Ryan Keith Markowski v. The State of Texas, 13-25-00191-CR, July 23, 2026.
On appeal from County Court at Law No. 3 of Williamson County, Texas
Synopsis
The court held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A) where the State proved an active family-violence bond condition prohibited the defendant from coming within 200 yards of the protected person’s residence, the underlying criminal case had not yet been disposed of, and officers observed him within the prohibited distance. The absence of a specific expiration date in the bond-condition order did not render the order unenforceable while the underlying case remained pending.
Relevance to Family Law
For Texas family-law litigators, this opinion matters because criminal bond conditions and related no-contact restrictions often overlap with divorce, SAPCR, protective-order, and exclusive-use-of-residence disputes. The case underscores that a criminal bond condition tied to family violence can remain operational without an express end date until the criminal case is resolved, which can materially affect possession exchanges, temporary orders, residence access, party communications, and strategy in parallel proceedings involving custody, occupancy, and safety-based injunctive relief.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
The defendant had been arrested in a family-violence case, and a magistrate signed an order imposing bond conditions. That order identified the complainant as a protected person and required the defendant not to come within 200 yards of her residence or workplace. The bond-condition order itself did not contain a stated expiration date. On the same date, the magistrate also signed a separate emergency protective order that did contain an express expiration date.
More than a year later, officers responded to a reported bond-condition violation. Before making contact, they reviewed the bond conditions. After speaking with the protected person at her residence, officers remained outside because they believed the defendant would return. They then observed him approaching the residence while walking two dogs and testified he came within the prohibited 200-yard range. The State charged him not with violating a protective order, but with violating a condition of bond in a family-violence case under Penal Code § 25.07.
At trial, the September 16, 2021 bond-condition order was admitted into evidence. Officers testified both that the defendant came within the prohibited distance and that the underlying criminal case was still active. Body-camera footage corroborated the encounter near the residence. The jury convicted, and the defendant challenged only the legal sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.
Issues Decided
- Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove a violation of a family-violence bond condition under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A).
- Whether the State was required to prove the statutory source for a protective order when the charging instrument alleged violation of a bond condition, not violation of a protective order.
- Whether a bond-condition order that contains no express expiration date remains enforceable while the underlying criminal case is still pending.
Rules Applied
The court applied the standard legal-sufficiency framework under Jackson v. Virginia and its Texas counterparts, evaluating whether a rational factfinder could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. It also measured sufficiency against the hypothetically correct jury charge authorized by the charging instrument.
Substantively, the court relied on Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A), which criminalizes intentionally or knowingly going to or near the residence of a protected individual in violation of a bond condition set in a family-violence case and related to the safety of the victim. The court also emphasized a doctrinal distinction embedded in § 25.07 itself: the statute covers multiple types of judicial restraints, including both qualifying protective orders and qualifying bond conditions. That distinction mattered because the appellant’s argument drew heavily from cases involving violations of protective orders rather than bond conditions.
The opinion discussed authorities such as Harvey v. State and Villarreal v. State, but only to explain why those cases did not control. Those decisions addressed § 25.07 prosecutions predicated on violating protective orders issued under identified statutory authority. Here, by contrast, the prosecution was based on an allegedly violated bond condition entered in a family-violence case for the complainant’s safety.
Application
The court treated the case as a straightforward bond-condition prosecution and refused to let it be reframed as a protective-order case. That was the pivot point in the appeal. The defendant argued the evidentiary record did not establish the statutory basis for a protective order and did not tie the accusation to one of the Family Code or Code of Criminal Procedure provisions referenced in prior case law. But the court found that premise flawed from the start because the information alleged violation of a condition of bond, not violation of a protective order.
Once the court focused on the correct theory of liability, the evidentiary path was direct. The bond-condition order itself was admitted into evidence. It expressly identified the protected individual and barred the defendant from approaching within 200 yards of her residence. Officers testified they reviewed those conditions before the incident, that the criminal case remained active, and that they personally observed the defendant within the prohibited radius. Body-camera footage provided additional support for the officers’ account.
The absence of an express expiration date in the bond-condition order did not create a sufficiency problem. The officers testified that such bond conditions remain in force until the underlying case is disposed of, and the record showed the underlying case was still pending. On that record, the jury could rationally infer the condition was valid and enforceable on the date of the charged conduct and that the defendant intentionally or knowingly went near the protected residence in violation of it.
Holding
The court held the evidence was legally sufficient to support the conviction under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A). The State proved a valid bond condition in a family-violence case prohibited the defendant from coming within 200 yards of the protected person’s residence, and officers observed him within that prohibited distance while the underlying case remained pending.
The court also held that the defendant’s reliance on protective-order cases was misplaced. In a prosecution based on violation of a bond condition, the State need not prove the statutory pedigree of a protective order merely because § 25.07 also encompasses other order-based violations. The charging instrument and proof aligned on a bond-condition theory, and that was sufficient.
Finally, the court held, in substance, that a bond-condition order lacking a stated expiration date remains enforceable through disposition of the underlying criminal case. That principle supported the jury’s finding that the order remained active on the date of the defendant’s conduct.
Practical Application
For family-law practitioners, Markowski is most useful in cases where criminal and family restraints operate at the same time. In divorce and SAPCR litigation, lawyers often assume the operative safety restrictions are limited to civil protective orders or temporary injunctions. This case is a reminder that criminal bond conditions may independently control where a party can go, whom the party may contact, and whether the party can lawfully approach a residence that may also be the marital home or a child-exchange location.
That matters in at least three recurring settings. First, in temporary-orders practice, a client’s claimed inability to access the residence, retrieve property, or attend exchanges may be driven by an active criminal bond condition rather than by the family court’s orders. Second, in conservatorship and possession litigation, courts evaluating best-interest, family-violence history, and practical exchange logistics should account for bond conditions that may still be in force even if a separate emergency protective order has expired. Third, in enforcement and contempt-adjacent disputes, counsel should carefully distinguish among bond conditions, magistrate’s emergency orders, temporary ex parte protective orders, and final protective orders; each has different issuance, duration, and proof questions.
Strategically, the opinion also gives family-law litigators a clean record-building lesson. If proximity restrictions matter, do not rely on general assumptions that “everyone knows” the restraint is still active. Put the operative order in the record, identify the protected address with precision, establish whether the underlying criminal case has been disposed, and develop testimony showing how and when the respondent came within the prohibited zone. Conversely, if you represent the restrained party in related civil litigation, do not assume an omitted expiration date creates a safe ambiguity. Markowski indicates that, at least for this type of bond condition, pendency of the underlying case can supply the continuing enforceability the State needs.
Checklists
Parallel-Proceeding Intake Checklist
- Determine whether there is a pending criminal case involving family violence.
- Obtain every operative order, not just the most recent one.
- Separate bond conditions from emergency protective orders and civil protective orders.
- Confirm the protected person, prohibited locations, and distance restrictions stated in each order.
- Verify whether the criminal case has been disposed, dismissed, or remains pending.
- Ask specifically whether the marital residence, a child’s school, or an exchange site falls within a prohibited zone.
Residence-and-Exchange Planning Checklist
- Confirm whether the restrained party is barred from the protected person’s residence.
- Evaluate whether a standard possession exchange location violates a no-go radius.
- Move exchanges to a neutral site if any criminal restriction may be implicated.
- Address property retrieval through agreed law-enforcement standby or written protocol.
- Build temporary-order language that does not inadvertently require a client to violate a criminal bond condition.
- Warn clients in writing that civil agreements do not override criminal no-contact or stay-away conditions.
Evidence Checklist for Proving a Violation
- Admit the signed bond-condition order into evidence.
- Identify the order as one entered in a family-violence case.
- Establish that the condition relates to victim or community safety.
- Prove the protected residence as specifically described in the order or record.
- Show the underlying criminal case was still pending on the incident date.
- Present testimony or video placing the respondent within the prohibited distance.
- Develop evidence supporting intentional or knowing presence near the residence.
Defense-Side Risk-Mitigation Checklist
- Do not assume an order is unenforceable merely because it lacks an expiration date.
- Verify the exact charging theory: bond-condition violation or protective-order violation.
- Examine whether the State can prove the location is the protected residence identified by the order.
- Scrutinize proof of distance, knowledge, and intentional conduct.
- Confirm whether the underlying criminal case was actually still pending.
- Advise the client to avoid all arguable proximity until the criminal court formally modifies conditions or disposes of the case.
Family-Law Hearing Preparation Checklist
- Tell the family court about any active criminal stay-away restrictions.
- Request practical exchange terms that harmonize with criminal conditions.
- Use the criminal order to support requests for supervised exchange, exclusive use, or safety provisions where appropriate.
- If representing the restrained party, request alternative communication and exchange mechanisms that preserve compliance.
- Make a clear record distinguishing expired emergency orders from still-active bond conditions.
- Avoid drafting agreed temporary orders that create impossible or contradictory obligations.
Citation
Ryan Keith Markowski v. State of Texas, No. 13-25-00191-CR, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 23, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
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