In the Interest of J.E.F. and J.J.F., Children, 04-26-00086-CV, May 13, 2026.
On appeal from 225th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Synopsis
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show the father knowingly exposed the children to endangering conditions and engaged in, or knowingly allowed, endangering conduct. The court relied primarily on evidence of child abandonment/endangerment, intoxication, domestic violence concerns, protective-order violations, and incarceration-related instability, and then affirmed under In re N.G. because the subsection (D) and (E) findings were supported.
Relevance to Family Law
Although this is a termination case, its reasoning has immediate spillover into private family law litigation, especially SAPCR modifications, conservatorship restrictions, supervised possession disputes, and protective-order related custody litigation. The opinion reinforces that family violence, intoxication, criminal conduct, protective-order violations, inadequate supervision, and instability in the home are not siloed “CPS facts”; they are the same facts that can drive managing conservatorship allocations, geographic restrictions, step-up possession limitations, injunctions, and emergency relief in divorce and post-divorce custody cases.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
The Department removed two young children in December 2024 after receiving two referrals: one for neglectful supervision and another for domestic violence in the home. The father was incarcerated for most of the case, including at trial. At the bench trial, the testimony came from the father, the Department caseworker, and the foster mother.
The appellate record, as the court itself noted, was underdeveloped. Even so, the evidence that did exist was enough. The caseworker testified the initial intake followed an incident in which the children had allegedly been left alone for an extended period. She also testified that when the parents returned, the father was intoxicated. The father denied those details, but he admitted he had been arrested for abandonment and child endangerment arising from that incident and had ultimately been convicted.
The record also included evidence of family violence concerns. The Department received a separate referral involving domestic violence in the home, allegedly perpetrated by the father. His service plan stated he had a history of intimate partner violence, that the relationship with the mother was unhealthy, and that he tended to become aggressive in ways that could lead to further altercations. Although the father denied physical violence, he acknowledged violating a protective order that had been issued after an earlier altercation with the mother. The court also considered the instability created by the father’s incarceration.
One notable aspect of the opinion is the court’s express frustration with the thin record. The panel again cautioned against underdeveloped termination records, but held that even this limited evidence, viewed under the clear-and-convincing standard and the appropriate appellate presumptions, was sufficient to sustain the subsection (D) and (E) findings.
Issues Decided
- Whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) for knowingly placing or allowing the children to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.
- Whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) for engaging in, or knowingly placing the children with persons who engaged in, endangering conduct.
- Whether, because subsection (D) and (E) findings were affirmed, the judgment could be affirmed under the framework required by In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019).
- The father also challenged subsection (N) and best interest, but the opinion excerpt provided centers on the court’s analysis of subsections (D) and (E), which carried special appellate significance under N.G.
Rules Applied
The court applied the familiar termination framework under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b): the Department had to prove by clear and convincing evidence at least one predicate ground for termination and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The court also applied the statutory definition of clear and convincing evidence in Family Code section 101.007 and the legal- and factual-sufficiency standards from In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. 2005), and In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. 2006).
For subsection (D), the court relied on the principle that the inquiry focuses on the children’s environment and whether the parent knowingly placed or allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being. The opinion cited authorities recognizing that “environment” includes both the child’s living conditions and parental conduct within the home, and that awareness of a potential for danger is enough; certainty is not required.
For subsection (E), the court applied the rule that endangerment can be shown through a parent’s course of conduct, including acts, omissions, and failures to act that create a potential for danger. The court reiterated that the conduct need not be directed at the child, and the child need not suffer actual injury. Conduct outside the child’s presence, before birth, or after removal may also be considered.
The opinion also relied on authority holding that domestic violence is probative of endangerment even when not directed at the child, and that incarceration connected to violence or repeated violations can contribute to instability that endangers a child. Finally, because subsection (D) and (E) findings have collateral consequences in future parental-rights litigation, the court followed In re N.G. and specifically reviewed those grounds rather than affirming on another predicate ground alone.
Application
The court’s application is important less for novelty than for its disciplined treatment of sparse but consequential proof. The panel openly acknowledged that the record was thin and that much of the testimony focused on the mother rather than the father. Still, the evidence tied to the father was enough to permit the trial court, as factfinder, to form a firm belief or conviction that both statutory grounds were satisfied.
On subsection (D), the court focused first on the incident in which the children were allegedly left alone for an extended period and the father returned intoxicated. Even though the father disputed the details, he admitted being arrested and later convicted for abandonment and child endangerment arising from that event. That admission allowed the trial court to credit the Department’s version over the father’s denials and to conclude that the children had been knowingly left in an endangering environment. The court treated inadequate supervision of very young children as classic subsection (D) evidence because it goes directly to dangerous surroundings and parental awareness of risk.
The court then broadened the subsection (D) analysis by looking at the home environment as a whole. The domestic-violence referral, the service-plan statements regarding intimate partner violence and aggression, and the father’s acknowledged protective-order violation collectively supported a finding that the children’s home was marked by instability, aggression, and the risk of violence. That type of environment is itself endangering, even if the children were not the direct targets of the violence.
On subsection (E), the court treated the same facts as evidence of an endangering course of conduct. The father’s intoxication, the abandonment/endangerment incident, the history of intimate partner violence, the unhealthy parental relationship, the protective-order violation, and incarceration all demonstrated more than an isolated lapse. They showed continuing behavior choices that exposed the children to danger and instability. This is a familiar but important point in appellate practice: the same facts often support both (D) and (E), but they do so through different analytical lenses—environment under (D), and conduct or course of conduct under (E).
The opinion also illustrates the practical force of deference in a bench trial. The father denied key allegations, but the trial court was free to disbelieve him, especially in light of his criminal conviction and the documentary evidence in the service plan. On appeal, the Fourth Court deferred to those credibility determinations and declined to reweigh the evidence.
Holding
The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under section 161.001(b)(1)(D). In the court’s view, the abandonment/child-endangerment incident, the evidence that the children had been left alone for an extended period, the father’s intoxication upon return, and the domestic-violence concerns in the home permitted the trial court to find that the father knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.
The court separately held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under section 161.001(b)(1)(E). The father’s criminal conduct, intoxication, intimate partner violence history, violation of a protective order, and incarceration-related instability supported a finding that he engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being, or knowingly placed them with persons engaging in such conduct.
Because the subsection (D) and (E) findings were affirmed, the court affirmed the termination judgment under the framework mandated by In re N.G. The opinion underscores that when those two grounds are challenged, the appellate court must address them directly because of their potential future consequences in other parental-rights proceedings.
Practical Application
For Texas family law litigators, In re J.E.F. is a reminder that endangerment findings are often built from a mosaic, not a single dramatic event. In a termination case, a neglectful-supervision episode coupled with intoxication, family violence evidence, criminal charges or convictions, and protective-order violations can be enough even if the trial record is far from ideal. In a private SAPCR or divorce case, those same facts can support temporary orders, exclusive possession of the residence, supervised visitation, restrictions on overnight possession, alcohol testing, batterer’s intervention requirements, and limitations on joint decision-making.
The case is also strategically useful on the proof side. First, practitioners representing the Department, an amicus, or a child’s advocate should not assume a sparse record will be cured by deference on appeal; this panel affirmed, but not without criticizing the evidentiary presentation. Second, practitioners defending against endangerment allegations should understand how admissions outside the termination record—criminal pleas, convictions, protective-order violations, service-plan statements, and prior family-violence history—can become the backbone of a sufficiency affirmance.
In custody litigation short of termination, this opinion provides a roadmap for framing endangerment-related facts in ways trial courts recognize. A parent’s repeated exposure of children to domestic conflict, intoxication, unsafe supervision, or arrest/incarceration instability can be argued not just as “poor judgment,” but as evidence of an environment and course of conduct detrimental to the child’s physical and emotional welfare. That framing matters in emergency motions, modifications based on material and substantial change, and requests for tailored possession conditions.
Finally, appellate lawyers should note the continuing force of In re N.G. Any case involving subsection (D) or (E) should be briefed with the understanding that those findings carry consequences beyond the immediate suit. That means preservation, record development, and targeted sufficiency briefing on those grounds are non-negotiable.
Checklists
Building an Endangerment Record Under Subsections (D) and (E)
- Tie each fact to either environment, conduct, or both.
- Develop testimony about the condition of the home before removal, not just after.
- Prove the parent’s knowledge of the risk, even if direct proof is unavailable.
- Offer criminal records, judgments, pleas, or admissions connected to abandonment, endangerment, assault, or protective-order violations.
- Introduce service plans, safety plans, or assessments that document violence, aggression, intoxication, or instability.
- Elicit dates and timelines so the trial court can connect the conduct to the children’s exposure.
- Establish the ages and vulnerability of the children; very young children heighten the danger analysis.
- Develop evidence of repeated instability, not merely isolated bad acts.
Defending Against Endangerment Allegations
- Attack the knowledge element under subsection (D) with specificity.
- Distinguish isolated events from a continuing course of conduct under subsection (E).
- Rebut or contextualize criminal charges with certified dispositions, not just testimony.
- Address domestic-violence allegations directly; silence invites adverse inferences.
- Explain protective-order history and any alleged violations with documentary support.
- Present evidence of rehabilitation, sobriety, housing stability, counseling, and compliance.
- Build a timeline showing changed circumstances after the triggering events.
- Avoid general denials when there are convictions or admissions in the record.
Preserving Error for Appeal
- Challenge both legal and factual sufficiency expressly.
- Request and obtain admission of all favorable exhibits rather than relying on offers of proof alone.
- Secure a complete reporter’s record, including pretrial and evidentiary rulings if relevant.
- Object to conclusory testimony and force factual specificity where possible.
- Request findings of fact and conclusions of law in bench trials when helpful.
- Address subsection (D) and (E) separately in appellate briefing because In re N.G. makes those findings uniquely significant.
- Identify whether the complained-of evidence goes to pre-removal environment, post-removal conduct, or both.
- Frame credibility disputes realistically; appellate courts defer heavily to the trial judge in bench trials.
Using This Case in Private Family Law Litigation
- Use evidence of family violence to support conservatorship restrictions even absent direct child injury.
- Argue that intoxication and inadequate supervision show immediate safety concerns warranting temporary relief.
- Connect incarceration and criminal instability to the child’s need for routine and predictability.
- Support supervised possession requests with documented protective-order violations or assaultive conduct.
- Seek alcohol or drug testing when intoxication is tied to caregiving failures.
- Emphasize that instability in the home environment is relevant to best interest, not just termination.
- Use the case to rebut arguments that only conduct directed at the child matters.
- Pair this authority with Family Code best-interest factors and any family-violence presumptions applicable in conservatorship disputes.
Citation
In re J.E.F. and J.J.F., Children, No. 04-26-00086-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 13, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
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