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CROSSOVER: Rule 193.6 Exclusion Cannot Be Converted Into a Surprise Take-Nothing Judgment

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

D&M Creative Custom Builders, Inc. v. Paul Pearce and Linda Pearce, 09-25-00450-CV, August 31, 2026.

On appeal from 457th District Court, Montgomery County, Texas

Synopsis

Rule 193.6 permits exclusion of inadequately disclosed evidence; it does not permit a trial court to convert that evidentiary ruling into a final take-nothing judgment absent a proper dispositive vehicle. When a court excludes expert or damages evidence under Rule 193.6 and then renders judgment because the plaintiff has “no evidence,” it has effectively granted an unauthorized summary judgment without Rule 166a’s notice and procedure.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters in Texas family litigation because disclosure fights routinely intersect with dispositive pressure points: tracing experts in property characterization disputes, business valuation opinions, reimbursement calculations, fee testimony, social-study and mental-health experts in conservatorship cases, and damages-style proof in tort or contract claims joined to divorce proceedings. The ruling is a useful procedural boundary marker: even if a family court properly excludes late or inadequate expert disclosures, that exclusion does not itself authorize a merits adjudication unless the issue is presented through a recognized dispositive procedure, such as summary judgment, directed verdict, or trial on the merits with the required process.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The plaintiff, D&M Creative Custom Builders, sued homeowners on a quantum meruit theory, alleging it performed approved upgrades and additions beyond the original home-construction contract and had not been paid for that extra work. The defendants responded and later filed a Rule 193.6 objection aimed at D&M’s expert designations and damages disclosures.

The objection asserted two disclosure defects. First, the defendants argued D&M’s expert disclosures failed to include the experts’ opinions, the bases for those opinions, and compensation information required by Rule 195.5(a). Second, they argued D&M had not adequately disclosed its damages calculation as required by Rule 194.2(b)(4).

After a jury had been empaneled but before jury selection proceeded, the trial court held a pretrial hearing on the Rule 193.6 objection. The court orally granted the objection as to both the expert issue and the damages issue, stated that expert testimony was required for the claimed damages, denied D&M’s oral request for continuance, dismissed the jury, and the next day signed a final take-nothing judgment. The judgment expressly stated that, after considering D&M’s lack of evidence on the elements of its only claim, D&M would take nothing.

D&M moved for reconsideration and new trial, arguing that the ruling functioned as an improper sua sponte summary judgment because the defendants had filed only an evidentiary objection, not a Rule 166a motion. The trial court denied that motion, and D&M appealed.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court’s reasoning rests on a straightforward distinction between evidentiary sanctions and merits adjudication.

Application

The Beaumont court treated the problem as one of procedural architecture. The defendants invoked Rule 193.6, which is an exclusion rule. That rule allows a court to keep inadequately disclosed evidence out of trial unless the proponent establishes good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. But the trial court went further. It not only excluded the evidence; it also concluded that, without that evidence, D&M could not prove its claim, and it rendered a final take-nothing judgment on that basis.

That second step was the appellate defect. The court recognized that the trial court’s ruling effectively decided legal merits questions embedded in the case—whether expert testimony was necessary to prove quantum meruit damages and whether D&M’s damages theory was legally insufficient. Those are not merely evidentiary housekeeping matters. Once the court used the exclusion ruling as the basis for a final merits disposition, the ruling functioned as an unauthorized summary judgment. No Rule 166a motion had been filed. No proper dispositive procedure had been invoked. And the trial court therefore lacked a procedural basis to render a final judgment simply because the evidentiary ruling left one side with a proof problem.

The opinion is especially important because it rejects a common practical shortcut: excluding critical proof on the eve of trial and then declaring that the claimant necessarily loses as a matter of law. Texas procedure does not permit the evidentiary ruling itself to do the work of a dispositive motion. The court can exclude. It cannot, without proper procedure, convert exclusion into a surprise merits judgment.

Holding

The court held that Rule 193.6 authorizes exclusion of untimely or inadequate disclosures, but it does not authorize rendition of a final take-nothing judgment on the merits. A trial court may sustain a Rule 193.6 objection and exclude evidence, but it may not transform that evidentiary ruling into a dispositive judgment absent a proper summary-judgment motion or other recognized merits procedure.

The court further held that the trial court’s judgment functioned as an improper summary judgment because the defendants filed only a Rule 193.6 objection and not a Rule 166a motion. Under Teer v. Duddleston, rendition of judgment in that posture was erroneous.

Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s final judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Practical Application

For family-law trial lawyers, this case should immediately be added to the toolbox for pretrial expert and damages disputes. In divorce cases involving closely held businesses, separate-property tracing, reimbursement, waste, valuation of professional practices, or fee-shifting claims, the opposing side may attempt to leverage disclosure deficiencies into a case-ending result. This opinion makes clear that exclusion and disposition are different procedural acts.

If your valuation expert, CPA, appraiser, counselor, custody evaluator, or fee expert is challenged under Rule 193.6, the court may exclude the testimony if the disclosure failure is not cured by good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. But if the court then proposes to render judgment because you now “have no evidence,” this case gives you a clean appellate point: Rule 193.6 is not a substitute for Rule 166a, trial on the merits, directed verdict, or another authorized dispositive mechanism.

The case also works in the opposite direction. If you are the movant attacking the other side’s disclosures, use the opinion as a reminder to separate procedural objectives. If you want exclusion, file the Rule 193.6 objection and build the prejudice record. If you want a merits disposition, use the correct vehicle and give the notice Texas procedure requires. In family cases, that often means filing a traditional or no-evidence summary-judgment motion on severable claims, using special exceptions to force clarification of damages or reimbursement theories, or preserving legal-sufficiency arguments for trial rather than asking the court to collapse an evidentiary ruling into judgment.

This matters particularly in these family-law settings:

Checklists

Preserve the Rule 193.6 Record

Block Conversion of Exclusion Into Judgment

When You Are Seeking Exclusion

Family-Law Expert Hygiene

Post-Ruling Damage Control

Family Law Crossover

The procedural rule established here is narrow but powerful: Rule 193.6 authorizes exclusion of evidence for inadequate or untimely disclosure, but it does not itself authorize final adjudication on the merits. In a Texas family-law case, that issue can arise when a court excludes a spouse’s tracing expert in a separate-property dispute, a business appraiser in a valuation fight, a CPA in a reimbursement claim, or a mental-health expert in a conservatorship matter. After exclusion, the court may limit the evidence the party can present at trial, but if the court wants to dispose of the claim or defense because the remaining proof is legally insufficient, it must do so through a recognized dispositive procedure with the corresponding notice and process. The opinion therefore reinforces a critical distinction in family practice between evidentiary gatekeeping and merits adjudication.

Citation

D&M Creative Custom Builders, Inc. v. Pearce, No. 09-25-00450-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS ___ (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 31, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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