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Fort Worth Court Affirms Termination When Father Challenged Only One Predicate Ground and Failed to Preserve Due-Process Complaint

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of A.M., a Child, 02-25-00694-CV, April 23, 2026.

On appeal from 467th District Court of Denton County

Synopsis

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination because Father attacked only one of three predicate grounds under Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1) and did not challenge best interest. That omission was fatal. The court also rejected Father’s due-process complaint because he did not preserve it in the trial court and then compounded the problem with inadequate appellate briefing unsupported by authority or record citations.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a parental-rights termination case, its appellate lessons apply across Texas family litigation, including divorce, SAPCR modification, conservatorship disputes, and even property appeals. The opinion reinforces two recurring realities for family lawyers: first, an appellant must attack every independent ground that supports the judgment or risk automatic affirmance; second, complaints about procedural unfairness, defective plans, deadlines, notice, or due process generally must be preserved in the trial court and then fully briefed on appeal. In practice, that means issue selection in family cases cannot be casual—whether the judgment concerns termination, managing conservatorship, relocation, enforcement, or a disproportionate division, any unchallenged independent basis may carry the decree.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The Department filed its petition to terminate Father’s parental rights in September 2024. At that time, Father was identified as the presumed or alleged father, and paternity testing later confirmed he was the biological father in February 2025. After a bench trial, the trial court terminated Father’s rights under three separate predicate grounds—Section 161.001(b)(1)(B), (C), and (N)—and also found that termination was in the child’s best interest.

The procedural backdrop mattered. The trial court extended the dismissal deadline under Family Code Section 263.401(b), and the record reflected that Father had been incarcerated since January 1, 2025, for probation violations. He was appointed counsel in September 2025, and the extension was tied in part to counsel’s need for adequate time to communicate with Father, prepare, and secure his appearance. On appeal, Father raised only two issues: he challenged the constructive-abandonment finding under Subsection (N), and he asserted that the Department violated statutory guidelines and deadlines in a manner that allegedly impaired his participation and violated due process. He did not challenge the independent predicate findings under Subsections (B) and (C), and he did not challenge best interest.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court relied on a straightforward but unforgiving set of appellate rules and termination principles:

Application

The court’s analysis was brief, but it delivered several sharp reminders for appellate practitioners. Father’s first issue targeted only the trial court’s constructive-abandonment finding under Subsection (N). That was strategically insufficient from the outset because the termination order also rested on Subsections (B) and (C), and Father did not attack either of those findings. He likewise left the best-interest finding untouched. Once those independent bases for affirmance remained in place, the court explained that it had no practical path to reversal. Under settled law, one unchallenged predicate ground plus an unchallenged best-interest finding is enough to sustain the judgment.

The court also noted that even Father’s challenge to Subsection (N) was itself inadequately briefed. Beyond reciting the standard of review, he did not meaningfully engage the record or relevant authority. That observation was not the primary reason for affirmance—the unchallenged grounds were enough—but it underscored how a weakly developed issue gives the court an additional waiver basis.

On the due-process issue, Father appeared to argue that the service plan was imposed prematurely because it was created while he was still only an alleged father rather than after adjudication of paternity. The court did not reach the merits of that theory because it found no preservation. Father had not objected in the trial court to the service plan or to his parentage-related procedural posture. That omission triggered Rule 33.1. The court then found a second waiver layer on appeal: Father cited no authority supporting the proposition that the complained-of service-plan timing amounted to a due-process violation. In other words, even if a colorable issue existed, it was lost both below and on appeal.

Holding

The court held that Father could not obtain reversal by challenging only the Subsection (N) constructive-abandonment finding when the termination order also rested on independent predicate findings under Subsections (B) and (C), neither of which he challenged. Because Father also did not challenge best interest, the unchallenged findings were sufficient to support affirmance of the termination order.

The court separately held that Father’s complaint that the Department violated statutory guidelines and due process was not preserved for appellate review because he did not object in the trial court. The court further held that the issue was waived on appeal due to inadequate briefing, including the absence of supporting authority and meaningful substantive analysis.

Practical Application

For appellate counsel handling termination cases, this opinion is a clean example of why issue-framing must begin with the judgment, not with the most interesting legal argument. Before drafting the brief, counsel should map every independent basis supporting the order: each predicate ground, best interest, and any ancillary findings with preclusive effect. If any one of those grounds can independently sustain the judgment, it must be challenged or affirmance becomes highly likely.

Trial lawyers should read the due-process portion just as carefully. Complaints about service plans, paternity posture, statutory deadlines, appointment timing, participation barriers caused by incarceration, notice defects, or Department noncompliance should be raised contemporaneously and clearly in the trial court. Family cases routinely involve compressed timelines and evolving parentage statuses, but appellate courts will still require preservation. General unfairness arguments made for the first time on appeal rarely survive.

This extends beyond termination practice. In divorce and SAPCR appeals, similar pitfalls arise when a party challenges only one reimbursement theory but not alternative property characterizations, attacks one best-interest rationale but not another conservatorship basis, or complains about due process without a trial-level objection to notice, continuance denial, evidentiary limits, or procedure. The broader lesson is familiar but worth repeating: challenge every independent support for the judgment, preserve every procedural complaint when it arises, and brief every issue with authority and record support.

Checklists

Appellate Issue-Selection Checklist

Preservation Checklist for Due-Process and Procedure Complaints

Appellate Briefing Checklist

Trial-Counsel Checklist in Termination Cases

Cross-Application Checklist for Divorce and SAPCR Appeals

Citation

In the Interest of A.M., a Child, No. 02-25-00694-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 23, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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