Family Code § 161.001(f) Reasonable Efforts to Return | L.G. v. DFPS (2025)

L. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, 03-25-00973-CV, May 22, 2026.

On appeal from 146th District Court of Bell County

Synopsis

Termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1) now requires more than proof of a predicate ground and best interest: the trial court must also make a written § 161.001(f) finding, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent. In L.G. v. DFPS, the Austin Court held that a tailored family service plan, referrals and payment for services, facilitated therapy, maintained contact, visitation, and reunification-oriented placement efforts were enough to support that finding legally and factually.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a termination case, its significance reaches beyond CPS dockets. For family-law litigators handling SAPCRs, modification suits, contested conservatorship disputes, and even divorce cases with family-violence or child-safety components, L.G. reinforces a broader judicial theme: trial courts expect a documented, child-centered progression of efforts before imposing the most severe parent-child restrictions. Strategically, the case is a reminder that service-plan compliance, therapy participation, credibility findings, and the quality of reunification efforts can influence not only termination cases but also managing conservatorship outcomes, possession restrictions, geographic disputes, and litigation positioning in parallel divorce or custody proceedings.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The Department filed its termination case in late 2024 after an incident involving alleged neglectful supervision and domestic violence. The record reflected that Mother drove at extreme speed with a child in the car after a confrontation involving J.P., and the encounter escalated into a vehicle collision in a parking lot. The case did not arise in isolation. The Department had prior involvement with the family, including earlier allegations of neglectful supervision and physical abuse, and the evidence showed an ongoing history of domestic violence, abusive conduct, and instability affecting the household.

By the time of trial, the child at issue was 16 years old. Unlike the younger siblings, who at various points remained with or were returned to Mother, this child was placed with an aunt in Texas. During the suit, the Department implemented a family service plan for Mother, arranged individual therapy for her, facilitated family therapy involving Mother and the child, maintained contact, and provided visitation. The child, however, consistently wanted to remain with the aunt and not return to Mother’s care.

The record also reflected facts undermining Mother’s reunification position. Although Mother had expressed fear of J.P. and reported domestic incidents involving him, the evidence suggested he later helped her move to Georgia, had access to her home there, and remained involved despite the safety concerns that had driven the Department’s intervention. Family therapy ultimately ended on the therapist’s advice. Shortly before a hearing, Mother appeared unannounced at the aunt’s home, yelled, knocked loudly, and delivered a notarized affidavit relinquishing her parental rights. The child was deeply upset by that event. After a bench trial, the trial court expressly found Mother not credible and signed a termination decree containing written findings on reasonable efforts, predicate grounds, and best interest.

Issues Decided

• Whether Texas Family Code § 161.001(f) requires a written finding, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before termination under § 161.001(b)(1).
• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child to Mother.
• Whether the evidence was factually sufficient to support that same § 161.001(f) finding, including in light of Mother’s complaints about the family-therapy component.
• Whether the decree’s written description of DFPS’s efforts satisfied the statute’s requirement that those efforts be described with specificity in a separate section of the order.
• More broadly, whether the record supported termination findings the court ultimately affirmed, including the predicate ground under § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and best interest.

Rules Applied

The court applied the 2023 amendments to Texas Family Code § 161.001, particularly subsections (f) and (g).

• Under Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(f)(1), in a DFPS-filed termination suit, the court may not terminate under § 161.001(b)(1) unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence, and describes in writing with specificity in a separate section of the order, that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before trial and that, despite those efforts, a continuing danger remained in the home preventing return.
• Under Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(g), when the suit involves that continuing danger despite reasonable efforts, the order must include written findings in a separate section describing with specificity the efforts DFPS made to return the child home.
• The court also relied on the definition of “clear and convincing evidence” in Tex. Fam. Code § 101.007.
• For sufficiency review, the court cited In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018), In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002), In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498 (Tex. 2014), and In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021), emphasizing that appellate courts still defer to the factfinder on credibility even under the clear-and-convincing standard.
• On what qualifies as a reasonable effort to return the child, the court cited recent Austin authorities recognizing that a family service plan, communication with the parent, services, and family-placement efforts generally support the reasonable-efforts requirement, including A.D. v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, 673 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. App.—Austin 2023, no pet.), and D.F. v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, __ S.W.3d __, 2026 WL 482451 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 20, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op.).

Application

The court treated § 161.001(f) as a genuine, reviewable prerequisite to termination under § 161.001(b)(1), not as a perfunctory recital. It began with the decree itself, which separately identified the Department’s reunification efforts: a narrowly tailored family service plan, referrals and provision or payment for services, family therapy, continued contact with Mother, and visitation between Mother and the child. That written detail mattered because the statute now expressly requires specificity in a separate section of the order.

From there, the court evaluated whether the evidence supported the finding by the elevated clear-and-convincing standard. The Department had done the kinds of things appellate courts have increasingly treated as classic reunification efforts. It created and implemented a service plan directed to the barriers preventing return. It arranged and funded therapeutic services for Mother and family therapy involving Mother and the child. It maintained communication. It also pursued relative placement, which the court regarded as part of the reunification-oriented framework. In other words, the Department built a record showing active efforts rather than passive case management.

Mother’s attack centered on reasonableness, not on whether some services occurred. She argued there was no evidence the efforts were reasonable and pointed to alleged problems surrounding family therapy. The court was not persuaded. It looked at the entire course of Department involvement rather than isolating one alleged imperfection in one service. Even if the family-therapy process had limitations or did not produce reunification, the statute does not require successful reunification; it requires reasonable efforts. On this record, the Department’s multi-layered interventions were enough for a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that the statutory requirement had been met.

The trial court’s credibility determination also played a substantial role in the appellate analysis. Because the judge expressly found Mother not credible, the court of appeals gave due deference to the trial court’s view of disputed testimony. That deference is particularly consequential in termination cases where a parent attempts to rebut the practical value or fairness of offered services. The appellate court effectively signaled that once DFPS creates a documented reunification record and the trial judge rejects the parent’s competing account, overturning a § 161.001(f) finding on sufficiency grounds will be difficult.

Holding

The court held that Texas Family Code § 161.001(f) requires a written finding, supported by clear and convincing evidence, that DFPS made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before termination may be ordered under § 161.001(b)(1). It further held that the decree in this case satisfied the statute’s writing-and-specificity requirement because it separately described the Department’s service plan, therapy, service referrals, maintained contact, and visitation efforts.

The court also held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the reasonable-efforts finding. The implementation of a tailored family service plan, the provision and funding of therapy and related services, continued contact with Mother, visitation, and efforts directed toward family placement and reunification were enough to permit a firm belief or conviction that DFPS acted reasonably.

Finally, as relevant to the appeal’s overall disposition, the court affirmed the termination decree after concluding that the evidence was also sufficient as to at least one predicate ground and best interest. For appellate practitioners, the key doctrinal point is that § 161.001(f) is now an essential termination component in DFPS cases, and L.G. shows the type of evidentiary record that will satisfy it.

Practical Application

For trial lawyers representing DFPS or child advocates, L.G. is a roadmap for building a termination record that will survive appeal under the 2023 statutory amendments. The order itself must do real work. A conclusory statement that “reasonable efforts were made” is risky; the safer practice is to itemize the service plan, referrals, funding, visitation, therapeutic interventions, communications, and any placement efforts in a discrete section of the decree. The evidentiary record should mirror that specificity through testimony, reports, billing authorizations, referrals, contact logs, and therapist recommendations.

For parent-side counsel, L.G. underscores that generalized complaints about services are unlikely to defeat a § 161.001(f) finding if the Department can show a coherent reunification framework. The better approach is to develop a precise record on why particular services were inaccessible, misaligned with the actual barriers to return, delayed, geographically impractical, culturally inappropriate, terminated prematurely, or undermined by agency inaction. If therapy failed because of scheduling, provider mismatch, transportation, interstate complications, or the Department’s refusal to adjust the plan, that record must be made in real time rather than reconstructed on appeal.

The case also matters in non-termination family litigation. In conservatorship and modification proceedings involving family violence, substance abuse, alienation claims, or a child’s resistance to reunification, judges often respond favorably to litigants who can show structured efforts to repair the parent-child relationship before seeking severe restrictions. Lawyers should think in L.G. terms: What was the plan? Who offered services? Were they funded or facilitated? Was contact maintained? Were relative supports explored? Was there a documented, child-specific explanation for why reunification efforts failed?

A few strategic takeaways follow:

• Draft proposed orders with separate, detailed findings whenever reunification efforts are relevant.
• Treat service plans and therapy records as merits evidence, not administrative background.
• Build a record connecting each service to a specific safety concern or parenting deficit.
• Address credibility aggressively at trial; sufficiency review will usually defer to the judge’s witness assessments.
• In interstate or relocation scenarios, document how services and visitation were adapted—or why they were not.

Checklists

Drafting a Termination Order That Complies with § 161.001(f) and (g)

• Include a separate section of the decree devoted to reasonable efforts.
• State expressly that the finding is made by clear and convincing evidence.
• Identify the family service plan and explain how it was tailored to the parent’s issues.
• List specific referrals, services provided, and services paid for by DFPS.
• Describe therapy efforts with enough detail to show reunification purpose.
• Include maintained contact, visitation efforts, and placement exploration where applicable.
• Add a separate written finding that, despite those efforts, a continuing danger remained in the home.
• Avoid conclusory boilerplate if the record supports more specific drafting.

Building the Evidentiary Record for DFPS or Child’s Counsel

• Offer the family service plan into evidence.
• Elicit testimony explaining why each required service was chosen.
• Prove that referrals were actually made, not merely contemplated.
• Show who paid for services and whether transportation or logistics were addressed.
• Establish frequency and quality of caseworker-parent contact.
• Document visitation opportunities and any barriers to implementation.
• Present evidence of relative-placement or kinship-placement efforts.
• Use therapist testimony, reports, or recommendations to explain why therapy continued, changed, or ended.
• Tie all reunification efforts to the statutory question of return to the home.
• Secure explicit credibility findings where the parent’s testimony conflicts with the Department’s record.

Challenging Reasonable-Efforts Findings for Parents

• Object to vague or non-specific findings in the proposed decree.
• Force the Department to identify what efforts were made before trial, not in general terms.
• Show that services were inaccessible because of distance, work schedule, language, disability, or cost.
• Demonstrate that the service plan was not actually tailored to the barriers preventing return.
• Develop testimony on delays in referrals, provider waitlists, canceled appointments, or inconsistent caseworker follow-through.
• Challenge whether the Department adapted services after relocation or changed circumstances.
• Show that visitation or therapy was restricted for reasons unrelated to the parent’s conduct.
• Distinguish between monitoring a case and making reunification efforts.
• Preserve complaints in the trial court rather than relying solely on sufficiency review on appeal.

Using L.G. in Broader Family Litigation

• In custody modifications, document concrete reunification steps before asking for severe possession limits.
• In divorce cases involving family violence, use structured therapy and supervised-contact records to support or oppose conservatorship positions.
• In SAPCR disputes, frame requests around child-specific safety concerns and remedial efforts, not abstract parental shortcomings.
• When a child resists reunification, create a record showing whether therapy and family contact were attempted and why they succeeded or failed.
• Use detailed proposed findings to improve appellate defensibility in any case involving parent-child restrictions.

Citation

L. G. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, No. 03-25-00973-CV (Tex. App.—Austin May 22, 2026, mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

~~c618ffe3-1762-494f-826e-c44b4fce6ee4~~