Gabriel Joshua Alonzo v. The State of Texas, 07-26-00075-CR, July 31, 2026.
On appeal from 242nd District Court, Hale County, Texas
Synopsis
A former dating partner’s prior access to a residence does not defeat a burglary charge if, at the time of entry, the complainant had the greater right to possession and had not given effective consent to enter. The Amarillo court held the evidence was sufficient where the complainant leased and occupied the home, the relationship had ended, the defendant was not on the lease and did not pay rent, and the complainant testified he was no longer allowed inside.
Relevance to Family Law
This opinion matters in family law because possession and consent disputes routinely arise in breakups, divorces, SAPCRs, protective-order proceedings, and post-separation property fights. The case reinforces a point family lawyers often need to prove quickly: past access, overnight stays, possession of a key, use of the address for mail, or an informal domestic arrangement does not necessarily establish a present right to enter or occupy a residence when another person has the greater right to possession at the relevant time. That principle can materially affect temporary-orders practice, exclusive-use disputes, enforcement strategy, injunction requests, and the framing of factual records when one party claims continuing residential rights after separation.
Family Law Crossover
The procedural and substantive crossover is the court’s use of Penal Code section 1.07(a)(35)(A)’s “greater right to possession” framework, measured at the time of the disputed entry, together with evidence-based proof that effective consent had been withdrawn. In family law, that same timing-centered possession analysis can become important when a court is asked to determine temporary exclusive use of a marital residence, whether a party violated a temporary injunction or protective order by entering a home, or whether a claimed possessory interest defeats emergency relief. The practical lesson is that present possessory right must be built through concrete proof—lease status, occupancy, payment history, lock changes, communications revoking access, and court orders—not merely historical access or relationship status.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
The defendant and complainant had dated for several months, and during the relationship he stayed at her house overnight, sometimes for extended periods. The complainant had lived there since 2018. Both testified he was not on the lease. According to the complainant, the relationship ended one to three weeks before the January 17, 2025 incident, and after the breakup he no longer had permission to enter the home.
On the morning in question, the complainant saw him on her security camera banging on and kicking the front door. While she was on the phone with police, he moved to a bedroom window and shattered it from outside. She went to the front door intending to unlock it and tell him police were on the way, but he broke through the door, grabbed her by the arms near the shoulders, shook her, and shoved her toward an entry table. She dropped her cell phone; he picked it up, put it in his hoodie pocket, and ran. The 911 call and home-security footage were admitted at trial.
The defense theory on sufficiency centered on prior access and indicia of residence. He offered proof that a phone bill reflected the address, that an appliance rental agreement bore his name and the home’s address, that he had been given a key in the past, and that a probation officer had visited the location as a reported address. The complainant countered that the appliance was a gift, the older phone account was no longer current, he was not on the lease, did not pay rent, did not live there, and was not authorized to use her address. She also testified that after a previous breakup she changed the locks and did not give him a key to keep. She identified another address where he lived, which was consistent with the address he later listed on his bond paperwork.
Issues Decided
- Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove burglary of a habitation under Penal Code section 30.02, specifically whether entry was without the effective consent of an owner when the defendant had prior access to the home.
- Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to show the underlying assault element of burglary.
- Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to show intent to deprive the complainant of her cell phone for purposes of theft.
- Whether the trial court erred in refusing a lesser-included-offense instruction on criminal trespass.
Rules Applied
The court relied primarily on the following authorities and rules:
- Texas Penal Code section 30.02, defining burglary of a habitation.
- Texas Penal Code section 1.07(a)(35)(A), defining “owner” as a person with title, possession, or a greater right to possession than the actor.
- Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016), holding that for burglary, the relevant possessory right is measured at the time of the alleged offense and that a person with some right to control property may still burglarize it if another person has the greater right to possession.
- Texas Penal Code section 22.01, defining assault.
- Texas Penal Code section 1.07(a)(8), defining bodily injury as physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
- Authorities recognizing that even minor physical pain is sufficient to establish bodily injury.
- Texas Penal Code section 31.01(3)(A), defining “deprive” in the theft context.
- The standard legal-sufficiency framework drawn from Jackson v. Virginia and restated in Morgan: whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Application
The court’s analysis turned first on ownership and consent. It treated the burglary issue not as a broad referendum on who had ever used the residence, but as a focused inquiry into who had the greater right to possession at the time of the alleged entry. That timing point mattered. The defendant had evidence of past access and informal connections to the address, but the complainant’s evidence showed present possessory superiority: she leased and occupied the home, had lived there for years, he was not on the lease, he did not pay rent, and she testified unequivocally that after the breakup he was not allowed inside. Under Morgan, those facts were enough for a rational jury to find she was the relevant “owner” and that any earlier permission had been withdrawn.
The court then addressed the assault component. The defendant argued there was no visible injury and denied touching her. But Texas law does not require visible injury; proof of physical pain is enough. The complainant testified that he grabbed, shook, and shoved her and that those actions caused pain. The 911 recording captured her saying “ow” multiple times. The court treated that evidence as sufficient bodily-injury proof and deferred, as sufficiency review requires, to the jury’s decision to credit her account over his.
On the theft component, the court focused on intent at the time the phone was taken. He seized the phone while she was actively on a 911 call, pocketed it, fled, and kept it for several days. Even though the phone was later returned, the court held the jury could rationally infer the requisite intent to deprive from the circumstances of the taking and the interruption of her immediate use during an ongoing emergency, followed by continued loss of use for days afterward.
Holding
The court held that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the burglary conviction. Applying Penal Code sections 30.02 and 1.07(a)(35)(A), and relying on Morgan v. State, it concluded the complainant was the relevant owner because she had the greater right to possession at the time of the entry. Her testimony that he was no longer permitted in the home was sufficient evidence of lack of effective consent despite his prior stays, past possession of a key, and documentary ties to the address.
The court also held the evidence was sufficient to prove the assault element of burglary. The complainant’s testimony that the defendant grabbed, shook, and shoved her, together with her statement that it caused pain and the 911 recording reflecting pain responses, satisfied the bodily-injury requirement.
The court further held the evidence was sufficient to support the theft theory. Taking the complainant’s phone during her 911 call, fleeing with it, and keeping it for several days permitted a rational inference of intent to deprive.
Finally, the opinion states that the court affirmed and rejected the challenge to the denial of a criminal-trespass lesser-included instruction. The provided excerpt truncates the court’s discussion of that issue, but the disposition reflects that no reversible instructional error was found.
Practical Application
For family-law litigators, the strategic value of this case lies in its disciplined focus on present possessory rights rather than historical access. In breakup and separation litigation, parties often marshal facts such as prior cohabitation, recurring overnight stays, possession of a garage code or key, receipt of mail, utility usage, or the use of an address on account records. Alonzo confirms those facts may be relevant, but they are not dispositive if the opposing party can prove a superior present right to possession and a clear withdrawal of consent.
That matters in at least four recurring settings. First, in temporary orders involving exclusive use of the marital residence, this case supports the proposition that the operative question is who has the superior current possessory right, especially where only one party is on the lease, only one party is paying the housing expense, or the court has already allocated occupancy. Second, in protective-order and injunction practice, the case illustrates the importance of a clean evidentiary record showing that consent to enter was revoked and when that revocation occurred. Third, in enforcement disputes, including allegations that a party entered a residence or removed items contrary to temporary restraining orders, the opinion underscores that documentary “ties” to an address do not necessarily establish a continuing right of entry. Fourth, in conservatorship cases, where exchanges or communication around the home can become flashpoints, counsel should distinguish parenting access from property-access rights; possession of a child does not itself establish consent to enter a residence.
Family lawyers should also note the evidentiary lesson. The complainant’s case was strengthened by contemporaneous objective proof: security footage, the 911 recording, lease evidence, testimony about rent and occupancy, and contrary address evidence from the defendant’s own bond paperwork. In other words, the possessory-right question is often won not by abstract legal argument but by a coherent record anchored to time, occupancy, financial responsibility, and explicit revocation of consent.
Checklists
Build the Present-Possession Record
- Obtain the current lease, deed, or occupancy agreement.
- Identify who was actually residing in the home on the relevant date.
- Gather proof of who paid rent, mortgage, utilities, insurance, and other carrying costs.
- Pin down whether the opposing party was listed on any lease or title document.
- Establish the exact date of separation, move-out, or revocation of access.
- Collect evidence of any changed locks, alarm-code changes, or revoked garage access.
- Preserve texts, emails, or recorded communications expressly withdrawing permission to enter.
Address Historical Access Without Overstating It
- Anticipate evidence of prior overnight stays, past cohabitation, or prior key possession.
- Distinguish prior permission from present consent at the relevant time.
- Explain address usage on bills, delivery records, or account statements.
- Clarify whether an item linked to the address was a gift, convenience arrangement, or temporary accommodation.
- Gather alternative-address evidence if the other party was living elsewhere.
- Compare claimed residential status against court filings, bond paperwork, driver-license records, school records, or probation records.
Use the Case in Temporary Orders and Injunction Hearings
- Ask the court to identify which party has the superior present possessory right to the residence.
- Tie your argument to a specific date and a specific act of entry or attempted entry.
- Request explicit temporary-orders language on exclusive use, keys, codes, and retrieval protocols.
- Include no-entry or notice-before-entry provisions where appropriate.
- Define how personal property may be retrieved to avoid later “consent” disputes.
- Preserve objections if the opposing party conflates past access with present authority to enter.
Prove Revocation of Consent Cleanly
- Use unequivocal language in client communications: “You do not have permission to enter the residence.”
- Confirm revocation in writing whenever possible.
- If a key was previously issued, document the demand for its return.
- If locks are changed, maintain records of the timing.
- Avoid mixed messages that could be characterized as renewed consent.
- If child exchanges are needed, designate neutral locations or curbside procedures.
Handle Violence-Adjacent Property Events Carefully
- Preserve 911 audio, surveillance footage, body-camera video, and photographs immediately.
- Document whether a phone or device was taken during the incident and for how long.
- Establish interference with emergency communication if applicable.
- Record any testimony concerning pain, impairment, or physical contact, even absent visible injury.
- Correlate event timing across dispatch records, videos, texts, and witness testimony.
- In parallel family cases, evaluate whether emergency relief should address both possession and personal safety.
Avoid the Non-Prevailing Party’s Proof Problems
- Do not rely solely on mail, account statements, or informal use of the address to prove a present possessory right.
- Do not assume prior receipt of a key equals continuing consent after separation.
- Do not ignore lease status, rent payments, or actual occupancy.
- Do not leave the record vague about when the relationship ended or when access was withdrawn.
- Do not assume later return of property defeats proof of intent at the time of the taking.
- Do not overlook the significance of your client’s own contrary address declarations in official documents.
Citation
Gabriel Joshua Alonzo v. State of Texas, No. 07-26-00075-CR, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS ___ (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 31, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
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