Section 85.025(b) Review Denial Not Appealable | Ikhlas v. Rasooli (2026)

Khaled Mohammad Ikhlas v. Farzana Rasooli, 14-25-00733-CV, July 23, 2026.

On appeal from 280th District Court, Harris County, Texas

Synopsis

Texas Family Code section 81.009(a) authorizes an appeal from a protective order rendered under Subtitle B, but not from an order denying a post-judgment motion to review, modify, or dissolve that order under section 85.025(b). In Ikhlas v. Rasooli, the Fourteenth Court held that a denial of a section 85.025(b) motion is not itself a new protective order, does not trigger appellate jurisdiction, and—at least on the facts presented—will not automatically be converted into a mandamus proceeding.

Relevance to Family Law

This jurisdictional holding matters well beyond standalone protective-order practice. Protective orders routinely intersect with pending divorce, SAPCR, modification, and possession litigation, and lawyers often treat later review proceedings as part of the broader family-law case. Ikhlas is a reminder that a post-order ruling finding a “continuing need” for an existing protective order may have major practical effects on conservatorship, possession, residence restrictions, firearms issues, and litigation leverage, yet still be nonappealable. For family-law litigators, that means appellate strategy must be built at the time of the original protective order, and any later section 85.025(b) challenge must be framed with a clear understanding that ordinary appeal may not be available.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The appellant attempted to appeal from the trial court’s denial of his “Motion Requesting Review of Protective Order and/or Motion to Modify and Dissolve Protective Order,” which he filed under Texas Family Code section 85.025(b). That statute permits a person subject to a protective order to request, no sooner than one year after the order was originally rendered, that the court review the order and determine whether a continuing need for the order remains.

After conducting a hearing, the trial court signed an order finding that there was a continuing need for the existing protective order. The appellant then filed a notice of appeal from that ruling. The Fourteenth Court issued a jurisdictional notice advising that the appeal appeared subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction. In response, the appellant conceded the absence of appellate jurisdiction but asked the court to treat the matter as a petition for writ of mandamus instead.

The court declined to do so. It distinguished cases in which mandamus treatment was appropriate because the issues presented were purely legal and statutory. Here, the appellant’s briefing raised factual complaints, including evidentiary sufficiency challenges to the trial court’s ruling.

Issues Decided

• Whether Texas Family Code section 81.009(a) permits an appeal from an order denying a motion to review, modify, or dissolve a protective order filed under section 85.025(b).
• Whether an order denying section 85.025(b) relief constitutes a new “protective order rendered under this subtitle” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under section 81.009(a).
• Whether the court of appeals should exercise its discretion to treat the attempted appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus.

Rules Applied

The court’s analysis centered on the text of the Family Code and recent intermediate appellate authority.

• Texas Family Code section 81.009(a) provides that “a protective order rendered under this subtitle may be appealed.”
• Texas Family Code section 85.025(b) allows a person subject to a protective order to seek review, modification, or dissolution of the order no sooner than one year after rendition, based on whether there is a continuing need for the order.
• Tate v. Landa, No. 01-23-00656-CV, 2025 WL 1634091 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 10, 2025), held that an order denying modification of a protective order is not itself a protective order, affords no affirmative relief, and is not appealable.
• Tate v. Landa, No. 01-23-00656-CV, 2025 WL 2697839 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 23, 2025, orig. proceeding), recognized that in some circumstances an attempted appeal may be treated as a mandamus proceeding.
• Rentfro v. Rentfro, No. 02-25-00481-CV, 2025 WL 3038951 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 30, 2025, no pet.), likewise concluded that the denial of a motion to vacate a protective order does not create appellate jurisdiction.
• Mandamus is available to correct a clear abuse of discretion or violation of a legal duty, but it is not a substitute for ordinary evidentiary review. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992).

Application

The Fourteenth Court treated the jurisdictional question as straightforward statutory line-drawing. Section 81.009(a) permits an appeal from a “protective order rendered under this subtitle.” The order challenged here did not render a new protective order. Instead, it merely denied a later motion seeking review, modification, or dissolution of an already-existing order under section 85.025(b). In the court’s view, that distinction controlled the jurisdictional analysis.

The court rejected the premise that a denial of review effectively becomes a new protective order simply because the original order remains in place. The trial court’s ruling did not grant new relief, expand the terms of the original order, or re-render the underlying protective order. It simply determined that a continuing need for the existing order remained. Because the Family Code contains no express provision authorizing an appeal from denial of section 85.025(b) relief, the court concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

On the mandamus request, the court took a narrower approach than the appellant urged. The opinion acknowledged that the First Court had, in Tate, treated an attempted appeal as a mandamus proceeding on rehearing. But the Fourteenth Court emphasized that Tate involved a pure statutory interpretation issue. By contrast, the appellant in Ikhlas advanced factual challenges, including attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s continuing-need determination. Because mandamus is designed to address legal error and abuses of discretion, not to provide a routine vehicle for relitigating fact disputes, the court declined to recast the case as an original proceeding.

Holding

The court first held that Texas Family Code section 81.009(a) does not authorize an appeal from an order denying a motion to review, modify, or dissolve a protective order under section 85.025(b). Appellate jurisdiction exists for a protective order rendered under Subtitle B, but not for a later order refusing to alter or dissolve that protective order.

The court next held that denial of a section 85.025(b) motion does not itself create a new protective order. An order finding a continuing need for the existing protective order leaves the prior order in place; it does not render a new appealable order under section 81.009(a).

Finally, the court held that it would not treat this attempted appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. Given that the appellant’s complaints were fact-bound and included evidentiary sufficiency issues, the case did not present the kind of pure legal question that warranted conversion to mandamus review. The appeal was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Practical Application

For practitioners, Ikhlas reinforces that post-judgment motion practice under section 85.025(b) is not an appellate reset button. If your client intends to challenge the legal or factual basis for a protective order, the original order remains the critical appellate event. Once the deadline to appeal that original order expires, a later motion to review or dissolve under section 85.025(b) may provide a trial-court vehicle for relief, but not necessarily an appellate one.

In divorce and SAPCR litigation, that point is especially important because protective orders often shape temporary-orders strategy, exclusive use of the residence, possession schedules, supervised access, and eventual best-interest findings. A respondent who waits to challenge the order through section 85.025(b) may secure a hearing on whether there is a continuing need, but Ikhlas teaches that an adverse ruling likely cannot be reviewed through direct appeal. Counsel should therefore think carefully about preserving error, building a record at the original protective-order hearing, and calendaring appellate deadlines independently of the related family-law case.

The opinion also has strategic implications for mandamus practice. If a lawyer hopes to pursue extraordinary relief after denial of section 85.025(b) review, the briefing must identify a true legal error, such as statutory misinterpretation, denial of a required hearing, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, or some other abuse of discretion that is reviewable without reweighing fact disputes. A record-heavy complaint that the evidence did not support a continuing need determination is far less likely to gain traction as mandamus.

Practitioners should also be alert to the procedural posture of related cases. Even when the protective order has spillover effects into custody or divorce litigation, those collateral consequences do not create appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise nonappealable section 85.025(b) denial. The better practice is to separate: identify what can be challenged through ordinary appeal in the divorce or SAPCR, what must be challenged through timely appeal from the original protective order, and what may only be addressed prospectively through later modification efforts in the trial court.

Checklists

Evaluating Appellate Jurisdiction After a Section 85.025(b) Ruling

• Identify the exact order being challenged.
• Determine whether the trial court rendered a new protective order or merely denied review, modification, or dissolution.
• Compare the order to Texas Family Code section 81.009(a), which authorizes appeal from a protective order rendered under Subtitle B.
• Do not assume that a finding of “continuing need” creates a new appealable order.
• Confirm whether any separate final or appealable orders exist in related divorce or SAPCR proceedings.

Protecting the Record at the Original Protective-Order Stage

• Calendar appellate deadlines immediately upon rendition of the original protective order.
• Request findings or clarifications when appropriate under the governing rules and local practice.
• Make a complete evidentiary record, including exhibits, objections, and offers of proof.
• Frame legal objections distinctly from factual disputes so that any later extraordinary-relief arguments are preserved.
• Advise the client that waiting for a later section 85.025(b) review may forfeit ordinary appellate review of the original order.

Using Section 85.025(b) Strategically

• Confirm that at least one year has passed since the original protective order was rendered.
• Develop evidence targeted to the statutory question of continuing need.
• Present changed circumstances clearly and concretely.
• Avoid treating the hearing as a substitute appeal of the original proceeding.
• Prepare the client for the possibility that an adverse ruling may not be directly appealable.

Assessing Whether Mandamus Is a Realistic Option

• Isolate any pure legal issue, such as statutory construction or refusal to perform a ministerial duty.
• Evaluate whether the complaint depends on reweighing evidence or resolving credibility disputes.
• Assemble a mandamus-quality record, including file-stamped pleadings, reporter’s record, and signed orders.
• Analyze whether there is an adequate remedy by appeal as to the issue actually presented.
• Do not rely on the court of appeals to automatically convert a defective appeal into a mandamus proceeding.

Counseling Clients in Parallel Divorce or Custody Litigation

• Explain that the protective-order track and the divorce/SAPCR appellate track are not interchangeable.
• Assess how the protective order affects conservatorship, possession, residence issues, and litigation posture.
• Coordinate filings so that protective-order deadlines are not lost amid broader family litigation.
• Consider whether relief can be pursued through modification of conservatorship or possession orders separate from the protective-order challenge.
• Document advice regarding appealability and the limits of post-order review.

Citation

Khaled Mohammad Ikhlas v. Farzana Rasooli, No. 14-25-00733-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 23, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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