Rule 106(b) Strict Compliance for Substituted Service | In re X.I.C. (2026)

In the Interest of X.I.C., a Child, 07-26-00062-CV, August 27, 2026.

On appeal from 467th District Court, Denton County, Texas

Synopsis

In this restricted appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed a default parentage judgment because substituted service did not strictly comply with the trial court’s Rule 106(b) orders, and the supporting affidavits were inadequate. When the face of the record shows that the plaintiff did not complete service in the exact manner authorized, defective service is apparent on the face of the record and the default judgment cannot stand.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters immediately to Texas family law litigators because default practice is common in parentage, SAPCR, divorce, enforcement, and modification cases. If you obtain substituted service by text, posting, social media, or delivery at a residence, this case is a sharp reminder that family courts are not exempt from the strict-compliance rules governing service: if the motion, affidavit, order, execution, or return is off by even a material step, your default can be reversed months later by restricted appeal. It also underscores a practical point family lawyers see often—addresses, phone numbers, and parallel SAPCR records can create record evidence that undermines the claimed effectiveness of substituted service if not reconciled before judgment.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The underlying case was a petition to adjudicate parentage. After filing suit, the petitioner attempted personal service on the alleged father at a Grand Prairie address on four occasions. According to the opinion, those attempts resulted in no answer at the door, and the process servers left contact information.

The petitioner then sought substituted service under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b). The first substituted-service order authorized service in two required ways at once: by leaving the citation, pleadings, and orders with someone over sixteen at the Grand Prairie address and by sending the same materials by text message. The process server texted the documents but did not leave them at the physical address as the order required.

The petitioner then filed a second motion for substituted service. That motion was again supported by proof the appellate court found wanting. The trial court entered a new order authorizing service by posting the citation, pleadings, and orders on the door at the Grand Prairie address, with proof of service to be made in the manner specified by the order. The later returns reflected that the documents were texted on one day and taped to the door the next.

The case proceeded without an answer. Temporary orders were later entered, but the record did not show that the respondent was notified of that hearing, and the certificate of service reflected service only on petitioner’s counsel. At final hearing, petitioner’s counsel also filed a certificate of last known address identifying a Dallas address for the respondent, not the Grand Prairie address used for substituted service. The petitioner also introduced a separate SAPCR-related order involving the same respondent that reflected his participation in another case and listed the Dallas address. Even so, no new notice of final hearing was attempted at that Dallas address. The trial court rendered a default parentage order including child support and attorney’s fees, and the respondent later brought a restricted appeal.

Issues Decided

The court addressed and effectively decided these issues:

• Whether the affidavits supporting the first and second Rule 106(b) motions were legally sufficient to authorize substituted service.
• Whether substituted service strictly complied with the trial court’s orders authorizing service.
• Whether defective substituted service constituted error apparent on the face of the record in a restricted appeal.
• Whether the resulting default judgment could stand.

Because the court reversed on service, it did not need to reach the remaining complaints concerning evidentiary support for child support or the attorney’s-fees award.

Rules Applied

The court relied on the familiar restricted-appeal framework and the strict-compliance line of service cases.

• Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 governs restricted appeals.
• In a restricted appeal, the appellant must show:
• notice of appeal filed within six months after judgment;
• party status in the underlying case;
• no participation in the hearing resulting in the complained-of judgment;
• and error apparent on the face of the record.
• The “face of the record” consists of the papers on file in the trial court when judgment was rendered.
• Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b) permits substituted service only on motion supported by affidavit or other evidence meeting the rule’s requirements.
• The supporting proof must show:
• the location where the defendant can probably be found;
• unsuccessful attempts at traditional service there; and
• for nontraditional methods, facts showing the proposed method will be reasonably effective to give notice of the suit.
• Texas courts rigidly enforce service requirements and indulge no presumptions in favor of valid service in default cases.
• Substituted service must strictly comply not only with Rule 106(b), but also with the precise terms of the order authorizing it.
• Defective service is error apparent on the face of the record and requires reversal of a default judgment.

The court specifically referenced authorities including Ex parte E.H., Clamon v. Delong, Wilson v. Dunn, and the Fort Worth court’s decision in Richardson v. Builder Services Group, Inc., among others.

Application

The court’s analysis moved in two related tracks: the sufficiency of the Rule 106(b) proof and the execution of the service orders actually signed.

First, the court concluded that the supporting affidavits were inadequate. On the first motion, the process-server affidavit described repeated unsuccessful attempts at the Grand Prairie address, but the court found it lacked probative facts showing why that address was a place where the respondent could probably be found. Just as importantly, the proof did not adequately establish that the requested substituted method would be reasonably effective to provide notice. Mere recitation of failed knocks and unanswered attempts did not satisfy Rule 106(b)’s evidentiary burden.

The second motion suffered from a similar defect. The supporting materials referenced the phone number and address, but the court found they still did not adequately show why the chosen methods would be reasonably effective. That deficiency mattered because Rule 106(b) is not satisfied by assumption; the movant must build a record demonstrating effectiveness.

Second, and more decisively, the court held that the actual service did not strictly comply with the first order. That order required delivery at the residence and service by text message. The record showed only the text occurred. That failure alone was enough to defeat the default. In Texas default jurisprudence, when an order authorizes substituted service in a specified manner, the plaintiff must do exactly what the order says. “Close enough” is not enough.

The record also created additional concern about notice because the petitioner later identified a Dallas address as the respondent’s last known address and introduced a separate order reflecting the respondent’s involvement in another family case at that Dallas address. Yet no effort was made to reconcile that information with the earlier Grand Prairie service record or to provide notice of the final hearing at the Dallas address. Although the court’s core holding rests on defective service, those facts made the notice problem harder to defend and reinforced the importance of building a clean record before taking a default in family court.

Holding

The court held that the trial court erred in authorizing substituted service on the record presented because the affidavits supporting the Rule 106(b) motions were insufficient. The movant did not provide the necessary probative facts establishing that the Grand Prairie address was a location where the respondent could probably be found or that the requested substituted methods would be reasonably effective to give notice.

The court further held that, even apart from the insufficiency of the affidavits, the substituted service did not strictly comply with the first order authorizing it. Because that order required service both by delivery at the address and by text message, and because the record showed only the text occurred, service was defective on the face of the record.

The court therefore held that defective service constituted reversible error apparent on the face of the record in this restricted appeal. The default judgment adjudicating parentage was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Practical Application

For family lawyers, the most important lesson is procedural discipline. Rule 106(b) practice often becomes informal in busy family dockets, especially where the respondent is evasive, transient, or communicating only by phone or social media. This opinion is a reminder that appellate courts will examine substituted service with exacting rigor, particularly when a default judgment affects parentage, conservatorship, support, reimbursement, property division, or fee awards.

In a divorce case, this issue commonly arises when one spouse has moved, is couch-surfing, or is thought to be avoiding service. If counsel seeks posting, social-media service, or text-message service, the affidavit must do more than say attempts failed; it must explain why the address, account, or number is tied to the respondent and why the proposed method is reasonably effective. If the order says “post on the door and send by text,” both steps must be completed exactly, documented exactly, and proved exactly.

In SAPCR and modification practice, this case also has strategic implications when your own record contains multiple addresses, recent pleadings from other cases, Office of the Attorney General records, or prior orders showing a different residence or contact point. If your file reflects a better address than the one used for substituted service, you should expect that inconsistency to become the centerpiece of a restricted appeal. The prudent move is to clean up the record before default, not to hope the discrepancy goes unnoticed.

On the defense side, this opinion is a useful roadmap for attacking family-law defaults. In a restricted appeal, counsel should compare the motion, affidavit, order, return, clerk’s notices, certificates of service, and any later-filed documents revealing different contact information. The strongest appellate arguments often come not from disputed fact questions, but from internal contradictions already sitting in the clerk’s record.

Checklists

Drafting the Rule 106(b) Motion and Affidavit

• Identify the exact location where the respondent can probably be found.
• Include specific facts showing how that address, phone number, email, or social-media account is connected to the respondent.
• Detail each unsuccessful attempt at traditional service with dates, times, and observations.
• State facts—not conclusions—showing why the proposed substituted method will be reasonably effective to give notice.
• If requesting service by text, social media, email, or another electronic means, include evidence that the respondent actually uses that account or number.
• Reconcile any inconsistent addresses or contact information appearing elsewhere in your file before submitting the motion.
• Avoid boilerplate language unsupported by underlying facts.

Reviewing the Proposed Substituted-Service Order

• Make sure the order clearly states each authorized act required to complete service.
• Determine whether the order requires multiple methods conjunctively, such as “and,” rather than alternatively.
• Avoid ambiguous wording about how proof of service must be made.
• Confirm that the order tracks the relief actually requested in the motion.
• Before the order is signed, consider whether every required step is realistically executable by the process server.

Executing Service After the Order Is Signed

• Provide the process server with the signed order, not merely the motion.
• Instruct the process server to comply with every element of the order exactly as written.
• If the order requires multiple acts, verify that each act is completed.
• Preserve screenshots, photographs, timestamps, delivery confirmations, and metadata where available.
• If service cannot be completed exactly as ordered, stop and obtain a new order rather than improvising.
• Do not assume substantial compliance will protect a later default judgment.

Proving Up Default in Family Court

• Review the clerk’s record before judgment as if you were opposing a restricted appeal.
• Confirm that the return strictly matches the method authorized in the order.
• Confirm that all notices of hearings required by rule or due process were sent to the best known address in the file.
• Check for later-filed documents showing a different address, phone number, or participation in another proceeding.
• If a different address emerges, consider re-service or additional notice efforts before proceeding to default.
• Do not rely on judicial notice of the file unless the file itself is clean.

Attacking a Family-Law Default on Restricted Appeal

• Confirm the notice of restricted appeal was filed within six months of the judgment.
• Confirm the appellant did not participate in the dispositive hearing and filed no disqualifying post-judgment motions.
• Compare the Rule 106(b) motion, affidavit, order, and return line by line.
• Look for conjunctive service requirements that were only partially completed.
• Look for conclusory affidavits that fail to show probable location or reasonable effectiveness.
• Search the clerk’s record for inconsistent addresses, phone numbers, or other evidence undermining the service theory.
• Argue defective service as error apparent on the face of the record.

Citation

In the Interest of X.I.C., a Child, No. 07-26-00062-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS ___ (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 27, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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