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Anders Review Affirms Termination Order | In the Interest of Z.D. (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of Z.D., a Child, 11-25-00323-CV, May 08, 2026.

On appeal from 326th District Court, Taylor County, Texas

Synopsis

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed a termination order after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief and the court’s own review found no arguable ground for reversal. The court also held that, under Family Code section 107.016(2) and In re P.M., appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw in the court of appeals was premature absent additional grounds, because representation generally continues through exhaustion of further appellate review.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a parental-rights termination appeal, the opinion matters more broadly to Texas family-law litigators because it reinforces two recurring themes that also shape divorce and SAPCR practice: preservation-driven appellate risk and the judiciary’s continued focus on a record that will withstand heightened review where parent-child rights are at stake. For custody litigators, the case underscores how substance abuse evidence, endangerment findings, and best-interest proof must be developed with appellate scrutiny in mind. For lawyers handling divorce cases with conservatorship disputes, amicus appointments, or parallel CPS issues, the opinion is a reminder that appellate counsel obligations in parent-child litigation can outlast the intermediate appeal and that record management—not just trial presentation—often determines whether an order survives review.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights to Z.D. after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1), including endangerment under subsections (D) and (E), and a finding that she caused the child to be born addicted to a controlled substance not legally obtained by prescription under subsection (Q), as renumbered by the 2025 amendments. The trial court also found that termination was in the child’s best interest under section 161.001(b)(2).

Only the mother appealed. Her court-appointed appellate counsel concluded that no nonfrivolous issue existed, filed an Anders brief, and moved to withdraw. Counsel also complied with the procedural protections associated with Anders practice by providing the mother the brief, the withdrawal motion, notice of her rights, and the means to seek access to the appellate record for a pro se response. The mother did not file a pro se response.

The court’s opinion reveals that, in its own record review, the evidence supporting the endangerment findings centered on the mother’s pattern of drug abuse and the related dangers that pattern posed to the child. The court specifically noted that the evidence showed a substantial risk of harm and rendered the mother incapable of parenting.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court relied on the now-familiar Anders framework as adapted to civil parental-rights termination appeals. The authorities expressly cited were:

Under those cases, appointed counsel who concludes an appeal is frivolous must still file a professionally conscientious brief identifying the procedural and substantive posture of the case, provide the client appropriate notice and access rights, and allow the appellate court to conduct its own independent review.

On the merits, the court applied Texas Family Code section 161.001(b), including predicate grounds under subsections (D), (E), and (Q), together with the best-interest requirement in section 161.001(b)(2). The opinion also referenced:

Those authorities matter because they frame how appellate courts analyze endangerment findings, including the constitutional significance of findings under subsections (D) and (E).

On counsel’s withdrawal request, the court applied:

Those authorities establish that appointed counsel in termination appeals generally remains obligated to represent the parent through exhaustion of appellate remedies, including potential proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas, and that a withdrawal motion in the court of appeals may therefore be premature.

Application

The Eleventh Court began with process, not merits. It first examined whether appointed counsel had complied with the procedural architecture required for an Anders filing. The court found that counsel had done so: the brief reflected a professional examination of the record and law, the mother was given the brief and motion, she was informed of her right to respond and to seek record access, and the briefing package satisfied the notice requirements associated with Anders, Schulman, and Kelly.

From there, the court undertook its own independent review of the appellate record. That is the critical step in any Anders disposition, and the court made clear that affirmance was based not merely on counsel’s conclusion, but on the court’s own determination that the appeal was frivolous and without merit. In discussing the substance, the court singled out the endangerment findings. It observed that the record showed a pattern of drug abuse by the mother, together with child-related dangers flowing from that conduct, creating a substantial risk of harm and demonstrating parental incapacity. That discussion tracks the established Texas endangerment line of cases holding that ongoing substance abuse can support findings under subsection (D) or (E), particularly where the conduct exposes the child to instability, risk, or impaired caregiving.

The opinion is also notable for what it does with In re N.G. Even in an Anders context, the court expressly addressed the endangerment findings, rather than bypassing them. That is consistent with the due-process significance of (D) and (E) findings, which can carry collateral consequences in future termination proceedings. For practitioners, the lesson is straightforward: if (D) or (E) is in the judgment, the appellate court will remain attentive to whether the record supports those findings, even where counsel believes no arguable issue exists.

On withdrawal, the court agreed with counsel’s merits assessment but still denied the motion to withdraw. Applying In re P.M., the court treated the motion as premature because appointed counsel’s statutory duty ordinarily continues through the exhaustion of appeals. The practical point is that an Anders affirmance does not automatically terminate counsel’s appointment. Unless there are independent grounds for withdrawal, counsel should expect to remain in the case long enough to evaluate and, if appropriate, file a petition for review that satisfies Anders standards.

Holding

The court held that when appointed counsel in a parental-rights termination appeal files an Anders brief that complies with Anders, In re Schulman, and Kelly, and the court’s independent review of the record reveals no arguable appellate issue, affirmance of the termination order is proper. Applying that rule, the Eleventh Court affirmed the order terminating the mother’s parental rights.

The court further held that no arguable appellate challenge appeared in this record, including as to the trial court’s endangerment findings under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court’s discussion of the mother’s pattern of drug abuse and the related risks to the child shows that it independently concluded the record was legally sufficient to eliminate any nonfrivolous appellate complaint on those grounds.

Finally, the court held that appointed appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw should be denied as premature. Under Family Code section 107.016(2) and In re P.M., appointed counsel’s representation in a termination case generally continues through exhaustion of appellate remedies, and that obligation is not extinguished merely because the court of appeals affirms on Anders review.

Practical Application

For appellate counsel in CPS and termination matters, this case is a clean reminder that Anders practice in Texas family law remains available, but only if counsel strictly complies with the procedural requirements and only after a genuinely conscientious review of the entire record. A conclusory no-merit filing is not enough; the appellate court expects a brief that demonstrates counsel actually tested the record against potential reversible issues.

For trial lawyers, the case reinforces the continuing centrality of endangerment proof. Substance-abuse evidence remains among the most durable evidentiary bases for findings under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), particularly when the record ties the drug use to specific risks to the child, parental instability, or inability to safely parent. In contested custody litigation outside the CPS context, the same lesson applies: if drug use is part of the case theory, the record must connect behavior to actual or probable harm, not merely moral disapproval.

For lawyers who split time between divorce, SAPCR, and CPS dockets, several strategic points follow:

The opinion also has a workflow implication. Appointed appellate lawyers should calendar post-opinion deadlines at the outset of the appeal and plan for possible petition-for-review obligations even if they anticipate filing Anders. Courts continue to treat representation as extending beyond the intermediate appeal, and firms handling these matters need staffing protocols that reflect that reality.

Checklists

Anders Compliance for Appointed Appellate Counsel

Building a Termination Record That Will Survive Appellate Review

Opposing an Anders Disposition

Handling Withdrawal Requests After Anders in Termination Appeals

Trial-Level Risk Management in Divorce and SAPCR Cases with Substance-Abuse Allegations

Citation

In the Interest of Z.D., a Child, No. 11-25-00323-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Eastland May 8, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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