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Family Code Section 201.015 Does Not Strip Associate Judge Authority | In re Leake (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In Re Maj. Christina I. Leake, 07-26-00228-CV, June 10, 2026.

On appeal from 137th District Court of Lubbock County, Texas

Synopsis

A written objection under Texas Family Code section 201.015 does not automatically disable an associate judge from receiving filings, sending hearing-related communications, or conducting proceedings in a SAPCR. The Amarillo Court held that section 201.015 addresses de novo review by the referring court after an associate judge’s order; it is not a jurisdiction-stripping mechanism, and mandamus fails absent a showing that the associate judge acted outside the authority granted by Family Code section 201.007.

Relevance to Family Law

This is a practical family-law decision, especially for litigators handling SAPCRs, custody modifications, temporary orders, and referral-heavy dockets where associate judges do much of the day-to-day work. The opinion clarifies that filing a section 201.015 objection is not a procedural freeze button: in custody and related family litigation, counsel should not assume that an objection to an associate judge’s ruling halts the associate judge’s ongoing administrative or adjudicative role unless the complained-of act actually exceeds the powers conferred by Chapter 201. The case also reinforces two recurring family-law realities—mandamus requires a disciplined record, and delay can destroy extraordinary relief even where the underlying complaint sounds serious.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The underlying proceeding was a long-running SAPCR that had been pending since 2016 and remained unresolved without a final order. By late 2025, the relator was proceeding pro se and had generated an unusually large volume of filings in the trial court and, later, in the court of appeals. In the mandamus proceeding, she advanced numerous complaints touching nearly every aspect of case administration, including the failure to rule on motions, the authority of the associate judge, clerk-routing practices, alleged post-recusal involvement by a former district judge, and asserted defects in prior temporary orders.

The issue with the most durable significance for family practitioners concerned the relator’s argument that two written objections under Texas Family Code section 201.015 stripped the associate judge of authority to continue participating in the case. She characterized the associate judge’s receipt of filings, issuance of hearing-related communications, and conduct of proceedings as void because, in her view, section 201.015 functioned as an automatic bar to further associate-judge action. She also attacked the routing of filings to the associate judge rather than directly to the district judge.

The Amarillo Court rejected that premise. Reading Chapter 201 in context, the court distinguished between the powers affirmatively granted to associate judges under section 201.007 and the de novo review procedure established by section 201.015. Because the relator did not identify conduct falling outside section 201.007’s authorization, she failed to establish an abuse of discretion or a basis for mandamus.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court applied several familiar mandamus and family-procedure rules:

Application

The court treated the relator’s section 201.015 theory as a statutory interpretation problem embedded in a mandamus case. Her position was that once written objections were filed, the associate judge became functionally disabled from doing anything further in the matter. The court refused that reading because it could not be squared with the statutory structure. Section 201.007 grants specific powers to associate judges. Section 201.015, by contrast, addresses what happens after an associate judge has made an order and a party seeks de novo review by the referring court. In the court’s view, the latter provision creates a review mechanism; it does not silently negate the former provision’s grant of authority.

That framing mattered because mandamus is not available to test abstract disagreement with case administration. The relator needed to identify concrete acts by the associate judge that fell outside the powers enumerated in section 201.007. She did not do so. Instead, she relied on the premise that her objections alone disabled the associate judge. Once the court rejected that premise, the mandamus complaint collapsed for lack of a demonstrated ultra vires act.

The court took a similarly restrained approach to the related complaint about the coordinator or clerk routing filings to the associate judge. Even assuming some procedural irregularity, the court emphasized the limits of its mandamus jurisdiction and the relator’s failure to show interference with the court’s jurisdiction. That is an important distinction for appellate preservation: procedural dissatisfaction is not self-executing mandamus error.

The balance of the opinion reinforces how unforgiving original proceedings can be. On the failure-to-rule complaints, the court held that filing motions is not enough; the record must show presentment and an unreasonable lapse of time. On the attack against older temporary orders, the court invoked mandamus delay principles, noting an approximately eighteen-month lag with no justification. On the recusal issue, the court found the record too imprecise to establish that the recused judge had actually acted. Across all of these points, the court returned to the same themes: exactness, statutory fit, and disciplined mandamus proof.

Holding

The court held that Texas Family Code section 201.015 does not divest an associate judge of authority to continue acting in a SAPCR. The statute governs de novo review by the referring court after an associate judge’s order; it is not an automatic stay, disqualification device, or jurisdictional bar. Because the relator failed to show that the associate judge acted outside the powers granted by section 201.007, mandamus relief was denied.

The court also held that complaints about filing-routing practices did not support mandamus on the record presented. Even if routing filings to the associate judge rather than the district judge were inconsistent with the relator’s reading of Chapter 201, the court lacked authority to compel changes by court staff absent a showing tied to its own jurisdiction.

As to the failure-to-rule complaints, the court held that the relator did not establish the required presentment or an unreasonable delay, especially given the complexity of the case and the extraordinary volume of filings. It further held that mandamus cannot be used to compel a particular ruling on a proposed order.

Finally, the court denied relief on the relator’s other complaints, including alleged action by a recused judge and attacks on prior temporary orders, because the record lacked the precision required for mandamus and because the delay in seeking extraordinary relief was unexplained and excessive.

Practical Application

For Texas family litigators, the immediate takeaway is straightforward: do not advise clients that filing a written objection under section 201.015 strips an associate judge of authority going forward. If you want to challenge an associate judge’s continuing role, the question is not whether an objection was filed, but whether the specific act complained of falls outside section 201.007 or violates some other enforceable statutory limit.

This matters in several common settings. In a contested custody case, counsel may object to an associate judge’s recommendation or order and pursue de novo review, but the case may still continue to move through referral procedures unless and until the referring court acts. In modification litigation, temporary-order practice and scheduling communications from the associate judge are not rendered void merely because a party has demanded de novo review. In enforcement and property-related family cases, the same principle cautions against building strategy around the assumption that the referral pipeline has been shut down by objection alone.

The case also has a strong procedural lesson for appellate-minded trial lawyers. If the complaint is failure to rule, create a presentment record. If the complaint is ultra vires action by an associate judge, tie the complained-of act to the limits of section 201.007 with specificity. If the complaint concerns clerk or coordinator practices, recognize the jurisdictional hurdles before converting an administrative grievance into a mandamus petition. And if the complaint concerns temporary orders or emergency writs, act promptly. Even a potentially meritorious issue can be lost through delay.

Practically speaking, lawyers should distinguish among three different steps that are often blurred together in family practice:

  1. Preserving complaint to the associate judge’s ruling.
  2. Perfecting de novo review in the referring court.
  3. Establishing a separate basis for extraordinary appellate relief.

This opinion confirms those are not interchangeable. A section 201.015 filing may preserve or invoke review, but it does not itself prove that subsequent associate-judge actions are void.

Checklists

Challenging an Associate Judge’s Authority

Preserving a De Novo Complaint Under Section 201.015

Building a Mandamus Record on Failure to Rule

Avoiding Delay-Based Mandamus Problems

Complaints About Clerk or Coordinator Practices

Recusal and Void-Order Allegations

Citation

In re Maj. Christina I. Leake, No. 07-26-00228-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS ___ (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 10, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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