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DWOP and Family Code Section 6.602 MSA Enforcement | Hines v. Hines (2024)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Eric Hines v. Tiffany Shavonne Stevenson Hines, 09-24-00263-CV, July 30, 2026.

On appeal from 418th District Court, Montgomery County, Texas

Synopsis

A family district court does not abuse its discretion by dismissing a divorce case for want of prosecution when counsel fails to appear at a required pretrial setting and the reinstatement record does not negate conscious indifference. Section 6.602 does not rescue the case on appeal where the appellant cannot provide a record showing the trial court was required to render judgment on the mediated settlement agreement rather than dismiss.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters in divorce litigation because it underscores a practical point many lawyers treat too casually: a signed MSA does not end the court’s docket-management authority. In property-division cases, prove-ups, decree-entry settings, and post-mediation disputes over decree language, this case is a reminder that missing a pretrial setting can still produce a DWOP even where counsel believes section 6.602 makes rendition mandatory. The lesson extends beyond divorce. In SAPCR and modification practice, where cases often settle in mediation but unravel during drafting or implementation, counsel must still protect the record, comply with scheduling orders, and appear when any live dispute exists.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Eric Hines filed for divorce in Montgomery County. The case was governed by a scheduling order, though that order was not included in the appellate record. A continuance reset trial for June 3, 2024, and set a docket call/pretrial conference for May 24, 2024, with prior scheduling deadlines remaining in place.

The parties mediated and filed a signed mediated settlement agreement in March 2024. According to Eric’s counsel, he later emailed court staff asking whether appearance at the May 24 pretrial conference was necessary, and he claimed staff responded that because the MSA had been approved by the associate judge, there was no need to appear and the trial date would be for entry or dismissal. That email chain, however, was never made part of the appellate record.

The case then stopped looking like an uncontested decree-entry matter. On May 21, Tiffany filed a motion to set aside the MSA, alleging nondisclosure and misunderstanding relating to the mortgage and loan terms. Neither party nor counsel appeared at the May 24 pretrial conference. Eric later moved for entry of an agreed final decree, asserting a proposed decree was attached, but no proposed decree appeared in the clerk’s record.

On June 3, the trial court signed an order dismissing the divorce without prejudice for want of prosecution. The dismissal order recited that the parties had passed pretrial conference on the representation that an agreed decree would be ready on the trial date, but no agreed decree was ready because one side wanted to set aside the MSA. Eric moved to reinstate. At the reinstatement hearing, the trial court focused on the missed pretrial setting, counsel’s admitted receipt of notice of the motion to set aside the MSA, and the court’s standing policy that cases may bypass pretrial only when they are actually proceeding to entry of a decree based on an undisputed MSA. The court denied reinstatement, and Eric appealed.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court applied familiar DWOP and appellate-record principles.

The opinion also reflects a recurring appellate rule in family cases: when key items such as the scheduling order, relevant correspondence, the proposed decree, or a reporter’s record from the dispositive setting are omitted, the court of appeals will not infer error.

Application

The Ninth Court treated this primarily as a record-and-discretion case, not as an abstract referendum on the power of section 6.602. The trial court had before it a missed pretrial conference, an existing scheduling framework, and a case that was no longer functionally settled because Tiffany had filed a motion to set aside the MSA before the pretrial setting. At the reinstatement hearing, Eric’s counsel conceded receipt of notice of that motion, even while arguing he had not actually focused on it because he was in trial. That concession mattered. The trial judge framed the problem as not merely clerical confusion, but the failure of both sides to appear for a required conference when counsel knew there was a live dispute over whether judgment should be entered on the MSA.

The appellate court deferred to that view. Without the scheduling order in the record, Eric could not effectively challenge the court’s description of its pretrial requirements. Without the email chain, he could not establish the precise content or context of any purported instruction from staff excusing attendance. Without a reporter’s record from the June 3 dismissal setting, he could not demonstrate what occurred when the court dismissed rather than entered judgment. And without the proposed decree, he could not show that a decree conforming to the MSA was actually before the court and ready for rendition. Those omissions were fatal because they prevented the court of appeals from concluding either that the dismissal was arbitrary or that section 6.602 compelled entry of judgment as a matter of law.

On reinstatement, the court effectively accepted that the trial judge could view counsel’s conduct as something more than an innocent calendaring mistake. Counsel knew of the pretrial setting, knew of the court’s warning that nonappearance could result in dismissal, and had at least received notice that the MSA was being challenged before pretrial. Against that backdrop, the trial court did not have to accept counsel’s explanation as negating conscious indifference.

Holding

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the divorce case for want of prosecution. The parties failed to appear at the pretrial conference, and the appellate record did not establish that the dismissal occurred without notice or contrary to the governing scheduling procedures.

The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying reinstatement under Rule 165a(3). On the record presented, Eric failed to show that the nonappearance was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, particularly given counsel’s awareness of the pretrial setting, the court’s dismissal warning, and the pending challenge to the MSA.

Finally, the court held that section 6.602 did not require reversal based on failure to enter judgment on the MSA. The appellate record omitted the critical materials necessary to demonstrate that the trial court was presented with a proper decree, that the MSA issue was ripe solely for rendition, or that dismissal rather than rendition was erroneous. In short, the court did not reject the force of section 6.602 in the abstract; it held that this appellant failed to prove reversible error on this record.

Practical Application

For family lawyers, the strategic point is simple: do not confuse a signed MSA with an administratively completed case. A divorce case remains exposed to docket-control orders, pretrial attendance requirements, and DWOP risk until the court signs a final decree or other dispositive order. If an MSA exists but decree language is disputed, a motion to set aside is filed, or performance issues surface, the matter is no longer a routine “entry” setting. Counsel should assume appearance is required unless the court expressly excuses it in a way that can be documented and, if necessary, made part of the record.

This case also reinforces that section 6.602 arguments must be built for appeal, not merely asserted. If you contend the court had a mandatory duty to render judgment on the MSA, the record should include the MSA, the proposed decree, any competing versions, any objections to form versus substance, the motion seeking rendition, and a reporter’s record showing the court was asked to render and refused. Without that architecture, even a strong section 6.602 argument can collapse into a no-record affirmance.

In Montgomery County and similar high-volume family dockets, practitioners should also expect trial courts to use pretrial conferences as enforcement points for mediation compliance and docket management. Passing pretrial based on an MSA is, from the court’s perspective, a representation that the case is truly ready for decree entry. If that representation becomes inaccurate, the safest course is to notify the court immediately, request a hearing, and appear unless formally excused.

The case is equally relevant in post-divorce enforcement, modification, and SAPCR matters resolved at mediation. If one side signs a Rule 11, an MSA, or a mediated parenting plan and then backs away before entry, counsel should move promptly to set rendition, obtain a record, and avoid any procedural default that allows the case to be dismissed before the court reaches the merits.

Checklists

Protect the Case From DWOP After Mediation

Build a Section 6.602 Enforcement Record

Prepare a Reinstatement Motion That Can Win

Preserve the Appellate Record

Citation

Hines v. Hines, No. 09-24-00263-CV, 2024 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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