In re Welltower TCG RIDEA Tenant LLC, 11-26-00194-CV, September 17, 2026.
On appeal from 220th District Court of Comanche County
Synopsis
When a plaintiff files in an improper county, the plaintiff does not get a second venue choice after the defendant properly moves to transfer. If the defendant establishes a proper county under Section 15.002 and Rules 86 and 87, the trial court must transfer there, and mandamus is available if the court instead transfers to a different county selected by the plaintiff.
Relevance to Family Law
This is a civil venue case, but the procedural lesson is directly relevant to Texas family law litigation, especially in disputes involving tort-style counterclaims between spouses, contract-based claims joined to divorce litigation, property-related claims against entities, and other non-SAPCR claims where general venue rules may matter. The opinion reinforces a strategic point family lawyers cannot ignore: when general venue rules apply and the petitioner chose an improper county, the responding party may seize control of the transfer destination by timely and properly proving a proper county, and the trial court may not restore that choice to the filing party by selecting a different permissible county later urged in response.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
The underlying suit arose from a wrongful-death claim involving a fall from a second-story window at an assisted-living facility in Hood County. The estate sued multiple business defendants in Comanche County, alleging venue was proper there because it was the decedent’s residence and the place where certain contractual undertakings, representations, and decisions supposedly occurred.
The defendants answered and filed motions to transfer venue, asserting that Comanche County was improper because none of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred there. They sought transfer to Tarrant County, relying on the principal-office ground for venue under Section 15.002(a)(3), and later supported that request with affidavit testimony establishing that one defendant’s principal place of business and headquarters were in Tarrant County.
In response, the plaintiff defended Comanche County as proper but also argued, in the alternative, that Hood County was proper because the events leading to the decedent’s death occurred there. The trial court did not keep the case in Comanche County. Instead, it transferred the case to Hood County—the plaintiff’s alternative venue theory rather than the defendants’ requested county. The defendants then sought mandamus relief.
Issues Decided
- Whether a plaintiff that initially files suit in an improper county may avoid transfer to the defendant’s chosen proper county by alternatively identifying a different proper county in response to the motion to transfer venue.
- Whether a trial court abuses its discretion by transferring the case to a proper county not requested by the defendant after the plaintiff’s original venue choice is shown to be improper.
- Whether mandamus is available to correct that kind of erroneous venue transfer.
Rules Applied
The court worked from the basic venue framework in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 15.002(a). Under that statute, venue generally lies in:
- the county where all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred;
- the county of the defendant’s residence, if the defendant is a natural person;
- the county of the defendant’s principal office in Texas, if the defendant is not a natural person; or
- if none of those apply, the county where the plaintiff resided when the claim accrued.
The court also relied on Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 86 and 87. Those rules govern a motion to transfer venue, the parties’ burden to make prima facie proof, and the materials the court may consider, including pleadings, affidavits, stipulations, and attachments.
The opinion cites and applies several familiar venue authorities:
- Fortenberry v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 664 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. 2023), for the plaintiff’s initial venue choice and the parties’ burden structure once venue is challenged.
- In re Fox River Real Est. Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. 2020), on the plaintiff’s initial venue selection.
- In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1999), for the rule that a plaintiff has the first choice of proper venue, but not the second, and that a trial court cannot effectively grant the plaintiff a redo after the initial filing was improper.
- Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 886 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. 1994), as part of the Supreme Court’s venue/mandamus framework recognized in this holding.
- In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004), and Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992), on abuse of discretion and adequacy of appellate remedy.
The court also noted the usual rule that venue rulings are generally reviewed only after final judgment, but that mandamus may issue in exceptional venue circumstances, including where a trial court transfers a case to an improper venue contrary to governing law.
Application
The Eleventh Court treated the case as a straightforward sequencing problem under Texas venue procedure. The plaintiff made the first venue choice by filing in Comanche County. But that choice had to be a legally proper one. Once the defendants challenged venue and established that Comanche County was not proper under Section 15.002, the plaintiff’s control over venue ended.
The court rejected the notion that the plaintiff could preserve venue control by shifting to an alternative county in the response to the motion to transfer. The key point was not whether Hood County might also have been a proper venue in the abstract. It may well have been, because the operative events occurred there. The problem was procedural: the plaintiff had already exercised the first choice and exercised it incorrectly. Under Masonite, the plaintiff was not entitled to a second selection once the initial county failed.
The defendants, by contrast, did what the rules required. They timely moved to transfer, identified Tarrant County as a proper county, and supported that venue position with verification and later affidavit proof showing a defendant’s principal office was there. That showing satisfied Section 15.002(a)(3). At that point, the trial court’s role was not to choose among all conceivable proper counties; it was to transfer the case consistently with the governing venue scheme and the motion properly before it.
By transferring the case to Hood County instead of Tarrant County, the trial court effectively gave the plaintiff a renewed venue election. The appellate court held that this was a misapplication of Texas venue law and therefore a clear abuse of discretion.
On remedy, the court acknowledged the general bar against interlocutory review of permissive venue decisions. But it treated this as one of the uncommon cases where appeal was inadequate because the trial court had transferred the matter to an improper venue in the procedural sense recognized by the Supreme Court’s venue mandamus jurisprudence. That justified mandamus relief.
Holding
The court held that when a plaintiff files suit in an improper county, the defendant may obtain transfer to a proper county established in its motion to transfer venue under Section 15.002 and Rules 86 and 87. A plaintiff cannot avoid that result by later proposing another proper county in response to the motion. In the court’s view, the plaintiff gets the first choice of venue, not a second chance after an improper filing.
The court further held that the trial court abused its discretion by transferring the case to Hood County rather than to Tarrant County, the proper county established in the defendants’ motion. Even if Hood County was independently proper under the general venue statute, the court could not select it in a way that effectively supplanted the defendants’ properly asserted transfer request after the plaintiff’s initial choice failed.
Finally, the court held that mandamus was available. Because the transfer order placed the case in an improper venue under controlling Texas venue procedure and because ordinary appeal was not an adequate remedy in these circumstances, conditional mandamus relief was warranted.
Practical Application
For family-law litigators, the case is less about assisted-living negligence than about who controls forum selection once general venue rules are activated. That issue can surface in divorce-adjacent business torts, reimbursement and fraud claims tied to marital entities, partition-type collateral suits, enforcement cases involving LLCs or trusts, and claims joined with or severed from family cases where Chapter 15 venue rules govern.
The practical lesson is simple but important. If you represent the petitioner and are filing a non-family-code claim subject to general venue rules, do not assume you can salvage an initially defective filing by arguing an alternative county once the respondent moves to transfer. This opinion says that strategy can fail even if the backup county would have been proper had the case been filed there in the first place.
If you represent the respondent, this case underscores the value of a disciplined venue challenge. A verified Rule 86 motion is only the start. If the petitioner contests your venue facts, be prepared to supply affidavit proof that tracks Section 15.002 precisely—principal office, event location, residence, or whatever ground you are asserting. If you prove a proper county and the original county is improper, you may be able to control the transfer destination.
In divorce and custody practice, venue questions often arise under specialized Family Code provisions, and those mandatory or specific statutes will govern where applicable. But family cases regularly generate ancillary claims that do not fit neatly within those provisions. When that happens, this opinion is a reminder that venue procedure matters, proof matters, and timing matters. Lawyers should think about venue at filing, at answer, and again when shaping claims for severance, joinder, or parallel litigation.
Checklists
Petitioner’s venue assessment before filing
- Identify whether the claim is controlled by a specific Family Code venue provision or by the general venue statute in Section 15.002.
- Confirm the precise factual basis for venue in the chosen county before filing.
- Determine whether the chosen county fits one of the actual statutory categories rather than a generalized fairness argument.
- Evaluate whether a defendant entity’s principal office creates a stronger competing venue position elsewhere.
- Avoid relying on a fallback theory that was not the basis of the original filing if the initial county is questionable.
Respondent’s motion-to-transfer preparation
- File a timely Rule 86 motion to transfer venue.
- Specifically identify the county to which transfer is sought.
- Plead the statutory ground for that county with precision.
- Verify the motion as required.
- If the venue ground depends on principal office, residence, or event location, gather affidavit proof early.
- Anticipate a challenge to the sufficiency of the verified motion and be ready to supplement with competent affidavits and attachments.
Venue proof for entity-based family litigation
- Obtain an affidavit from a corporate representative with personal knowledge.
- State the entity’s principal office or headquarters in Texas clearly and unequivocally.
- Attach supporting business records if useful.
- Distinguish among affiliated entities so the record ties the venue fact to a proper defendant.
- Make sure the affidavit addresses the exact venue fact required by Section 15.002.
Responding to an improper initial filing
- First attack the plaintiff’s chosen county directly.
- Then establish your own requested county as proper under the statute.
- Preserve the argument that the plaintiff is not entitled to a second venue choice after filing in an improper county.
- Cite In re Masonite Corp. and this case for the “first choice, not second choice” rule.
- Request transfer to the county identified in your motion, not merely “a proper county.”
Trial-court briefing points
- Emphasize that the issue is not simply whether multiple counties could be proper in the abstract.
- Frame the question as which party controls the venue selection once the original county is shown to be improper.
- Explain that Rules 86 and 87 impose burdens of proof; they do not authorize a new plaintiff-selected transfer destination.
- Argue that transferring to a county not requested in the defendant’s motion effectively grants the plaintiff a second venue election.
- Preserve mandamus points in the record if the court transfers to the wrong county.
Family-law crossover scenarios to evaluate
- Divorce cases joined with business tort or fiduciary-duty claims involving closely held entities.
- Property disputes involving marital LLCs, partnerships, or trusts.
- Fraud, reimbursement, waste, or contract claims severed from the core divorce proceeding.
- Estate-related family litigation with parallel tort or contract allegations.
- Enforcement or declaratory actions involving non-natural-person defendants whose principal office may drive venue.
Family Law Crossover
The procedural rule established here is that, under the general Texas venue framework, control over the transfer destination shifts to the defendant once the plaintiff’s original county is shown to be improper and the defendant proves a proper county in a Rule 86 motion supported under Rule 87. The trial court may not bypass that requested county by transferring the case to a different county later identified by the plaintiff as an alternative proper venue. In a family-law setting, this can arise when a divorce or post-divorce dispute includes severed business, contract, fiduciary-duty, tort, estate, or property claims against entities or third parties that are governed by Chapter 15 rather than a specialized Family Code venue statute. In those cases, counsel should treat venue as a proof-driven procedural contest, not as a flexible equitable selection issue.
Citation
In re Welltower TCG RIDEA Tenant LLC, No. 11-26-00194-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 17, 2026, orig. proceeding).
Full Opinion
~~3f6e65f4-c0d5-4412-a4fd-18fe2321fd5b~~
Share this content: