Jackson v. Slack, 12-26-00030-CV, June 24, 2026.
On appeal from 7th Judicial District Court, Smith County, Texas
Synopsis
A no-answer default judgment cannot stand if substituted service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b) does not strictly comply with the trial court’s service order. In Jackson v. Slack, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that service on a leasing-office employee was invalid where the order authorized delivery only to a person over sixteen at the defendant’s specified apartment unit, or posting on that unit’s front door.
Relevance to Family Law
This opinion matters in family law because default divorces, SAPCR modifications, enforcement actions, and property-related claims often depend on substituted service when a respondent is evasive or transient. If the movant obtains a Rule 106 order tied to a specific residence, unit, or method, service must match that order exactly; otherwise, the resulting default decree, conservatorship order, support order, or property division is vulnerable to reversal for lack of personal jurisdiction. For family-law litigators, Jackson is another reminder that substitute service is not a substantial-compliance exercise, and a seemingly practical shortcut by a process server can unravel a final order years later.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
The plaintiff sued several defendants, including Jackson, and later moved for substituted service after multiple unsuccessful attempts at personal service. The motion described attempts at Jackson’s Dallas apartment, one attempt at his mother’s Houston residence, and an e-mail attempt. One of the Dallas attempts included contact with a leasing-office employee, “Jarrod,” who confirmed Jackson lived in the complex and in the identified unit.
The trial court signed an order authorizing substituted service at a very specific location and in only two ways: at “5225 Verde Valley #L-21, Dallas, TX 75254,” either by leaving the citation, petition, and service order with anyone over sixteen at that address, or by firmly affixing those documents to the front door at that address.
The return, however, stated that service was executed at “5225 Verde Valley Lane, Dallas, TX 75240” by delivering the papers to “Jared Simpson in the leasing office, per court order.” Jackson never answered, and the trial court later rendered a default judgment against him. After final judgment, Jackson moved for new trial, asserting lack of proper service and lack of notice. The trial court denied relief, and Jackson appealed.
Issues Decided
- Whether substituted service under Rule 106(b) supported a no-answer default judgment when the return showed service was made in the leasing office rather than at the apartment unit specified in the substituted-service order.
- Whether a deviation between the order’s authorized address and manner of service and the return’s recitals defeated strict compliance and therefore personal jurisdiction.
- Whether the default judgment had to be reversed because substituted service did not strictly comply with the order authorizing it.
Rules Applied
The court applied the familiar Texas default-service framework:
- A no-answer default judgment is disfavored and cannot stand unless the record affirmatively shows strict compliance with the rules governing issuance, service, and return of citation. Spanton v. Bellah, 612 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2020); Ins. Co. of State of Pa. v. Lejeune, 297 S.W.3d 254, 256 (Tex. 2009).
- Actual notice does not cure defective service. Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990).
- When substituted service is authorized under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b), the trial court’s order is the sole source of authority for that service; any deviation from the order invalidates service supporting a default judgment. Pirate Oilfield Services, Inc. v. Cunningham, 631 S.W.3d 421, 429 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.); Pro-Fire & Sprinkler, L.L.C. v. The Law Co., Inc., 661 S.W.3d 156, 163 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, no pet.).
- Appellate courts indulge no presumptions in favor of valid service in the default context. Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 316.
- The return of service is prima facie evidence of how service was performed, including when its recitations undermine the judgment. Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994).
The court also relied on address-discrepancy and substitute-service precedents emphasizing that mismatches in the defendant’s address or in the authorized method of service are fatal when the record does not show exact conformity. See Spanton, 612 S.W.3d at 317–18; Todd v. Sport Leasing & Fin. Services Corp., No. 01-10-00608-CV, 2011 WL 5617872, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 17, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Application
The court treated the substituted-service order as a narrow grant of authority, not a general permission slip to reach anyone associated with Jackson’s apartment complex. The order authorized service only at unit L-21 and only in one of two ways: delivery to a person over sixteen at that address or posting on the front door of that address. The return did not say either occurred. Instead, it said service was made on a leasing-office employee, in the leasing office, at a different address recitation.
That distinction drove the result. The court emphasized that the order did not authorize service on apartment staff, on a manager, or anywhere within the apartment complex generally. Nor did it authorize service “wherever Jackson could be found.” Had the order been written more broadly, the analysis might have been different. But under the order actually signed, the leasing office was not the place, and the leasing-office employee was not the authorized recipient.
The court also rejected any suggestion that the discrepancy was merely technical. Under Spanton, address discrepancies can sometimes be immaterial in other contexts, but not where substitute service depends entirely on a precise order and the record does not otherwise establish personal service or broad authorization. Here, the gap between “unit L-21” and “leasing office” was substantive, not ministerial. Because the return itself showed noncompliance, the appellate court concluded the service was invalid on the face of the record.
Holding
The Tyler Court of Appeals held that the substituted service did not strictly comply with the trial court’s Rule 106(b) order. Because the order authorized delivery only to a person over sixteen at Jackson’s specified apartment unit, or posting on that unit’s front door, delivery to a leasing-office employee in the complex office was outside the order’s terms and therefore ineffective.
The court further held that, absent valid service, the trial court never acquired personal jurisdiction to render a no-answer default judgment against Jackson. The default judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Practical Application
For Texas family-law litigators, Jackson should influence both drafting and attacking default records. In divorce and SAPCR practice, substituted service is common when a spouse has moved out, a parent is avoiding service, or the petitioner only has an apartment-complex address, workplace lead, or relative’s residence. This case underscores that once you ask for a Rule 106 order, you are locking yourself into the exact place and exact manner the order authorizes. If the order says “leave with anyone over sixteen at Apartment 204,” service on a front-desk employee, concierge, leasing agent, doorman, receptionist, or neighboring unit occupant will not support a no-answer default unless the order expressly authorizes that route.
The case also has consequences in post-judgment family litigation. A party seeking to set aside a default divorce, default modification, default enforcement, or default property division should start with the substituted-service order and the return, comparing them line by line. If the address varies, the unit number differs, the documents listed in the order were not all delivered, or the recipient does not fit the order’s description, the jurisdictional attack may be stronger than any equitable motion-for-new-trial argument.
On the front end, counsel seeking substitute service in family cases should draft orders with realistic precision. If the facts support service through an apartment manager, front-office staff, gated-community attendant, workplace supervisor, or electronic method, say so expressly in the motion and proposed order. Do not assume a process server, district clerk, or later reviewing court will treat “close enough” as enough. They will not, and under Spanton, Wilson, and now Jackson, they should not.
Checklists
Drafting the Rule 106 Motion and Order
- Identify the exact address where prior attempts were made, including unit number, city, and ZIP code.
- Match the address in the motion, proposed order, citation, and supporting affidavit exactly.
- Request every substitute method you may realistically need based on the facts.
- If service at an apartment complex may involve a leasing office, manager, concierge, or gate attendant, expressly include that person or location in the proposed order.
- If posting is requested, specify the exact door or location where posting may occur.
- If electronic service is sought, identify the exact e-mail address, social media account, or other technology and include it in the order.
- Require service of all documents the rules and the order contemplate, including the citation, petition, and signed substituted-service order.
Reviewing the Return Before Taking Default
- Confirm the return recites the exact address authorized in the order.
- Confirm the return identifies the exact method authorized in the order.
- Confirm the return states service was made on a person matching the order’s description, if delivery—not posting—was used.
- Confirm the return recites delivery of every required document, including the substituted-service order if the order requires it.
- Confirm the date and manner of service are internally consistent across the citation, return, and docket activity.
- Confirm there are no discrepancies in apartment number, street suffix, ZIP code, or recipient identity.
- If there is any discrepancy, re-serve before taking default.
Attacking a Default Order in Family Court
- Obtain the clerk’s record, including the motion for substituted service, supporting affidavit, signed order, citation, and return.
- Compare the order and return word for word for address, unit, and method compliance.
- Check whether the return shows service on an unauthorized intermediary, such as a leasing-office employee or receptionist.
- Evaluate whether the order authorized service at a specific location or more broadly wherever the respondent could be found.
- Raise lack of personal jurisdiction directly; do not rely only on lack of notice or equitable excuse.
- Cite Spanton v. Bellah and Wilson v. Dunn for strict compliance and the rule that actual notice does not cure defective service.
- In family cases, assess whether later orders dependent on the default decree may also be vulnerable.
Using Jackson Proactively in Family Litigation
- In default divorce cases, verify substitute service before proving up marital property relief.
- In SAPCR cases, scrutinize substitute service before seeking conservatorship restrictions or child-support orders by default.
- In enforcement cases, ensure service complies exactly before pursuing contempt-adjacent relief or money judgments.
- In modification suits, use Jackson to oppose efforts to shortcut service through apartment staff or office personnel unless the order expressly permits it.
- In restricted-appeal or post-judgment strategy, treat service defects as jurisdictional leverage that may overcome otherwise difficult timelines or factual disputes.
Citation
Jackson v. Slack, No. 12-26-00030-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Tyler June 24, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
Family Law Crossover
This is the kind of civil procedure ruling that can be weaponized effectively in a Texas divorce or custody case because family dockets are full of defaults built on “practical” service workarounds. If opposing counsel obtained a Rule 106 order limited to a residence but the process server left papers with office staff, a parent of the respondent, a new spouse, or apartment personnel outside the order’s terms, Jackson supplies a clean appellate and post-judgment argument: no strict compliance, no personal jurisdiction, no valid default. Conversely, if you are the party seeking default relief, Jackson is a warning that aggressive merits strategy is worthless if the service record is brittle. In family cases involving disproportionate property awards, sole managing conservatorship, geographic restrictions, support arrearages, or enforcement relief, the service record may be the most important part of the file.
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