In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child, 13-25-00635-CV, May 07, 2026.
On appeal from County Court at Law No. 5 of Nueces County, Texas
Synopsis
The Thirteenth Court held that the 2025 amendment to Texas Family Code § 161.001 applies to SAPCR termination cases that were still pending on September 1, 2025, even if they were filed earlier. Because this case remained pending when the amendment took effect, the trial court correctly applied the amended version of subsection (O), and the termination judgment was affirmed.
Relevance to Family Law
Although this appeal arose in a parental-rights termination case, its significance reaches well beyond CPS litigation. For Texas family law litigators handling divorce, conservatorship, modification, enforcement, relocation, and property-related proceedings within a SAPCR framework, the opinion is a reminder that statutory amendments with express applicability clauses can govern pending cases, not just newly filed ones. That matters strategically: when a family case spans a legislative effective date, counsel must reevaluate pleadings, jury charges, trial themes, motion practice, and preservation based on the statute actually in force at the time of trial rather than the version in effect when suit was filed. In practical terms, this is a transition-rule case, and transition rules regularly affect family litigation involving conservatorship standards, procedural rights, evidentiary burdens, and remedial options.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
Mother appealed a judgment terminating her parental rights to A.R.B. The trial court terminated under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O), and also found that termination was in the child’s best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). On appeal, Mother did not challenge legal or factual sufficiency as to the endangerment findings, the substance-abuse-related finding, or best interest. Her sole complaint was narrower: she argued the trial court applied the wrong version of § 161.001(b)(1)(O).
That argument arose because the case was filed in 2023, but the Legislature amended § 161.001 in 2025. Before the amendment, subsection (O) addressed failure to comply with a court-ordered family service plan. The 2025 amendment deleted that former ground and renumbered subsequent provisions, with subsection (O) then becoming the former subsection (P), concerning controlled-substance use that endangered the child coupled with failure to complete treatment or continued abuse after treatment. Mother argued that because the case began before the amendment, the former version of subsection (O) should have governed. But the case was still pending when the amendment took effect on September 1, 2025, and trial occurred in October 2025.
Issues Decided
- Whether the 2025 amendment to Texas Family Code § 161.001 applies to a termination suit filed before September 1, 2025, but still pending on that date.
- Whether the trial court correctly relied on the amended version of § 161.001(b)(1)(O) in terminating Mother’s parental rights.
- Whether Mother was entitled to reversal of the subsection (O) finding based on her argument that the former statute should have applied.
Rules Applied
The court’s analysis turned primarily on the Legislature’s express transition language in the 2025 amendment to Texas Family Code § 161.001. The opinion explains that the Act provides that the change in law applies to a suit affecting the parent-child relationship pending in a trial court on the Act’s effective date, September 1, 2025, as well as suits filed on or after that date.
The court also described the substance of the statutory change:
- Former § 161.001(b)(1)(O) allowed termination based on a parent’s failure to comply with a court-ordered service plan that specifically established actions necessary to obtain the child’s return.
- The 2025 amendment repealed that former subsection (O).
- After renumbering, subsection (O) now corresponds to former subsection (P), addressing controlled-substance use that endangered the child together with failure to complete treatment or continued abuse after treatment.
In support of its reading of the amendment’s temporal reach, the court cited recent memorandum opinions from other courts of appeals recognizing that the amended statute applies to SAPCRs pending on or after September 1, 2025:
- In re J.C.D.Y., No. 01-25-00640-CV, 2025 WL 4099753, at *9 n.5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 3, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).
- In re D.M., No. 11-25-00102-CV, 2025 WL 2980658, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 23, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.).
- In re W.R.I.F., No. 05-25-01458-CV, 2026 WL 992202, at *3 n.4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 13, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
Application
The Thirteenth Court treated the appeal as a straightforward transition-statute problem. Mother’s premise was that filing date controlled: because the suit began in 2023, she argued the trial court should have used the pre-amendment version of subsection (O), the service-plan-compliance ground. The court rejected that premise because the Legislature had expressly answered the temporal question. The amendment did not limit itself to newly filed cases. Instead, it stated that it applied to SAPCRs pending in the trial court on the effective date.
That was dispositive. This suit was filed in 2023, but it was undisputedly still pending on September 1, 2025, and was tried in mid-October 2025. Once the court identified that timing, the remainder of the analysis followed naturally: the trial court was required to apply the amended statutory scheme in effect at the time the case was tried. The appellate court therefore concluded that the trial court correctly used amended subsection (O), now the substance-abuse-based ground, rather than the repealed service-plan ground formerly labeled subsection (O).
The court also noted a practical point that appellate lawyers will appreciate. Mother sought reversal as to termination under § 161.001(b)(1)(O), but she did not ask the court to modify the judgment to reflect a finding under former subsection (P). That omission did not drive the holding, but it underscores the importance of precision in framing appellate relief when statutory renumbering is involved.
Holding
The court held that the 2025 amendment to Texas Family Code § 161.001 applies to suits affecting the parent-child relationship that were pending in the trial court on September 1, 2025. Because this termination case remained pending on that date, the amended statute governed even though the suit had been filed in 2023.
The court further held that the trial court correctly applied amended § 161.001(b)(1)(O), rather than the repealed pre-amendment version of subsection (O). On that basis, the court overruled Mother’s sole appellate issue and affirmed the termination judgment.
Practical Application
For family law trial lawyers, the real lesson is not limited to termination grounds. It is that effective-date and applicability provisions must be treated as merits issues, not as housekeeping details. When a family case is pending across a legislative change, counsel should assume that statutory text, burdens, available remedies, pleading targets, and appellate complaints may all need recalibration. In termination litigation specifically, this case confirms that the 2025 renumbering and repeal of former subsection (O) is not merely semantic; it can change the substance of the pleaded ground and the proof required at trial.
The case also has broader procedural implications for divorce and custody litigation. In any SAPCR-related dispute embedded in a divorce or post-divorce modification, lawyers should audit pending cases after each legislative session for provisions with explicit transition clauses. If a new conservatorship standard, procedural requirement, or remedial limitation applies to pending actions, a lawyer who continues to litigate under superseded law risks defective pleadings, an erroneous charge, misdirected evidence, or an appellate issue that collapses under the statute’s applicability language.
On appeal, the opinion is a caution against abstract statutory arguments untethered to the session law. The losing argument here focused on the date suit was filed, but the governing answer was in the Act itself. Appellate counsel should therefore lead with the session law, effective date, and transition clause before developing any textual, retroactivity, or preservation theory. Where renumbering has occurred, the requested appellate relief should also be framed with care so the court is not left to infer whether the complaint is substantive, clerical, or merely terminological.
Checklists
Transition-Rule Audit for Pending Family Cases
- Check every new Family Code amendment for an express applicability or savings clause.
- Determine whether the statute applies to:
- cases filed on or after the effective date,
- cases pending on the effective date, or
- only conduct occurring after the effective date.
- Calendar effective dates for all relevant statutory amendments affecting pending cases.
- Reassess the governing law again before final hearing, trial, charge conference, and entry of judgment.
- Update internal case summaries so the team is not relying on superseded subsection numbering or text.
Pleading Review After Statutory Amendments
- Compare the petition and live pleadings against the post-amendment statutory language.
- Confirm that the pleaded termination grounds match the current statute in effect for the case.
- If grounds have been repealed, renumbered, or substantively changed, amend pleadings promptly.
- Verify that requested findings and proposed judgments track the amended statutory citations.
- Avoid using obsolete subsection labels without clarifying whether the reference is historical or current.
Trial Preparation for Cases Crossing an Effective Date
- Rebuild the elements chart under the version of the statute that actually governs the case.
- Align witness examinations and exhibits to the current statutory elements.
- Review the service plan, treatment records, and agency evidence to ensure proof matches the operative ground.
- Revise opening, closing, and bench briefs to reflect the amended law.
- Confirm that the final judgment uses the correct subsection designations and statutory text.
Appellate Preservation and Briefing
- Preserve complaints tied to statutory amendments by citing the session law, not just the codified statute.
- Address the applicability clause directly in objections, post-judgment motions, and briefing.
- If renumbering creates ambiguity, explain both the former and amended subsection references.
- Tailor the requested relief carefully—reversal, modification, remand, or rendition—so it matches the actual complaint.
- Do not assume the filing date controls; analyze whether the Legislature expressly made the amendment applicable to pending cases.
Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Party’s Problem
- Do not base the entire argument on the date suit was filed without confronting the Act’s transition language.
- Do not assume that a familiar subsection label still carries the same substantive ground after amendment.
- Do not overlook persuasive cross-court authority already applying the amendment to pending cases.
- Do not wait until appeal to sort out whether the trial court used the correct post-amendment numbering.
- Do not seek relief framed around an obsolete statutory label unless you also explain the consequence of renumbering and the exact corrective action sought.
Citation
In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child, No. 13-25-00635-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 7, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
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