor, with costs split equally, and separately required the mother to attend counseling with an LPC until discharge.

The appellate record, as summarized by the court, included testimony from the father that the children’s school was not accredited by the State of Texas, that its teachers were not state-certified, and that the children were not progressing academically as expected. A Kumon assessment reportedly showed the children performing roughly a year and a half behind, at a beginning-kindergarten level during the middle of first grade. The father also expressed concern about how the school handled sexual misconduct by teachers and testified that the school was not forthcoming with him and treated him differently because he was not a member of the affiliated church. The mother and the school’s principal offered testimony favorable to the school. The trial court ultimately found that the children’s minimal educational needs were not being met and that they were likely substantially behind similarly aged peers.

As to counseling, the opinion indicates the trial court heard evidence that the mother engaged in manipulative conduct, interfered with the children’s ability to maintain a positive relationship with the father and his family, and made unfounded allegations about inappropriate behavior by the father. The opinion excerpt cuts off before the court’s full discussion concludes, but the court’s affirmance makes clear it regarded the record as sufficient to support the counseling-related provisions as conservatorship terms.

Issues Decided

The Amarillo court addressed the following issues:

• Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that the children attend public school rather than remain in their private school or be homeschooled.
• Whether the evidence was legally or factually sufficient, within the abuse-of-discretion framework, to support the educational modification.
• Whether the mother preserved her constitutional complaints that the schooling order violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
• Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the mother to attend counseling.
• Whether the counseling provisions were supported by sufficient evidence and authorized under the Family Code.

Rules Applied

The court applied the familiar modification framework under Texas Family Code section 156.101(a)(1): a trial court may modify conservatorship-related terms if modification is in the child’s best interest and the circumstances of the child, a conservator, or another affected party have materially and substantially changed since rendition of the prior order.

The court also relied on these settled appellate principles:

• Best interest is the primary consideration in conservatorship determinations. TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.002(a).
• Modification orders involving conservatorship and related terms are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
• In that posture, legal and factual sufficiency are not independent appellate grounds but are relevant to whether the trial court had sufficient information to exercise discretion and whether it then reasonably applied that discretion. See In re A.M., 604 S.W.3d 192, 196–97 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2020, pet. denied).
• Trial courts receive substantial deference because they observe the witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and determine credibility.
• Constitutional complaints, including parental-rights objections, must be preserved in the trial court under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. See also Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1993); In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. 2003).
• Texas Family Code section 153.010 expressly permits counseling orders in conservatorship cases when the court finds a history of conflict in resolving conservatorship, possession, or access issues.

Application

The court’s educational analysis is a straightforward example of how deferential abuse-of-discretion review can be outcome-determinative in modification appeals. The mother framed her challenge in sufficiency terms, but the court recast the question correctly: whether the trial court had enough evidence to act and whether its decision fell within the zone of reasonable discretion. On that record, the Amarillo court had little difficulty concluding the evidentiary threshold was met.

What mattered most was not that the evidence was one-sided, because it was not. The mother and the principal offered testimony supporting the existing school. But the father presented concrete concerns that the trial court was entitled to credit: lack of accreditation, lack of certified teachers, evidence of serious academic lag, and concerns about institutional transparency and student safety. The Kumon assessment was especially important because it translated generalized dissatisfaction into measurable educational concern. Once the trial court found that the children’s minimal educational needs were not being met and that they were likely substantially behind their peers, the appellate court treated the public-school requirement as a discretionary best-interest call well within the trial court’s authority.

Equally significant is what the court did not do. It did not independently compare public school to private religious education as an abstract policy matter, and it did not treat the case as presenting a broad parental-autonomy question. Instead, it analyzed the actual evidentiary record about these children, this school, and this co-parenting dynamic. That is exactly how modification cases are won and lost in Texas trial courts.

The constitutional arguments failed for a more procedural reason. The mother argued on appeal that the order interfered with her right to direct the children’s upbringing and education under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held those complaints were waived because she did not preserve them in the trial court. For appellate practitioners, that is the quiet but important part of the opinion: even potentially weighty parental-rights arguments do nothing on appeal if they were not timely presented below.

On counseling, the court again deferred to the trial court’s management of conservatorship conditions. The record included evidence of manipulative behavior, interference with the father-child relationship, and unfounded accusations. That evidence supported the trial court’s apparent view that therapeutic intervention was warranted to address conflict affecting the children and the parties’ ability to co-parent. Given Family Code section 153.010 and the low appellate tolerance for second-guessing trial-level conservatorship management, the counseling provisions survived review.

Holding

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the prior order to require public-school enrollment. The record contained sufficient evidence that the children’s educational needs were not being adequately met in their then-current setting and that public school was in their best interest. The appellate court emphasized that conflicting testimony did not justify reversal because credibility and weight determinations belonged to the trial court.

The court further held that the mother waived her constitutional challenges to the schooling provision by failing to preserve them in the trial court. Her appellate briefing did not identify a timely request, motion, or objection raising those constitutional complaints, and the court’s own review of the record revealed none.

The court also held that the counseling provisions, including the requirement that the mother attend counseling, did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The record reflected evidence of conflict, manipulation, and interference with the father-child relationship sufficient to support therapeutic conditions under the Family Code and the trial court’s broad authority to structure conservatorship-related relief in the children’s best interest.

Practical Application

For practitioners, this opinion is most valuable as a record-building case. If you are seeking a schooling modification, do not argue educational philosophy in the abstract. Build the case around performance data, credentialing issues, attendance and progress records, institutional practices, and child-specific welfare concerns. The prevailing parent here appears to have done exactly that: he presented evidence that gave the trial court a concrete, fact-bound reason to conclude the current arrangement was not working.

The case also underscores that not every successful modification requires a change in primary residence. The trial court left the mother’s right to designate residence in place while carving out a narrower but consequential educational directive. In many close cases, that kind of tailored relief may be more realistic, more defensible, and more likely to survive appeal than an all-or-nothing conservatorship overhaul.

On counseling, the lesson is that therapeutic relief should be tied to evidence of co-parenting dysfunction affecting the children, not merely to generalized acrimony. A record showing manipulation, relationship interference, false accusations, or inability to resolve parenting issues can support counseling provisions under section 153.010 and related conservatorship authority.

Finally, this opinion is a preservation warning. If your client intends to assert a parental-rights, free exercise, due process, or other constitutional objection to an educational or counseling provision, raise it clearly in the trial court, obtain a ruling, and ensure the issue is unmistakably preserved in the record. Otherwise, the argument is likely gone.

Checklists

Building a Schooling-Modification Record

• Plead both material-and-substantial change and best interest with factual specificity.
• Obtain objective academic data, including testing, benchmark results, tutoring assessments, report cards, and attendance records.
• Develop evidence comparing the child’s actual performance to age-level expectations.
• Investigate the school’s accreditation status, teacher qualifications, disciplinary practices, and safety procedures.
• Present evidence showing how the current educational arrangement affects the particular child, not just generalized criticism of private schooling or homeschooling.
• Use witnesses who can translate educational concerns into practical consequences for the child’s development.
• Request findings of fact and conclusions of law to lock in the trial court’s rationale.

Defending Against a Schooling Challenge

• Present concrete evidence of the child’s progress, not conclusory statements that the program is “working.”
• Be prepared to rebut assessments suggesting academic delay with records, expert interpretation, or competing testing.
• Address accreditation and teacher-qualification concerns directly rather than minimizing them.
• Demonstrate structure, curriculum, progress monitoring, and remediation plans.
• Show parental cooperation and transparency with the other conservator regarding school access, records, and events.
• If religious or constitutional concerns are implicated, preserve them expressly and obtain rulings.

Seeking Counseling Provisions

• Tie the requested counseling to identifiable co-parenting conflict affecting conservatorship, possession, or access.
• Develop testimony showing manipulation, gatekeeping, alienating behavior, false allegations, or chronic inability to resolve parenting disputes.
• Cite Family Code section 153.010 when seeking counseling for a parent or family unit.
• Ask for practical terms in the order, including provider, cost allocation, duration, discharge standard, and commencement deadline.
• Frame counseling as a child-centered remedy rather than a punitive measure against the other parent.

Avoiding Preservation Problems on Appeal

• Make constitutional objections expressly, on the record, and with sufficient specificity.
• Obtain a ruling or refusal to rule from the trial court.
• Reurge important objections if the final form of the order changes the relief.
• Ensure the reporter’s record reflects the objection and argument.
• Include preservation references in post-trial motions where appropriate, but do not rely on post-judgment briefing alone if an earlier objection was required.
• When appealing, cite the precise place in the record where each complaint was preserved.

Drafting Orders Likely to Survive Review

• Narrowly tailor the relief to the problem proved at trial.
• Define educational rights and obligations with precision.
• Include operational details such as enrollment responsibility, attendance duties, event notification, and access rights.
• For counseling, specify provider or selection process, payment allocation, and termination standard.
• Avoid vague “best efforts” language where a clear directive is possible.
• Request findings supporting both changed circumstances and best interest.

Citation

In the Interest of C.G.H. and C.H.H., Children, No. 07-25-00255-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS ___ (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 23, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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