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Rule 145 Indigency Contest | In re E.C.O. and A.J.O. (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of E.C.O. and A.J.O., Children, 05-25-01603-CV, June 02, 2026.

On appeal from 468th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas

Synopsis

Rule 145 does not carry a high-income exception, but it still requires proof. In In the Interest of E.C.O. and A.J.O., the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a declarant who admitted earning about $180,000 annually, acknowledged a monthly surplus after expenses, and failed to present documentation supporting an inability to pay costs or give security did not establish indigency, so the trial court acted within its discretion in sustaining the contest.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters in family-law appeals because Rule 145 contests arise frequently in SAPCR, modification, enforcement, and divorce cases where one side seeks to avoid appellate costs, transcript fees, or security requirements after an adverse ruling. The case gives family-law litigators a practical roadmap: if the opponent claims inability to pay, the real battleground is not rhetoric about fixed obligations or support burdens, but a documented record showing whether the declarant can pay all, part, or security through a genuine good-faith effort without sacrificing necessities. In custody and property litigation alike, this decision reinforces that trial courts may scrutinize spending choices, income, available assets, and the absence of corroborating proof.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The appellant, proceeding pro se, filed a statement of inability to afford court costs or an appeal bond under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145 while pursuing an appeal in a family-law matter involving children. The appellee filed a contest, and the trial court conducted the required hearing.

At that hearing, the appellant testified that his fixed expenses exceeded his reliable income, that his liquid assets were only about $60, and that borrowing or posting security would be catastrophically disruptive because it would impair his ability to pay for housing, transportation, and child support. But he also admitted several facts that materially undercut the indigency claim. He acknowledged current employment and a salary of approximately $180,000 per year. He further acknowledged there was at least a slight monthly surplus after expenses, even though he maintained the surplus was insufficient to cover appellate bond and transcript costs.

The trial court initially signed an order sustaining the contest, but the court of appeals abated the matter because the order lacked sufficiently detailed findings under Rule 145(f)(2). On remand, the trial court entered more specific findings, including that the appellant earned roughly $180,000 annually, had a monthly surplus of $1,765 after expenses, owned a vehicle worth $23,558, and made excessive personal spending choices. The appellant challenged those findings, arguing among other things that the trial court used the wrong standard, lacked evidentiary support, failed to consider supplemental materials submitted after the hearing, omitted Rule 145(f)(4) language, and did not consider installment payments.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court relied primarily on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145, especially Rule 145(f)(1), which places the burden on the declarant to prove inability to afford costs when a contest is filed. The court also referenced Rule 145(f)(2), requiring detailed findings when a contest is sustained, Rule 145(f)(3), which permits partial or installment payment orders, and Rule 145(f)(4), which addresses notice of the right to challenge the order in the court of appeals.

The controlling substantive standard came from In re C.H.C., 331 S.W.3d 426, 429 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam): indigency turns on whether the record shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant would be unable to pay the costs, or a part of them, or give security, if the applicant really wanted to and made a good-faith effort to do so.

The court also applied familiar abuse-of-discretion review principles, citing Basaldua v. Hadden, 298 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (per curiam), and reiterated that the trial court may consider employment history, valuable property, and the ability to obtain funds through available resources, citing In re M.M.J., No. 05-22-00356-CV, 2022 WL 2582560, at 1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 8, 2022, order) (mem. op.). For the proposition that unobjected-to unsworn statements may be treated as evidence, the court relied on Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam). And on the installment-payment point, the court relied on waiver principles reflected in Interest of S.V., 05-23-00324-CV, 2025 WL 2898007, at 5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 10, 2025, order) (mem. op.).

Application

The Dallas Court of Appeals framed the case around the evidentiary burden, not the appellant’s characterization of his finances. The appellant testified that his obligations were substantial and that paying costs would be harmful, but the trial court was entitled to weigh that testimony against the admissions that mattered most: he was currently employed, he earned about $180,000 annually, and he had a monthly surplus after paying expenses. In a Rule 145 contest, those facts do not automatically defeat indigency, but they force the declarant to come forward with competent, concrete proof explaining why apparent income and surplus do not translate into an ability to pay costs, part of costs, or security.

That evidentiary showing never materialized. The appellate court emphasized that the appellant presented no documentation of expenses and no exhibits corroborating his claim that, notwithstanding his income and admitted surplus, he could not fund appellate costs. That omission was especially consequential because the Rule 145 inquiry is not whether payment would be inconvenient or financially painful; it is whether the declarant could not pay, even in part, despite a real good-faith effort. On this record, the trial court could reasonably conclude the appellant had not made that showing.

The court also rejected procedural attacks on the findings. The detailed post-abatement findings were sufficient because they identified concrete facts—income, surplus, asset value, and spending behavior—rather than merely reciting a conclusion of “not indigent.” The court further held that the appellant’s hearing statements, though unsworn, counted as evidence absent objection under Mathis. And when the appellant attempted to cure evidentiary deficiencies after abatement by filing supplemental materials and seeking another hearing, the court held Rule 145 entitled him to one evidentiary hearing, not a do-over. The appellate abatement was for findings, not for reopening the proof.

Finally, the court treated the omitted Rule 145(f)(4) notice language as harmless under the circumstances because the appellant had already challenged the ruling in the court of appeals. As to installment payments, the court noted Rule 145(f)(3) is permissive and held the complaint waived because the record did not show the appellant actually asked the trial court to consider installments.

Holding

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the contest to the statement of inability to afford costs. The record showed substantial current income, an admitted monthly surplus after expenses, and no documentary support establishing inability to pay costs, part of the costs, or security despite a good-faith effort. Under Rule 145 and In re C.H.C., that record did not establish indigency.

The court also held that the trial court’s detailed findings on remand were adequate. Findings that the declarant earned approximately $180,000 annually, had a monthly surplus of $1,765 after expenses, owned a vehicle of material value, and engaged in excessive personal spending were factual findings sufficient to support the ruling.

The court further held that unobjected-to unsworn statements made by the pro se appellant at the hearing could be treated as evidence, that Rule 145 did not require a second evidentiary hearing after abatement for findings, that any omission of Rule 145(f)(4) notice language was harmless on these facts, and that any complaint about installment payments was waived because it was not raised in the trial court.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, this case is most useful as a record-building decision. In divorce and custody appeals, indigency disputes often arise after fee-intensive temporary-orders battles, final trials, or enforcement proceedings have already produced a messy financial picture. E.C.O. confirms that the declarant’s burden is affirmative and evidentiary. If your opposing party has meaningful income, owns non-exempt or financeable assets, or admits any monthly surplus, a Rule 145 contest should focus the court on the absence of corroborating financial proof and on whether the party can pay at least some portion of costs or provide security through a good-faith effort.

In property cases, this is especially important where the would-be appellant claims cash-flow distress while still controlling valuable vehicles, brokerage balances, deferred compensation, business interests, or discretionary spending categories. The opinion suggests that trial courts may look past broad claims of “fixed obligations” and examine whether those obligations are truly necessary expenses or simply spending choices. In a divorce appeal involving a high earner with debt service, elective expenses, and a strained liquidity story, this case is authority for insisting on bank records, paystubs, budgets, debt statements, and evidence of inability to obtain financing.

In SAPCR and modification litigation, the opinion also has tactical significance for transcript and clerk’s-record costs. When the declarant argues that support obligations and household expenses make payment impossible, the response is not to minimize those obligations but to force the Rule 145 standard back into view: can the party pay all, part, or security if acting in good faith? If the answer may be yes, the contest should be developed accordingly. Conversely, if you represent the declarant, this case is a warning that conclusory testimony—even emotionally compelling testimony—will often fail without documentary backup.

Several practical takeaways follow:

Checklists

Contesting an Opponent’s Rule 145 Statement

Proving Indigency for Your Client

Preserving Error at the Rule 145 Hearing

Using This Case in Family-Law Appeals

Citation

In the Interest of E.C.O. and A.J.O., Children, No. 05-25-01603-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Dallas June 2, 2026, mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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