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Grandparent Standing Requires Proof of Lineage | In the Interest of A.T. (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of A.T., a Child, 05-25-00118-CV, June 12, 2026.

On appeal from 301st Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas

Synopsis

A litigant invoking grandparent standing under Texas Family Code sections 102.004(a)(2), 102.004(b), or 153.432 must prove the jurisdictional facts establishing that grandparent relationship. Where alleged paternal grandparents offered no evidence that they were the alleged father’s parents, they failed to raise a fact issue on standing, and dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters well beyond grandparent-access disputes because it reinforces a recurring procedural reality in Texas family litigation: standing facts must be proved, not merely pleaded. In modification suits, interventions, conservatorship contests, and access claims arising out of divorce or nonmarital parentage disputes, practitioners must build a jurisdictional record that connects every statutory relationship in the standing chain. If lineage is part of the standing theory, the absence of proof on that link can end the case before the court ever reaches best interest, parental fitness, or the merits of conservatorship and possession.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The underlying SAPCR began when DFPS filed suit involving A.T. in 2016. A 2018 order appointed DFPS permanent managing conservator, appointed the child’s mother possessory conservator, and did not establish paternity. A later modification proceeding was filed in 2019, and two groups intervened, including Willie N. Taylor, III and Terina R. Taylor.

The Taylors filed an amended petition in intervention asserting standing under pre-2025 Texas Family Code sections 102.004(a)(2), 102.004(b), and 153.432. Their theory was that they were A.T.’s paternal grandparents through Brent Taylor, whom they contended was A.T.’s father. Amy Christina Badstubner moved to strike the intervention for lack of standing, challenging both the paternity premise and the Taylors’ entitlement to proceed under the pleaded statutes.

The trial court dismissed the intervention. After final orders were entered in the modification proceeding, the Taylors appealed, arguing the trial court erred in concluding they lacked standing and in excluding them from the merits trial. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on a narrower defect than the paternity debate that occupied much of the parties’ briefing: the record contained no evidence that Willie and Terina Taylor were Brent Taylor’s parents.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court treated standing as a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and reviewed it de novo. It relied on the familiar principle that in SAPCR litigation a party must both plead and establish standing within the limits set by the Family Code.

The court drew its jurisdictional review framework from these authorities:

As to the statutory predicates, the court addressed the pre-2025 version of Family Code section 102.004 and section 153.432:

Application

The court’s analysis was disciplined and jurisdiction-first. It assumed, without deciding, that the Taylors may have raised some question about Brent Taylor’s relationship to A.T. But that did not solve the standing problem because every theory they pleaded required a second jurisdictional link: proof that Willie and Terina Taylor were Brent’s parents.

That evidentiary link was missing. The materials the Taylors cited addressed Brent’s alleged paternity of A.T., including DFPS pleadings, court orders, a disputed birth certificate attached to their petition, and Brent’s written consent supporting the intervention. None of that evidence established that Brent was the child of Willie or Terina Taylor. The court noted that even Brent’s notarized consent only swore that he was A.T.’s father; it said nothing about his parentage. Likewise, Terina Taylor’s affidavit did not identify herself as Brent’s mother.

The opinion is particularly important for its treatment of bare allegations. The Taylors repeatedly alleged that they were A.T.’s paternal grandparents, but once that jurisdictional fact was challenged, allegations alone were not evidence and did not amount to more than a scintilla under Powell and Swanson. The appellate court also emphasized that when asked at oral argument, the Taylors could not identify any place in the record where evidence of their relationship to Brent appeared.

Because all pleaded standing theories depended on the same relational chain, the failure of proof on one link defeated every theory at once. The court therefore did not need to resolve the larger dispute over whether Brent had been legally established as A.T.’s father. Even if that question favored the Taylors, the absence of proof that they were Brent’s parents was independently fatal.

Holding

The court held that a party seeking to invoke grandparent standing under Texas Family Code sections 102.004(a)(2), 102.004(b), or 153.432 must establish the jurisdictional facts showing the claimed grandparent relationship. In practical terms, the litigant must produce evidence supporting each required familial link, not simply the child’s relationship to an alleged parent.

The court further held that alleged paternal grandparents lack standing when the jurisdictional record contains no evidence that they are the alleged father’s parents. Because the Taylors produced no evidence raising a fact issue on that lineage element, the trial court correctly dismissed their intervention for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

The court also made clear that this evidentiary failure disposed of all appellate complaints, including the argument that the Taylors were improperly excluded from the merits proceedings. Without standing, they were not entitled to participate as parties in the merits trial.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, this case is a reminder that standing in SAPCR practice is often won or lost on record assembly, not legal rhetoric. Grandparent intervenors and original filers must be prepared to prove the biological or adoptive pathway that gives them statutory status. If the theory is “paternal grandparents through father,” counsel should expect a challenge to every jurisdictional step: the child-to-father relationship, the father-to-grandparent relationship, and, depending on the statute invoked, any additional elements such as significant impairment or access prerequisites.

The opinion also has consequences in modification practice involving foster placements, kinship disputes, and contested conservatorship interventions. Many practitioners focus on best-interest facts and assume relational status will be inferred from names, pleadings, or informal references in prior orders. This case shows that appellate courts will not make those inferences when standing is challenged with a no-evidence jurisdictional attack.

The strategic lesson is straightforward: if your client’s standing depends on consanguinity, put on competent proof of consanguinity. That may include birth records, adoption records, judicial admissions, stipulations, affidavits with admissible factual content, or testimony expressly establishing the lineage. If you represent the party opposing intervention, this case provides a clean roadmap for narrowing the fight to an omitted jurisdictional link and seeking dismissal before the case reaches the merits.

This opinion is also useful in divorce and post-divorce litigation where nonparents attempt to enter an already-pending conservatorship dispute. Standing challenges remain one of the most efficient procedural tools available. If the intervenor’s statutory footing depends on a family relationship that has not been proved, counsel should consider a focused no-evidence jurisdictional challenge rather than litigating best interest prematurely.

Checklists

Building a Grandparent Standing Record

Responding to a Standing Challenge

Opposing a Grandparent Intervention

Drafting Practice for Intervenors and Petitioners

Citation

In the Interest of A.T., a Child, No. 05-25-00118-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Dallas June 12, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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