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CROSSOVER: Discovery Sanctions Need Proof: Unsupported Fee Awards Reversed, Remanded for New Evidence Hearing

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

John Tomaszewski and Heather Bryan v. K. Hovnanian of Houston II, LLC d/b/a Brighton Homes, 01-24-00320-CV, August 06, 2026.

On appeal from 333rd District Court, Harris County, Texas

Synopsis

A Texas trial court may impose monetary discovery sanctions under Rule 215.2(b), but the amount must be supported by evidence tying the award to reasonable costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees actually caused by the discovery abuse. Where the record does not contain sufficient proof of the amounts awarded, the sanctions orders must be reversed and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing on amount.

Relevance to Family Law

This decision matters in family law because discovery sanctions are common in high-conflict divorce, SAPCR, modification, and property-tracing litigation, particularly where one side alleges nondisclosure of financial records, electronic communications, business documents, or third-party materials. If a family court assesses substantial monetary sanctions for discovery violations, this case reinforces that the fee component must still be proven with competent evidence of reasonableness and causation; a large number in an order, even one framed as a sanction, is vulnerable on appeal if the evidentiary record does not show what work was done, why it was necessary, and how it was directly caused by the discovery abuse.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The underlying suit was a construction-defect case involving alleged mold problems in the plaintiffs’ home. During discovery, the defendant contended that the plaintiffs had failed to disclose documents concerning prior mold issues and communications with third-party contractors. According to the opinion, the defendant learned of these materials years into the case during depositions of third-party contractors.

The defendant sought death-penalty sanctions and also requested $120,000 in monetary sanctions, apparently representing the total attorney’s fees incurred to that point. After a hearing, the trial court declined to impose death-penalty sanctions but entered three separate sanctions orders imposing more than $50,000 in monetary sanctions. The first order awarded $12,070.50 for costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees connected to third-party depositions, plus $35,652 for preparing and presenting the sanctions motion, subject to later confirmation or modification. The second order modified that latter amount to $33,184. The third order later awarded an additional $2,044 in costs and expenses and $5,637 in attorney’s fees for post-hearing discovery-related work.

The plaintiffs later nonsuited their claims and appealed the sanctions orders, as well as a related contempt order entered after they did not pay the sanctions. On appeal, they argued primarily that the evidence was insufficient to support the amount of the monetary sanctions and that the trial court erred in imposing sanctions without first testing lesser measures. The First Court of Appeals resolved the case on evidentiary sufficiency grounds and remanded for a new hearing on amount.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court applied the familiar Rule 215 framework governing discovery sanctions, together with the Texas Supreme Court’s sanctions and fee-proof jurisprudence.

Application

The court did not disturb the trial court’s decision to impose some form of monetary sanctions. Instead, it focused on whether the record actually supported the dollar amounts awarded. That distinction is important. Trial courts retain broad discretion to address discovery abuse, but once the sanction takes the form of money—especially attorney’s fees and expenses—the amount cannot rest on impression, estimate, or generalized representations by counsel.

The First Court of Appeals examined the sanctions through the lens of direct nexus and evidentiary support. The trial court had awarded separate sums for third-party depositions, for preparing and presenting the sanctions motion, and for later discovery activity. But the appellate court concluded the record did not contain sufficient evidence to support those amounts. The opinion emphasizes that fees imposed as a sanction are not exempt from ordinary proof requirements simply because they arise in a sanctions context. There still must be evidence showing what legal work was performed, the time reasonably expended, the rate charged, and how that work was necessitated by the discovery abuse rather than by the ordinary demands of the case.

That deficiency was fatal here. The problem was not merely that the sanctions were substantial, though more than $50,000 in sanctions naturally sharpened appellate scrutiny. The problem was that the record did not adequately demonstrate the reasonable costs, expenses, and fees caused by the specific discovery violation. Because Rule 215 permits compensatory monetary sanctions tied to the abuse, not unsupported lump-sum transfers untethered to proof, the awards could not stand as entered.

The court also rejected the appellants’ attempt to obtain reinstatement of their nonsuited claims. They argued that the trial court’s refusal to defer payment effectively forced the nonsuit. But the appellate court held that this complaint was not preserved and, independently, that it lacked authority on this record to reinstate claims that had already been nonsuited.

Holding

The court held that monetary discovery sanctions under Rule 215.2(b) must be supported by evidence establishing a direct nexus between the sanctioned conduct and the reasonable costs, expenses, or attorney’s fees awarded. Because the evidentiary record was insufficient to support the amounts awarded in the sanctions orders, the trial court abused its discretion as to amount.

The court therefore reversed the sanctions orders and remanded the case for a new hearing so that the trial court could redetermine the amount of monetary sanctions based on evidence introduced by the parties. This is the key appellate takeaway: even where sanctions are warranted, unsupported fee amounts will not survive review.

The court also declined to grant the appellants’ request to reinstate their nonsuited claims. It held that the issue was not preserved and that the court lacked authority to afford that relief on the record before it.

Because the monetary sanctions were reversed, the related contempt order tied to nonpayment of those sanctions was also necessarily undermined.

Practical Application

For family law litigators, this case is best understood as a proof case, not just a sanctions case. In divorce and custody litigation, sanctions requests often arise from failures to produce bank records, business ledgers, trust documents, phone extractions, social media content, mental-health records, or communications with third parties such as accountants, therapists, or business managers. When you seek monetary sanctions, you should build the record as though you are proving a fee claim after trial: identify the discovery abuse with precision, isolate the work it caused, segregate compensable time from ordinary merits work, and present testimony or records establishing reasonable hours and rates.

The converse is equally important. If you are resisting a sanctions request, do not limit your response to whether there was a violation. Attack the nexus and the proof. Ask whether the requested amount includes ordinary litigation tasks that would have occurred anyway. Challenge block-billed entries, conclusory affidavits, unsupported expense summaries, and “all fees to date” theories. In family cases, where sanctions motions can become vehicles for shifting broad swaths of litigation cost, Tomaszewski provides a strong basis for insisting that Rule 215 remains compensatory and evidence-driven.

This case also has strategic implications in temporary-orders practice and pretrial settings. Family courts sometimes hear sanctions motions on abbreviated records. If the court is inclined to award a substantial monetary amount, practitioners should request that the movant present actual fee evidence and should preserve objections to the absence of testimony, billing detail, segregation, reasonableness, and causation. A sanctions order entered on a thin record may be reversible even if the underlying discovery conduct warranted some response.

Checklists

Building a Defensible Sanctions Record

Opposing a Monetary Sanctions Request

Using the Case in Divorce, Custody, and Property Litigation

Avoiding the Nonmovant’s Problem

Citation

Tomaszewski v. K. Hovnanian of Houston II, LLC d/b/a Brighton Homes, No. 01-24-00320-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 6, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

Family Law Crossover

The procedural rule reinforced by this opinion is straightforward but powerful: when a Texas court uses Rule 215.2(b) to shift money as a discovery sanction, the amount must be proven with evidence showing that the awarded fees, costs, and expenses were reasonable and were directly caused by the discovery violation. In family law, this arises whenever a party seeks sanctions over incomplete production, late supplementation, noncompliance with an order to compel, or the need to retake depositions or pursue third-party discovery because key materials were not produced. The crossover point is that Rule 215 does not create a relaxed evidentiary standard merely because the context is sanctions. In a divorce, SAPCR, or property case, the movant still must prove the sanction amount with competent evidence, and the trial court must be able to trace the award to the procedural harm created by the discovery problem.

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