Termination Under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E): In re A.T.G. (2026)

In the Interest of A.T.G., A.G.G., A.G.G. II, A.G.G., and A.G.G., Children, 07-26-00027-CV, May 13, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law No. 1, Randall County, Texas

Synopsis

The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that evidence of domestic violence against the other parent, physical abuse of the children, and a home environment defined by fear and aggression was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The case is a strong reminder that a sustained pattern of violence in the household can support both endangering conditions and endangering conduct, even where some sexual-abuse allegations were later clouded by uncertainty.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a termination case, its practical significance reaches well beyond CPS litigation. For Texas family lawyers handling SAPCRs, divorces involving conservatorship disputes, protective orders, and modification proceedings, In re A.T.G. reinforces that domestic violence is not merely a character issue—it is affirmative evidence of child endangerment, impaired parental judgment, and a home environment incompatible with safe possession or joint decision-making. In custody litigation, this opinion strengthens arguments for restrictions on possession, supervised access, sole managing conservatorship, and no-contact relief when the record shows violence toward a spouse, harsh corporal punishment, and children expressing sustained fear of a parent.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The Department became involved after an August 2024 intake alleging Father sexually assaulted one child’s friend during a sleepover. During the investigation, one of the subject children, C1, described nighttime touching and a broader history of abuse in the home. All five children were removed, though they were later returned to Mother, who was ultimately appointed permanent managing conservator.

By the time of final hearing, the sexual-abuse allegations had become less clear. The record reflected that the friend reportedly later said she had lied, C1 expressed confusion about what had happened, and a SANE examination did not reveal trauma. Neither child testified live at trial, though the trial court had interviewed them by Zoom before trial, and a transcript was provided to Father on the morning of the final hearing.

What remained consistent, however, was the evidence of violence and fear in the home. Officers testified to prior domestic violence incidents, including a 2011 assault in which Mother reported Father hit her with a belt and hammer, choked her, and caused extensive bruising. The record also contained evidence of a deferred adjudication arising from that offense and later extension of community supervision. Another officer described a 2021 assault report in which Mother said Father assaulted her, took her keys and phone, and tried to prevent her from leaving.

Mental-health professionals, Department personnel, and CASA witnesses supplied the core endangerment evidence. C1 described Father as angry, excessively punitive, and physically abusive, including spanking that left bruises and the use of belts, rods, and poles. She reported that Father made the children stand in corners for hours and that she and C2 received the worst of it. C2 likewise described Father as very angry, said he was afraid to return home, and recounted severe punishments including being struck with a metal or red pole and having his head put through glass. Both children told professionals and advocates they did not want further contact with Father, and the witnesses uniformly described their fear as deep, persistent, and credible.

The Department’s witnesses also emphasized that the children were doing well in Mother’s care and that Father had not shown he could provide a safe environment. The trial court terminated Father’s rights to C1 and C2 under § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), found termination was in their best interest, and entered a no-contact order.

Issues Decided

The court decided, among other matters, the following issues relevant to endangerment:

• Whether legally sufficient evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) for knowingly placing or allowing the children to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.
• Whether legally sufficient evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E) for engaging in conduct, or knowingly placing the children with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.
• Whether the evidence was factually sufficient to support those same predicate grounds.
• Whether evidence of domestic violence, physical abuse, and the children’s fear of Father could sustain termination even though portions of the sexual-abuse evidence were disputed or uncertain.

Rules Applied

The court applied the familiar termination framework requiring clear and convincing evidence of both a predicate ground under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1) and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The opinion reiterates the constitutional dimension of parental rights while emphasizing that those rights are not absolute and may be forfeited by conduct that endangers children.

The principal rules in play were these:

• Under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), termination may be supported by evidence that the parent knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.
• Under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), termination may be supported by evidence that the parent engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.
• “Endanger” means to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize the child’s emotional or physical health; actual injury is not required.
• Domestic violence may constitute endangering conduct and may also support a finding that the child’s environment was endangering.
• A pattern of abusive or violent behavior within the home, including violence directed at the other parent, is probative because children are endangered by exposure to such conduct even if they are not the direct target every time.
• Appellate review of termination findings requires legal- and factual-sufficiency review under the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard described in cases such as In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002), with the court determining whether the factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the allegations.

The opinion also cites the foundational cases recognizing the constitutional status of parental rights and the need for strict scrutiny in termination cases, including Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985), In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2003), In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. 2003), and Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1987).

Application

The court’s analysis was significant because it did not depend on fully resolved proof of sexual abuse. Instead, the opinion focused on the broader and more stable evidentiary picture: repeated domestic violence against Mother, repeated physical abuse of the children, excessive corporal punishment with objects, threats and intimidation, and the children’s marked fear of Father.

That matters strategically. Termination cases often involve allegations that evolve over time, recantations, partial inconsistencies, or parallel criminal proceedings that make the record uneven. Here, the appellate court treated the uncertainty surrounding the sexual-assault allegations as non-dispositive because the remaining evidence independently established endangerment. The testimony from counselors, CASA, law enforcement, and Department witnesses supplied a consistent narrative of a violent home. Mother’s reports of serious assaults in 2011 and 2021 were not isolated episodes; they were part of a pattern. The children’s statements about bruising, belts, rods, poles, forced standing in corners for hours, yelling, aggression, and fear demonstrated not simply harsh parenting but an atmosphere of danger.

For subsection (D), the court had ample basis to conclude Father created or maintained endangering conditions and surroundings. A home characterized by domestic assaults, violent discipline, intimidation, and fear is itself an endangering environment. For subsection (E), the same course of conduct—assaultive behavior toward Mother, abusive punishment of the children, aggression in the home, and conduct that caused the children to fear him intensely—qualified as endangering conduct. The court thus treated the environmental and behavioral endangerment theories as overlapping but independently supportable.

The witnesses’ descriptions of the children’s fear were particularly important. Texas appellate courts routinely give weight to evidence that children are terrified of a parent, especially where that fear is tied to specific acts of violence. Here, the children’s desire to avoid Father altogether, including C1’s reluctance even to be visible online during court proceedings, corroborated the abuse evidence and underscored the emotional endangerment component.

Holding

The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D). The evidence permitted the trial court to find that Father knowingly subjected the children to endangering conditions and surroundings by maintaining a home environment marked by domestic violence, excessive physical punishment, aggression, and fear.

The court also held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Father’s pattern of domestic violence against Mother, physical abuse of the children, and conduct that caused the children to fear him constituted endangering conduct within the meaning of the statute.

More broadly, the court confirmed that a pattern of abuse directed both at the other parent and at the children may satisfy both subsections (D) and (E). Even where some allegations in the case are disputed or uncertain, termination may still be affirmed if the remaining evidence clearly and convincingly establishes an ongoing course of endangering conduct and an endangering home environment.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, In re A.T.G. is best read as a record-building case. It demonstrates that when abuse evidence comes in through multiple channels—law enforcement, therapist testimony, CASA, Department witnesses, and the children’s own statements—the court can affirm endangerment findings without relying on a single dramatic allegation. In a custody case, that same evidentiary architecture can support sole managing conservatorship, denial of expanded possession, supervised visitation, injunctions, and geographic or communication restrictions.

In divorce and SAPCR practice, the case is especially useful where the abusive parent argues that violence toward the spouse should be compartmentalized from child-related issues. The opinion rejects that framing in practical terms. Violence in the household is child endangerment evidence because it shapes the child’s environment and reflects the parent’s behavioral instability. If the children witnessed the violence, heard it, lived under its threat, or absorbed its effects through fear and coercion, the evidence is directly relevant to conservatorship and possession.

The decision also highlights the importance of preserving alternative theories. If one set of allegations weakens during the case—as occurred here with some of the sexual-abuse evidence—the trial lawyer who has developed evidence of domestic violence, corporal abuse, coercive control, fear-based parenting, and emotional harm still has a viable endangerment case. For respondents, the lesson is equally sharp: merely attacking one allegation will not carry the appeal if the record otherwise shows a chronic pattern of violence and intimidation.

Practitioners should also note how useful child-fear evidence can be when it is specific, repeated, and tied to identifiable conduct. Generic statements that a child is “afraid” are less persuasive than testimony that the child asked for termination, refused contact, described implements used for punishment, or linked fear to particular episodes of violence. That kind of detail turns emotional-endangerment evidence into appellate-proof evidence.

Checklists

Building an Endangerment Record Under Subsections (D) and (E)

• Obtain police reports, affidavits, EMS records, and criminal dispositions relating to domestic violence.
• Develop testimony showing not just isolated incidents, but a pattern of violence, coercion, or intimidation in the home.
• Tie household violence to the child’s environment: what the child saw, heard, feared, or experienced.
• Present evidence of physical discipline that exceeds reasonable corporal punishment, especially where objects were used or bruising occurred.
• Use multiple witness categories where available: investigators, therapists, CASA, law enforcement, teachers, relatives, and medical providers.
• Elicit testimony that connects the conduct to emotional harm, fear, dysregulation, or reluctance to return to the parent.
• Preserve both subsection (D) and subsection (E) theories distinctly, even if the proof overlaps.

Proving the Child’s Fear in a Way That Matters on Appeal

• Ask witnesses for the child’s exact language where admissible and properly presented.
• Develop specific descriptions of the conduct that caused the fear.
• Show consistency across time and across witnesses.
• Document avoidance behaviors, refusal of visitation, fear of appearing in court, or requests for protection.
• Connect fear evidence to safety concerns rather than mere preference.
• Avoid conclusory testimony untethered to facts.

Using the Case in SAPCR, Divorce, and Modification Litigation

• Cite the case for the proposition that domestic violence toward the other parent is relevant endangerment evidence affecting conservatorship.
• Use it to support supervised possession or denial of expanded possession where the record shows fear and aggressive discipline.
• Pair the case with requests for protective orders, temporary injunctions, or no-contact provisions where appropriate.
• Frame the abusive parent’s conduct as both environmental endangerment and behavioral endangerment.
• Emphasize that actual serious physical injury to the child is not required; exposure to danger and emotional jeopardy is enough.
• Use corroborated fear evidence to support sole managing conservatorship and restrictions on communication.

Defending Against an Endangerment Case

• Do not assume disproving one allegation defeats the entire case; address the full pattern evidence.
• Confront prior domestic violence directly, including criminal records and deferred adjudication documents.
• Rebut claims of excessive corporal punishment with specific, credible evidence—not general denials.
• Address the child’s fear evidence through admissible context, treatment progress, or contrary fact testimony where available.
• Demonstrate affirmative protective conduct, treatment, compliance, and changed circumstances with documents and third-party witnesses.
• Preserve procedural objections, but do not neglect the substantive sufficiency fight.

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Parent’s Appellate Problem

• Understand that longstanding domestic violence can independently sustain termination findings.
• Recognize that violence against a spouse is not collateral in child-related litigation.
• Avoid noncooperation with Department investigations; lack of cooperation can deepen the trial court’s concern.
• Provide financial support and demonstrate consistent parental responsibility during the case.
• Engage in services early and build a record of measurable behavioral change.
• Anticipate that children’s detailed fear-based statements may be highly persuasive if repeated through multiple professionals.

Citation

In the Interest of A.T.G., A.G.G., A.G.G. II, A.G.G., and A.G.G., Children, No. 07-26-00027-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS ___ (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 13, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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