Family Violence Finding Supports Sole Conservatorship | Paris v. Paris (2025)

Austin Paris v. Alexandra Paris, 02-25-00235-CV, June 25, 2026.

On appeal from 442nd District Court, Denton County, Texas

Synopsis

Yes. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Family Code Section 153.004 authorizes a trial court to appoint one parent sole managing conservator and to substantially restrict the other parent’s possession and access when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of family violence and substance or alcohol abuse. The evidence here was sufficient to support protective limitations, including no in-person contact during the pendency of the protective order, electronic contact only, step-up visitation conditions, reunification measures, and testing requirements.

Relevance to Family Law

This case is a useful reminder that Section 153.004 is not limited to situations involving direct violence against the children themselves. In divorce and SAPCR litigation, evidence of family violence against the other parent, coupled with evidence of alcohol or substance abuse, can drive conservatorship, possession, and access outcomes in a decisive way. For trial lawyers, the case underscores two strategic realities: first, a developed evidentiary record on violence, recurrence risk, and impaired parenting will support highly restrictive possession provisions; second, appellants challenging those findings face a steep abuse-of-discretion standard, especially where the decree is layered onto an existing protective order.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Austin Paris appealed a divorce decree entered after a one-day bench trial in Denton County. The parties had three children. After the parties separated, Alexandra Paris filed for divorce and sought a protective order, alleging a history or pattern of family violence during the two years preceding filing and a history of alcohol abuse. Austin denied those allegations and sought joint managing conservatorship.

Before trial on the divorce, the court held a hearing on the protective-order application and found that Austin had committed family violence and was likely to do so again. The resulting protective order gave Alexandra exclusive possession of the children and prohibited Austin from going within 500 feet of locations where Alexandra or the children were known to be, and from communicating with them except through counsel or AppClose. Austin represented that he had no in-person contact with the children after entry of that order.

At the later divorce trial, the court appointed Alexandra sole managing conservator and Austin possessory conservator. But the decree did not allow immediate standard possession. Instead, it provided that no in-person visitation would occur until all protective orders protecting Alexandra and the children had expired and until Austin completed a batterers intervention and prevention program. The decree also allowed limited scheduled electronic contact, imposed step-up provisions before unsupervised visitation could occur, required reunification therapy, and required drug and alcohol testing. The decree also included a property-damage award and attorney’s fees, though the headline issue for family lawyers is the affirmance of the Section 153.004 findings and restrictions.

Issues Decided

The court addressed these issues:

• Whether the trial court abused its discretion by restricting the father’s possession of and access to the children based on findings of family violence and alcohol or substance abuse.
• Whether Family Code Section 153.004 permits restrictions on possession and access even when the alleged family violence was not directed at the children themselves.
• Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support findings of a history or pattern of family violence and alcohol or substance abuse.
• Whether the resulting conservatorship and possession structure, including sole managing conservatorship for the mother and step-up conditions for the father, was within the trial court’s discretion.

Rules Applied

The court relied principally on the Family Code and familiar abuse-of-discretion review principles:

• Texas Family Code Section 153.002: the child’s best interest is the primary consideration in conservatorship and possession determinations.
• Texas Family Code Section 153.004(c): the trial court must consider family violence in deciding whether to deny, restrict, or limit possession by a parent appointed possessory conservator.
• Texas Family Code Section 153.004(d) and (d-1): where there is a history or pattern of family violence during the two years before suit or during the suit, the court may not allow access unless it finds access would not endanger the child’s physical health or emotional welfare, would be in the child’s best interest, and enters a possession order designed to protect the child and any other victim of family violence.
• Texas Family Code Section 153.004(e): credible evidence of a history or pattern of abuse or family violence creates a rebuttable presumption that unsupervised visitation is not in the child’s best interest.
• Abuse of discretion standard: custody, conservatorship, and possession determinations are reviewed deferentially, with the appellate court asking whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or without reference to guiding rules and principles.
• The court also cited authority recognizing the trial court’s broad latitude in determining best interest and in crafting possession restrictions where the record contains some evidence to support them.

Application

The court treated the conservatorship and possession issues through the lens that matters most in Texas family appeals: best interest under a highly deferential standard, informed by the mandatory family-violence framework in Section 153.004. The father’s central appellate premise was that restrictions were improper because there was no evidence he committed family violence against the children. The court rejected that framing. Section 153.004 requires consideration of family violence in determining possession and access and is designed to protect not only the child, but also any other person who has been a victim of family violence committed by the parent. In other words, violence against the other parent can be enough to trigger the statute’s protective architecture.

That mattered because the trial court was not operating in a vacuum. It had already heard evidence in the protective-order proceeding, found that the father committed family violence, and found that he was likely to do so again in the future. The divorce decree expressly preserved the protective order and built the possession scheme around it. The appellate court also took judicial notice of the related appellate record from the protective-order case. In practical terms, this meant the family-violence findings were not isolated allegations in pleadings; they had already been adjudicated in a related proceeding and were part of the broader record.

Against that backdrop, the decree’s structure made sense under Section 153.004. The court did not simply terminate the father’s relationship with the children. It allowed scheduled electronic contact and established a step-up path toward future in-person and potentially unsupervised contact. But that path required expiration of protective orders, completion of a batterers intervention and prevention program, reunification therapy, and alcohol and drug testing. The appellate court viewed those conditions as precisely the sort of protective tailoring contemplated by the statute.

The court also accepted that evidence of alcohol or substance abuse supported these restrictions. The opinion’s holding confirms that the evidence was sufficient to sustain findings in that area as well, reinforcing that family-violence evidence and impairment evidence often work in tandem in possession litigation. Once the trial court had credible evidence supporting those concerns, it was entitled to conclude that immediate in-person possession or unsupervised access would not adequately protect the children and the other parent.

Holding

The court held that Family Code Section 153.004 supports restrictive conservatorship and possession orders when credible evidence establishes a history or pattern of family violence by a parent. The statute does not require proof that the parent committed violence directly against the children before the court may restrict possession and access. Violence against the other parent may support findings that shape both conservatorship and access.

The court further held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings regarding family violence and alcohol or substance abuse. Because those findings were supported by the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing the mother sole managing conservator, naming the father possessory conservator with major limitations, requiring electronic contact only for a period, conditioning future in-person contact on completion of a batterers intervention program and other protective measures, and requiring testing and reunification-related conditions.

Practical Application

For Texas family litigators, this case is best read as a record-building case. If you represent the parent seeking protection, do not present family violence as a narrow fault ground or as mere character evidence. Tie it directly to Section 153.004, recurrence risk, the child’s emotional welfare, and the need for a possession order designed to protect both the child and the victimized parent. This opinion validates decrees that sequence contact through a step-up structure rather than forcing the court into an all-or-nothing choice.

If you represent the accused parent, this case illustrates the danger of underestimating the cumulative force of related proceedings. A prior protective-order finding can heavily influence the later divorce decree, especially where the decree expressly preserves the protective order and aligns possession provisions with it. Defense strategy must therefore begin early, with focused cross-examination, competing witnesses where available, treatment records, negative testing, and a coherent rehabilitation narrative. Waiting to raise sufficiency complaints on appeal is usually too late.

This case also has drafting implications. Practitioners seeking restrictions should propose decrees with concrete safety mechanisms rather than vague “reasonable restrictions.” The provisions affirmed here were specific: no in-person contact during the protective-order term, scheduled electronic access, a batterers intervention requirement, reunification therapy, and testing. Those are easier to defend on appeal because they show the court did exactly what Section 153.004 expects: it fashioned an order designed to protect.

In relocation, temporary orders, and enforcement-adjacent disputes, the lesson is similar. When family violence and substance use overlap, conservatorship and possession become less about default frameworks and more about risk management. The lawyer who gives the court a detailed, evidence-based protective structure is far more likely to prevail than the lawyer who argues in generalities about parental rights.

Checklists

Building a Section 153.004 Record

• Plead a history or pattern of family violence with date ranges that fit the two-year statutory window or the pendency of suit.
• Tie the alleged conduct to Section 153.004 in both pleadings and trial briefing.
• Offer evidence not only of incidents, but of recurrence risk, escalation, and effect on the children’s emotional welfare.
• Develop evidence showing why unrestricted possession would endanger the child’s physical health or emotional welfare.
• Include evidence concerning the safety of the other parent or any other victim of family violence.
• If alcohol or substance abuse is part of the theory, present corroborating records, tests, admissions, witness testimony, or incident-based proof.
• Ask for express findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Drafting Protective Possession Terms

• Propose whether contact should begin with no contact, electronic contact, supervised visitation, or therapeutic contact.
• Include objective step-up triggers, such as:
• completion of a batterers intervention and prevention program
• clean drug and alcohol testing
• reunification therapy milestones
• expiration or modification of a protective order
• Specify communication platforms, duration, and frequency for electronic contact.
• Define who selects supervisors, therapists, and testing providers.
• Address transportation, exchange logistics, and safety-buffer provisions.
• Ensure the decree expressly states how it interacts with any protective order.

Defending the Restriction on Appeal

• Anchor the order in best-interest findings and Section 153.004 findings.
• Show that the restrictions are protective rather than punitive.
• Emphasize that the court crafted a path for future increased access, if appropriate.
• Cite the abuse-of-discretion standard and the trial court’s superior position to assess credibility.
• Preserve and reference related proceedings, including protective-order records, where judicial notice may be available.
• Avoid overreaching requests unsupported by the evidence; tailored restrictions are more defensible than blanket denials.

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Parent’s Problems

• Do not assume the absence of violence directed at the children defeats Section 153.004.
• Address protective-order allegations immediately and comprehensively; do not treat them as isolated from the divorce case.
• Present affirmative evidence of sobriety, treatment, compliance, and parenting stability.
• If substance use is alleged, obtain independent testing early and consistently.
• Complete voluntary intervention, counseling, or treatment before trial where appropriate.
• Offer a concrete safety plan and a realistic step-up schedule instead of demanding immediate standard possession.
• Ensure appellate briefing is fully developed with authority, record cites, and legal analysis.

Trial Preparation for Sole Managing Conservatorship Requests

• Link the requested conservatorship structure to specific safety facts, not generalized distrust.
• Show why joint managing conservatorship would be unworkable or unsafe under the evidence.
• Address decision-making authority, school, medical care, counseling, and communication boundaries.
• Use testimony and exhibits to explain why sole managing conservatorship is necessary to protect the children’s stability.
• Draft final orders that integrate conservatorship, possession restrictions, protective orders, and therapeutic conditions into one coherent framework.

Citation

Paris v. Paris, No. 02-25-00235-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 25, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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