Site icon Thomas J. Daley

UCCJEA Home State Requires Six Consecutive Months | In re A.M.K. (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of A.M.K., A Child, 14-25-00656-CV, May 14, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law No. 1, Galveston County, Texas

Synopsis

Texas did not have initial child-custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA because the child had not lived in Texas for six consecutive months immediately before the SAPCR was filed. The Fourteenth Court held that even treating the child’s departure to Georgia as a temporary absence, the child’s maximum Texas residence was only 5 months and 20 days, which is insufficient under Texas Family Code §§ 152.102(7) and 152.201(a)(1).

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters directly to Texas family-law litigators handling SAPCRs, divorces involving children, and interstate custody fights. The case is a sharp reminder that UCCJEA jurisdiction is not flexible, cannot be supplied by equities, and cannot be cured by rounding up a residency period that falls short of six consecutive months. In practice, this affects filing strategy, emergency-order requests, forum-selection arguments, and the timing of pleadings when a parent or child has recently relocated. It also underscores that even if a Texas court could arguably consider significant-connection jurisdiction, the court may still decline to exercise jurisdiction on inconvenient-forum grounds in favor of the state with deeper evidentiary ties.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The child, A.M.K., was born in April 2024. After spending approximately seven months in Georgia, the parents and child moved to Galveston County, Texas. On May 3, 2025, Mother took the child to Georgia, initially representing that the trip was only to visit family. On May 14, 2025, she informed Father that neither she nor the child would return to Texas.

Father filed a SAPCR on May 27, 2025, seeking conservatorship, possession, and support orders. Mother moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, contending Texas was not the child’s home state under the UCCJEA and that Georgia, where the child had lived previously and where Mother had returned, was the proper forum.

An associate judge initially found that Texas qualified as the child’s home state. Mother sought de novo review. After the de novo hearing, the presiding judge reversed, dismissed the SAPCR for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and also determined that Texas was an inconvenient forum and Georgia the more appropriate forum. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court applied the UCCJEA as codified in Texas Family Code Chapter 152, focusing primarily on the following provisions:

The court also relied on familiar UCCJEA principles from Texas case law:

Application

The court’s analysis was straightforward and text-driven. It began with the UCCJEA’s home-state definition and measured the child’s time in Texas backward from the filing date of the SAPCR, because commencement of the proceeding is the operative date under the statute. On that record, the child had not been in Texas for the required six consecutive months.

Critically, the court gave Father the benefit of the most favorable framing available to him: it assumed that the period from May 3, when Mother left Texas with the child, until May 27, when Father filed suit, could be treated as a temporary absence. Even with that assumption, the child’s maximum Texas residence totaled only 5 months and 20 days. That arithmetic ended the home-state inquiry. The temporary-absence concept can preserve continuity during a qualifying six-month period; it cannot manufacture the missing days when the child never reached six consecutive months in Texas in the first place.

The court then addressed Father’s effort to invoke significant-connection jurisdiction under § 152.201(a)(2). Rather than definitively resolving whether those contacts might have supported jurisdiction in the abstract, the court held that the argument did not change the outcome because the trial court had also declined jurisdiction under the inconvenient-forum provision. On that point, the appellate court emphasized facts tying the case to Georgia: Mother and the child were living there when suit was filed, the child had spent more total time in Georgia than in Texas, and Mother’s extended family witnesses were located there. Given those circumstances, and given the absence of timely requested findings requiring more granular explanation, the court implied the findings necessary to support the trial court’s decision that Georgia was the more appropriate forum.

Holding

The Fourteenth Court held that Texas was not the child’s home state under Texas Family Code §§ 152.102(7) and 152.201(a)(1). The statute requires at least six consecutive months of residence in Texas immediately before commencement of the proceeding, and the child’s maximum possible Texas residence—counting the period after departure as a temporary absence—was only 5 months and 20 days. That shortfall was fatal to initial home-state jurisdiction.

The court further held that dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper. Because the UCCJEA provides the exclusive jurisdictional basis for an initial child-custody determination, the trial court did not err in refusing to proceed where Texas did not qualify as the home state.

The court also upheld the trial court’s inconvenient-forum determination under § 152.207. Even assuming Father could frame a significant-connection argument, the appellate court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Georgia was the more appropriate forum based on the child’s history there, the parties’ circumstances at filing, and the concentration of relevant witnesses and evidence in Georgia.

Practical Application

For practitioners, the principal lesson is that filing too early can be jurisdictionally fatal. In interstate custody disputes, counsel should calculate the six-month period with precision from the date of commencement, not from anticipated filing windows, verbal separation dates, or assumed temporary absences. If the child has not lived in Texas for six consecutive months, do not assume the court can bridge the gap through equitable arguments or by treating an out-of-state departure as temporary.

The case is particularly relevant in emergency-separation situations, relocation disputes, and unmarried-parent SAPCR filings. A parent who remains in Texas after the other parent leaves with the child may have strong equitable facts, but those facts do not alter the UCCJEA’s jurisdictional prerequisites. Counsel should instead evaluate whether another state is the home state, whether temporary emergency jurisdiction may be available under a different statutory provision, and whether a prompt filing in the home state is strategically superior.

The opinion also warns against overreliance on significant-connection jurisdiction. Even if a plausible argument exists under § 152.201(a)(2), the trial court may still decline to act under § 152.207 if another state is the more appropriate forum. That means litigators should develop the inconvenient-forum record early, including witness location, documentary evidence, domestic-violence allegations, financial burdens, and the comparative ability of each state’s courts to adjudicate the case expeditiously.

In divorce cases involving children, this issue can affect much more than conservatorship. A mistaken assumption about custody jurisdiction may distort the entire filing strategy, delay temporary orders, increase costs, and create parallel proceedings. Counsel should separate questions of divorce jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and UCCJEA child-custody jurisdiction rather than treating them as interchangeable.

Checklists

Pre-Filing UCCJEA Home-State Analysis

Evidence to Prove or Disprove “Temporary Absence”

Building the Inconvenient-Forum Record

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Party’s Problem

Strategic Response When Texas Is Short of Six Months

Citation

In the Interest of A.M.K., A Child, No. 14-25-00656-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 14, 2026, mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

~~4beeafaf-644e-406d-96bc-5159f269c45c~~

Share this content:

Exit mobile version