Rahimi Preservation of Firearm-Ban Challenge | Noyes v. State (2026)

Noyes v. State of Texas for the Protection of Samantha Jo Voges, 24-0023, May 15, 2026.

On appeal from Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas

Synopsis

The Supreme Court of Texas held that Noyes sufficiently preserved his constitutional challenges to a lifetime firearm prohibition contained in a protective order. Because the court of appeals decided the federal and state right-to-bear-arms issues without the benefit of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Court vacated the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded for reconsideration under the post-Rahimi framework.

Relevance to Family Law

This is a family-law significant preservation case, even though its immediate doctrinal focus is constitutional review of a firearm prohibition. Protective orders routinely intersect with divorce, SAPCR, custody, and post-judgment enforcement proceedings, and firearm restrictions can materially affect possession schedules, law-enforcement employment, military service, bargaining leverage, and parallel criminal exposure. Noyes confirms that when a litigant has fairly presented a constitutional challenge to a protective-order firearm ban, Texas appellate courts should reach the issue rather than dispose of it on preservation grounds, and it signals that protective-order provisions restricting firearms—especially lifetime bans—must now be evaluated with Rahimi squarely in view.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The case arose from a permanent protective order entered against Jonathan Noyes after a bench hearing at which the trial court found reasonable grounds to believe he had engaged in criminal stalking. The order did more than restrain contact or regulate conduct toward the protected person. It also prohibited Noyes from possessing any firearm for the remainder of his life.

Noyes challenged that firearm-dispossession provision as violating his rights under both the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution’s right-to-bear-arms provision. The court of appeals affirmed the protective order, including the firearm restriction. But shortly after that appellate decision, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), addressing when an individual may constitutionally be disarmed and the permissible duration and justification for that disarmament in the protective-order context.

The Supreme Court of Texas did not itself decide the ultimate merits of Noyes’s constitutional claims. Instead, it focused on two threshold matters central to appellate practice: whether those constitutional objections had been sufficiently preserved in the trial court and whether the intervening issuance of Rahimi warranted vacatur and remand so the court of appeals could reconsider the issues under the correct and current governing framework.

Issues Decided

• Whether Noyes sufficiently preserved for appellate review his constitutional challenges to the lifetime firearm prohibition in the protective order.
• Whether vacatur of the court of appeals’ judgment and remand were warranted because the court of appeals decided the Second Amendment and Texas constitutional issues without the benefit of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).

Rules Applied

The Court’s per curiam disposition turns on preservation principles and the Texas Supreme Court’s authority to vacate and remand when an intervening decision materially affects the controlling legal framework.

Relevant authorities included:

• United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), addressing the constitutionality of disarming persons subject to protective-order-type restrictions and the historical-tradition analysis governing Second Amendment claims.
• TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, authorizing the Supreme Court of Texas to dispose of a petition without oral argument in appropriate circumstances.
• TEX. R. APP. P. 60.2(f), authorizing vacatur of the court of appeals’ judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Although the opinion snippet is concise, the preservation holding reflects the standard Texas appellate principle that a complaint is preserved when the party’s objection or argument is sufficiently specific to make the trial court aware of the complaint and to allow the issue to be reviewed on appeal. The Court also recognized that when an intervening high-court decision changes or substantially clarifies the governing constitutional analysis, remand is often the proper course if the lower court did not evaluate the issue under that controlling authority.

Application

The Supreme Court of Texas first addressed preservation, because without preserved error there would have been no occasion to revisit the firearm-ban issue at all. The Court concluded that Noyes had sufficiently preserved his constitutional challenges to the lifetime prohibition. That conclusion is strategically important. The Court did not require hyper-technical phrasing or a perfectly developed constitutional treatise at the trial level; it was enough that the constitutional objection to the firearm prohibition had been fairly raised in a manner adequate for appellate review.

From there, the Court turned to the effect of Rahimi. The court of appeals had affirmed before the United States Supreme Court supplied its most recent guidance on disarmament in the protective-order setting. That timing mattered. Because Rahimi addressed both the circumstances under which disarmament may be permissible and the duration of that restriction, the Supreme Court of Texas determined that the court of appeals’ prior analysis should not stand untouched. Rather than decide the constitutional merits in the first instance, the Court chose the narrower and institutionally conventional route: Vacate the judgment and remand so the court of appeals could reconsider the Second Amendment and Texas constitutional questions with Rahimi available as the governing reference point.

That procedural choice reflects a familiar appellate sensibility. When an intervening precedent bears directly on the legal test applied below, especially in a constitutional case with a potentially fact-sensitive historical analysis, remand allows the intermediate court to do the first pass under the corrected framework.

Holding

The Supreme Court of Texas held that Noyes sufficiently preserved his constitutional challenges to the protective order’s lifetime firearm prohibition for appellate review. That aspect of the decision is independently significant for family-law litigators, because it rejects an unduly cramped view of preservation in protective-order litigation involving constitutional restraints.

The Court also held that vacatur and remand were warranted because the court of appeals resolved the firearm-dispossession issues without the benefit of United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for review, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case for further proceedings under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 59.1 and 60.2(f).

Practical Application

For family-law trial lawyers, Noyes has immediate consequences in protective-order cases that arise alongside divorce, SAPCR, modification, and enforcement disputes. If the requested protective order includes firearm restrictions, do not assume the firearms language is merely collateral. It may become the center of the appeal, particularly where the restriction is broad, indefinite, or expressly lifetime in duration. Counsel representing applicants should build a record supporting the necessity, legal basis, and duration of any requested disarmament provision. Counsel representing respondents should specifically challenge the constitutional basis, scope, and duration of the restriction and obtain a clear ruling.

The case also matters in negotiated resolutions. Agreed injunction-like language or agreed protective-order provisions can have downstream effects on possession of firearms, hunting rights, employment credentials, security clearances, and leverage in related custody litigation. If firearm restrictions are part of the requested relief, practitioners should evaluate whether the duration is tied to findings actually made by the court and whether the record will withstand review under Rahimi.

In custody and divorce litigation, this issue can also shape temporary-orders strategy. Allegations supporting a protective order often overlap with requests for exclusive use of property, supervised possession, injunctions, and geographic restrictions. A firearm restriction may influence mediation posture and final settlement terms. Litigators should therefore treat the constitutional and statutory predicates for that restriction as part of the core case, not as boilerplate.

Practically, lawyers should do at least the following:

• Preserve constitutional objections expressly, on the record, and with enough specificity to identify the challenged provision and the constitutional source of the complaint.
• Address both the existence of a firearm prohibition and its duration; Noyes highlights that duration is not an afterthought.
• Ask the trial court for findings or a record that explains why the restriction is being imposed and why its scope is justified.
• On appeal, flag any intervening authority—especially Rahimi—that may alter the analytical framework applicable to firearm restrictions in protective orders.
• In applicant-side briefing, avoid assuming that a finding supporting a protective order automatically resolves the scope of any firearm-dispossession provision.

Checklists

Preserving a Firearm-Ban Challenge in Protective-Order Litigation

• Identify the exact provision being challenged, including whether the prohibition is temporary, permanent, or lifetime.
• State the constitutional basis for the objection on the record, including the Second Amendment and, where appropriate, Article I, Section 23 of the Texas Constitution.
• Explain whether the challenge is facial, as-applied, or both.
• Object not only to the existence of the firearm prohibition but also separately to its breadth and duration.
• Request a ruling from the trial court; if the court does not expressly rule, make sure the record reflects an implicit denial or adverse disposition.
• Reassert the objection if the written order goes beyond the trial court’s oral pronouncements.

Building an Applicant-Side Record to Defend Firearm Restrictions

• Tie the requested firearm restriction to the specific factual findings supporting the protective order.
• Develop evidence showing why the respondent presents a danger warranting disarmament.
• Address why the proposed duration of the restriction is justified by the facts and governing law.
• Avoid relying on generic or boilerplate requests for lifetime relief without a record supporting that scope.
• Ensure the final order’s firearm language matches the relief requested and the findings made.

Protecting the Record for Appeal in Divorce and SAPCR Cases with Overlapping Protective Orders

• Determine early whether a protective-order proceeding will affect conservatorship, possession, property access, or employment-related issues.
• Coordinate evidentiary themes across the protective-order case and the family-law case to avoid inconsistent positions.
• Preserve separate appellate complaints for the protective order and for any related temporary or final family-court orders.
• Monitor intervening appellate or Supreme Court decisions that may affect constitutional review of protective-order provisions.
• Consider requesting additional findings if the firearm restriction will likely be a focal point on appeal.

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Party’s Appellate Vulnerabilities

• Do not assume an appellate court will deem a constitutional issue waived simply because the argument was imperfectly phrased; address preservation directly and comprehensively.
• Do not brief the merits under outdated Second Amendment doctrine without accounting for Rahimi.
• Do not treat duration as incidental; a lifetime prohibition invites focused appellate scrutiny.
• Do not rely solely on the general validity of the protective order to defend every ancillary restriction.
• Do not leave ambiguity in the order; unclear firearm language creates avoidable appellate risk.

Citation

Noyes v. State of Texas for the Protection of Samantha Jo Voges, No. 24-0023, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. May 15, 2026) (per curiam).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here.

~~7560e521-ef6f-44ac-af27-a7dfd934140c~~