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Restricted Appeal Requires Record Proof of No Notice | Renteria Cortez v. Pacheco (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Renteria Cortez v. Pacheco, 04-25-00511-CV, September 23, 2026.

On appeal from 83rd Judicial District Court, Val Verde County, Texas

Synopsis

A restricted appellant attacking a post-answer default decree for lack of notice must affirmatively establish nonreceipt from the face of the appellate record. Conflicting email addresses and an unsupported assertion that notice was not received did not rebut the presumption of proper notice where the record showed electronic service of the final-hearing setting through the electronic filing manager.

Relevance to Family Law

Post-answer defaults are common in divorce and SAPCR litigation, particularly when a self-represented party stops participating after making an appearance. Renteria Cortez confirms that a restricted appeal is not an opportunity to develop a new factual record concerning notice: the appellant must show the notice defect from the clerk’s record and reporter’s record themselves. For practitioners seeking a divorce decree, conservatorship orders, child support, a property division, or family-violence findings after the opposing party fails to appear, the case underscores the importance of creating an affirmative service record. For counsel challenging such a decree, it emphasizes the need to select a procedure—such as a timely motion for new trial—that permits evidence of nonreceipt when the existing record does not establish the defect.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The litigation began as a suit affecting the parent-child relationship involving Carlos Alberto Renteria Cortez, Alondra Pacheco, and their two children. An earlier SAPCR order established parentage, appointed the parents joint managing conservators, imposed child-support obligations, and included possession and access provisions. That order identified an email address for Renteria ending in renteria511@gmail.com.

Renteria later filed a pro se divorce action in Ector County. His handwritten filings contained versions of an email address that he argued differed from the address appearing in the earlier SAPCR proceeding. The Ector County clerk’s docket sheet reflected yet another variation. The divorce was ultimately transferred to the 83rd Judicial District Court in Val Verde County and proceeded under the cause number assigned to the existing SAPCR.

Pacheco answered and filed a counterpetition for divorce. The trial court initially set the final hearing for March 10, 2025. The automated certificate of electronic service showed that the setting was transmitted to Renteria at the email address previously associated with him in the SAPCR. Renteria appeared at that hearing and requested additional time to retain counsel. The trial court granted the request and stated that the final hearing would be reset.

Pacheco then moved for another final setting. The trial court reset the final hearing for May 13, 2025, and the automated certificate of electronic service showed transmission through the electronic filing system to the same address used for the March setting. Renteria did not appear.

At the May hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of its file and stated that the electronic filing record showed that the setting had been emailed to Renteria. After concluding that due process had been satisfied, the court heard Pacheco’s evidence concerning the divorce, the children, child support, the marital estate, and alleged family violence.

The resulting decree dissolved the marriage, addressed conservatorship and child support, awarded Pacheco the parties’ Odessa residence, and included a family-violence finding. Renteria did not timely pursue ordinary post-judgment relief but filed a restricted appeal, alleging that he had not received notice of the May hearing and challenging the evidentiary support for portions of the decree.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 permits a restricted appeal by a party who did not participate—either personally or through counsel—in the hearing that resulted in the judgment and who did not timely file a post-judgment motion, request findings and conclusions, or file a notice of appeal within the ordinary timetable. The appellant must establish four elements:

  1. The restricted appeal was filed within six months after the judgment was signed.
  2. The appellant was a party to the underlying suit.
  3. The appellant did not participate in the hearing resulting in the judgment and did not timely file the specified post-judgment pleadings.
  4. Error is apparent on the face of the record.

Under Ex parte E.H., 602 S.W.3d 486, 497 (Tex. 2020), the “face of the record” includes all papers properly before the appellate court, including both the clerk’s record and the reporter’s record. A restricted appeal affords review comparable to an ordinary appeal, but the reviewing court may not consider evidence outside that record.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 requires reasonable notice of a contested trial setting. Failure to provide the required notice implicates due process because it deprives a party of the opportunity to appear, present evidence, and voice objections.

Rule 245 permits notice to be served under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21a. When electronic service is required, Rule 21a contemplates service through the electronic filing manager. Electronic service is complete upon transmission to the serving party’s electronic filing service provider, and a certificate of service constitutes prima facie evidence of service.

Proper service creates a presumption of receipt, although that presumption may be rebutted by competent evidence of nonreceipt. As recognized in Grant v. Grant, No. 04-12-00315-CV, 2015 WL 5438949, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 16, 2015, no pet.), a restricted appellant bears the burden to rebut the presumption of proper notice by affirmatively demonstrating lack of notice from the face of the record. Allegations made only in an appellate brief do not satisfy that burden.

The court also relied on the service principles discussed in Echartea v. Flores, 691 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied). Electronic service through the filing manager is intended to reduce disputes over which of several possible email addresses should have been used. Parties and counsel are responsible for maintaining accurate service-contact information within that system.

Finally, because the judgment followed a post-answer default, Pacheco was still required to present evidence supporting the relief sought. A post-answer default does not operate as a confession of the opposing party’s claims, and the reporter’s record is part of the record examined for restricted-appeal error.

Application

The first three restricted-appeal requirements were not disputed. Renteria was a party, timely invoked the restricted-appeal procedure, did not participate in the May 13 hearing, and did not timely file a post-judgment motion or request findings and conclusions. The appeal therefore turned on whether reversible error appeared on the face of the record.

The notice record did not affirmatively establish nonreceipt. The same email address was repeatedly associated with Renteria in the underlying proceedings. More significantly, notice of the March final setting had been electronically transmitted to that address, and Renteria personally appeared at the March hearing. That appearance supported the inference that the address used through the electronic filing system was capable of providing him notice.

When the final hearing was reset for May, the motion to set and the reset order were transmitted through the electronic filing manager to the same service address. The automated certificate identified Renteria as the service contact and reflected that the notice was sent. At the final hearing, the trial court also noted on the record that the electronic filing information showed transmission of the setting.

Renteria relied on handwritten filings containing different versions of his email address. The court concluded, however, that the existence of those variations did not affirmatively prove that the address used by the electronic filing manager was incorrect or that the May notice was not received. At most, the record contained conflicting information. That ambiguity was insufficient to establish facial error because the restricted appellant—not the appellee—had the burden to rebut the presumptions of proper service and receipt.

The court also declined to treat Renteria’s allegation of nonreceipt as evidence. A factual assertion in an appellate brief cannot expand the face of the record. Without competent record evidence establishing nonreceipt, the court could not resolve the factual dispute in Renteria’s favor through a restricted appeal.

The court likewise found no reversible error apparent from the record concerning the challenged portions of the decree. The reporter’s record showed that Pacheco presented evidence addressing the divorce, the children, child support, the residence, and family violence. The restricted-appeal record therefore did not demonstrate a facial basis for reversing those provisions.

Holding

Renteria satisfied the first three requirements for a restricted appeal. He timely filed the appeal, was a party to the underlying proceeding, did not participate in the hearing that produced the final decree, and did not timely pursue the post-judgment remedies that would preclude restricted review.

He did not, however, establish a notice violation apparent on the face of the record. A restricted appellant must affirmatively rebut the presumption of proper notice. The electronic-service certificates, the repeated use of the service address, and Renteria’s appearance at the prior hearing after notice was sent to that address prevented the record from establishing nonreceipt.

The court further held that conflicting email addresses in handwritten filings did not, without competent evidence of nonreceipt, establish that electronic service was defective. An unsupported appellate allegation that the party did not receive the setting was insufficient under Rule 30.

Because neither the notice argument nor the challenges to the decree demonstrated reversible error apparent on the face of the record, the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the divorce decree.

Practical Application

For the party seeking a post-answer default, Renteria Cortez illustrates the value of making notice part of the trial record rather than relying exclusively on assumptions about the clerk’s file. File the motion to set, obtain a written setting order, serve both through the electronic filing manager, and preserve the automated certificates. At the hearing, ask the trial court to take judicial notice of the service history and place its notice findings on the record.

The case is especially important when the absent party is self-represented or has used inconsistent contact information. Counsel should use the service contact registered in the electronic filing system while documenting any additional efforts to provide notice. Courtesy service to known alternative addresses may be prudent, even if Rule 21a does not require it.

For the party challenging a default decree, procedural selection may determine the outcome. If the deadline for a motion for new trial remains open, that procedure generally provides a better vehicle for presenting sworn evidence of nonreceipt, electronic-delivery failures, or an incorrect service contact. A restricted appeal confines the litigant to the existing record and cannot ordinarily cure the absence of evidence concerning notice.

Practitioners should also distinguish between proof of transmission and proof of actual receipt. Rule 21a’s certificate creates prima facie evidence of service, and proper service gives rise to a presumption of receipt. Actual nonreceipt may still be shown, but it must be established with competent evidence that becomes part of the record through a procedurally available mechanism.

Finally, counsel obtaining a post-answer default divorce should not treat the opposing party’s absence as relieving the petitioner of the burden of proof. Evidence should be developed for jurisdiction, grounds for divorce, conservatorship, the best interest of the children, child support, characterization and value of property, a just-and-right division, reimbursement claims, and any requested family-violence finding.

Checklists

Before Seeking a Post-Answer Default

Building the Notice Record at the Default Hearing

Challenging a Default Decree for Lack of Notice

Evaluating a Restricted Appeal

Managing Electronic Service Contacts

Citation

Renteria Cortez v. Pacheco, No. 04-25-00511-CV (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 23, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion.

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