Section 161.001(b)(1)(L) Substantial Similarity | In the Interest of C.S. (2026)

In the Interest of C.S., a Child, 04-26-00262-CV, July 22, 2026.

On appeal from 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Synopsis

Section 161.001(b)(1)(L) permits termination based on an out-of-state conviction if the foreign statute contains elements substantially similar to a listed Texas child-sex or child-injury offense. In In the Interest of C.S., the Fourth Court held that a Georgia statutory-rape conviction under GA. CODE § 16-6-3 was sufficient because the record established conduct that satisfied the elements of Texas Penal Code § 21.11 indecency with a child, and that proof was legally and factually sufficient to support termination.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters well beyond stand-alone termination suits. For Texas family-law litigators handling SAPCRs, divorces involving conservatorship disputes, step-parent adoptions, and private termination actions, the case confirms that out-of-state sex-offense convictions can carry direct termination consequences even when Texas has no identically named offense. Strategically, that affects pleading, discovery, evidentiary preparation, and settlement leverage in any case where one parent has a foreign criminal history that bears on parental rights, possession, access, or a prospective adoption.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The case arose from a private termination-and-adoption proceeding filed by the child’s mother and her husband in Bexar County. The father had lived with the mother and child in Georgia during the child’s early years. When the child was approximately three, the father pleaded guilty in Georgia to statutory rape and was sentenced to ten years, serving roughly three before release in 2022.

After release, the father worked intermittently as a contractor, saw the child only twice over an extended period, and admitted he had provided only minimal support—$25 in cash for a book fair. In 2024, he was arrested again for failure to register his address as a sex offender and was reincarcerated in January 2025.

Mother and stepfather initially pleaded termination under what is now section 161.001(b)(1)(P), then amended to add subsections (C), (F), and (L). At trial, the central appellate issue became subsection (L): whether the Georgia conviction qualified as a conviction under “a law of another jurisdiction that contains elements that are substantially similar” to one of the Texas offenses enumerated in Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(L). The trial court concluded it did, terminated the father’s rights, and the father appealed on sufficiency grounds and best interest.

Issues Decided

• Whether Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(L) authorizes termination based on an out-of-state conviction whose statutory elements are substantially similar to a listed Texas offense.
• Whether a Georgia statutory-rape conviction under GA. CODE § 16-6-3 is substantially similar to a listed Texas offense, particularly Penal Code § 21.11 indecency with a child.
• Whether proof of the foreign conviction and its statutory elements was legally and factually sufficient to establish the subsection (L) predicate ground.
• Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding.

Rules Applied

The court applied the standard two-prong termination framework under Family Code section 161.001(b): clear and convincing evidence of at least one predicate ground and clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest.

On appellate review, the court used the familiar legal- and factual-sufficiency standards applicable in parental-rights termination cases, citing authorities including:

• In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2024)
• In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. 2024)
• In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021)
• In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2009)
• In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002)

As to the predicate ground, the court focused on Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(L), which reaches convictions under specified Texas statutes or “a law of another jurisdiction that contains elements that are substantially similar” to those offenses.

The comparison centered on:

• GA. CODE § 16-6-3, defining statutory rape as sexual intercourse with a person under 16 who is not the actor’s spouse.
• TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11, indecency with a child, which includes sexual contact with a child younger than 17.
• The statutory definition of “sexual contact” in TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(c).

The court also relied on In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 2020), for the proposition that a conviction for indecency with a child can itself support the inference of “serious injury of a child” under subsection (L), without additional evidence beyond the conviction itself.

Application

The Fourth Court approached the case as a substantial-similarity analysis rather than a demand for a mirror-image foreign statute. That distinction is the opinion’s practical core. Georgia’s offense was labeled statutory rape, while Texas has no directly corresponding statutory offense by that name. But the court did not treat the label as controlling. Instead, it looked to the foreign statute’s elements and the conduct necessarily established by the conviction.

Georgia statutory rape required proof of sexual intercourse with a person under sixteen. Texas Penal Code section 21.11 requires sexual contact with a child under seventeen. The court reasoned that sexual intercourse with a person under sixteen necessarily includes sexual contact with a child younger than seventeen. The record also reflected that the offense resulted in conception of a child, which the court viewed as making it obvious that the elements of indecency with a child were satisfied.

The father argued there was insufficient proof of the Georgia victim’s age at the time of the offense. The court rejected that point by treating the conviction itself as establishing the predicate facts of the offense. In other words, the termination court was not required to relitigate the underlying Georgia prosecution. Once the conviction under GA. CODE § 16-6-3 was proved, the age element embedded in that statute came with it.

From there, the court addressed the “death or serious injury” language in subsection (L). Relying on In re Z.N., the court treated indecency with a child as an offense from which serious injury can be inferred from the conviction itself. The opinion further noted the evidence that the underage victim became pregnant and gave birth, reinforcing the serious-injury component at least from an emotional or psychological standpoint. That analysis allowed the court to conclude that the conviction, coupled with the statutory comparison, satisfied subsection (L).

Because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough to affirm termination, the court’s analysis of subsection (L) effectively carried the judgment.

Holding

The court held that Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(L) allows termination based on an out-of-state conviction when the foreign law contains elements substantially similar to one of the Texas offenses listed in subsection (L). The statute does not require the foreign offense to have the same title or to duplicate Texas wording exactly.

The court further held that a Georgia conviction for statutory rape under GA. CODE § 16-6-3 was sufficiently similar to Texas Penal Code § 21.11 indecency with a child because sexual intercourse with a person under sixteen necessarily satisfies the sexual-contact requirement involving a child under seventeen. Proof of the Georgia conviction and the governing statutory elements was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under section 161.001(b)(1)(L).

The court also affirmed the trial court’s termination order overall, including the best-interest determination, thereby leaving the adoption path open for the stepfather.

Practical Application

For private petitioners, this case is a roadmap for pleading and proving subsection (L) when the parent’s criminal history arose outside Texas. The lesson is to build the termination case around statutory elements, certified conviction records, and a disciplined comparison to a listed Texas offense. Do not get distracted by differences in nomenclature. If the conduct established by the foreign conviction necessarily satisfies the elements of a listed Texas offense, C.S. gives trial courts room to find substantial similarity.

For respondents, the case is a warning that a generic sufficiency challenge will likely fail if the petitioner introduces the conviction and the foreign statute. The better defense posture is to attack the comparison at the element level. If the foreign offense can be committed in ways that do not necessarily satisfy the Texas comparator offense, that is where the record must be developed. Waiting until appeal to complain about missing details in the underlying criminal case is unlikely to succeed if the conviction itself resolves those details.

In conservatorship and possession litigation short of termination, the opinion also has persuasive value. Although subsection (L) is a termination ground, the court’s reasoning underscores how foreign sex-offense convictions should be framed in best-interest disputes. Practitioners should expect those convictions to influence supervised-access requests, geographic restrictions, and adoption planning.

In step-parent adoption cases, C.S. is especially useful because these suits often involve incomplete criminal records from another state. This opinion suggests that certified proof of conviction, coupled with the text of the foreign statute and a clean Texas-elements comparison, may be enough without reconstructing the entire criminal file.

Checklists

Pleading a Subsection (L) Case Based on a Foreign Conviction

• Plead Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(L) expressly.
• Identify the foreign statute by code section and offense name.
• Identify the Texas comparator offense listed in subsection (L).
• Allege that the foreign statute contains elements substantially similar to the Texas offense.
• Plead best interest separately and thoroughly; do not assume the predicate ground will carry best interest by itself.
• In private termination/adoption cases, tie the pleading to the adoption objective and permanency plan.

Proving Substantial Similarity at Trial

• Offer a certified copy of the foreign judgment of conviction.
• Offer the text of the foreign statute in effect at the time of conviction.
• Offer the text of the proposed Texas comparator statute.
• Walk the court through the element-by-element comparison.
• Highlight where the foreign offense necessarily includes conduct satisfying the Texas offense.
• If available, introduce record facts showing the conduct, especially where they reinforce the comparison.
• Preserve a clean evidentiary record showing that the victim’s age element is embedded in the foreign statute.

Building the Record for Petitioners

• Obtain certified penitentiary packets, judgments, plea paperwork, or other authenticated conviction documents.
• Confirm whether the foreign conviction was by plea, verdict, or deferred/community-supervision equivalent.
• Research whether the listed Texas comparator offense has controlling Supreme Court or court-of-appeals authority on subsection (L).
• Use In re Z.N. where indecency-with-a-child-type offenses support the serious-injury inference.
• Develop best-interest evidence independent of the criminal conviction: support history, contact history, stability, current household, and adoption plan.
• Request findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Defending Against a Foreign-Conviction Termination Theory

• Challenge whether the petitioner identified the correct Texas comparator offense.
• Analyze whether the foreign statute is broader than the Texas comparator.
• Determine whether the foreign offense can be committed without satisfying each essential Texas element.
• Object to unauthenticated criminal records or incomplete statutory materials.
• Force precision on the conviction date and the foreign statutory text in effect at that time.
• Contest any effort to supplement missing elements with speculation rather than record evidence.
• Develop contrary best-interest evidence even if the predicate-ground challenge is uphill.

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Parent’s Problems

• Do not assume that a foreign conviction is insulated from Texas termination statutes.
• Do not rely on the absence of a Texas offense with the same name.
• Do not leave support and contact records undeveloped; minimal support and sporadic contact are powerful corroborating facts.
• Do not overlook the collateral consequences of sex-offender-registration violations.
• Do not wait until appeal to raise element-comparison arguments that should have been sharpened in the trial court.
• Do not ignore findings of fact and conclusions of law; they often shape the appellate battlefield.

Using the Case in Related Family-Law Settings

• In modification suits, use the reasoning to frame risk-based access restrictions.
• In divorce cases involving SAPCR issues, investigate out-of-state convictions early in discovery.
• In step-parent adoption cases, evaluate subsection (L) before defaulting to abandonment-only theories.
• In mediated negotiations, use the strength of a documented foreign conviction as leverage on access, surrender, or adoption terms.
• In contested best-interest hearings, connect the conviction history to present-day child safety and stability concerns.

Citation

In the Interest of C.S., a Child, No. 04-26-00262-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 22, 2026, mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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