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CROSSOVER: Rule 27.2 Can Save a Premature Family-Law Appeal When the Trial Court’s Order Is Not Yet Final

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Burgess v. Andersson, 03-26-00462-CV, September 25, 2026.

On appeal from 250th District Court of Travis County

Synopsis

A notice of nonsuit may resolve claims left pending after an interlocutory summary judgment, but the appellate timetable does not begin until the trial court signs a judgment or dismissal order disposing of those claims. Under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 27.1 and 27.2, the appellate court may abate and remand for entry of a final order, then treat a previously filed notice of appeal as relating forward to that order.

Relevance to Family Law

This finality problem can arise in divorce, custody, and property litigation whenever an order resolves fewer than all pending claims, parties, interventions, or consolidated proceedings. Examples include a partial summary judgment on characterization or reimbursement claims, an order disposing of claims against one joined party but not another, or a nonsuit of remaining modification or enforcement claims after another claim has been adjudicated. Burgess confirms that filing a nonsuit does not itself start the appellate timetable: counsel must obtain a signed order or final judgment disposing of the remaining matter.

The decision also provides a potential procedural cure. If a family-law appeal is filed before the final dismissal or judgment is signed, the court of appeals may use Rules 27.1 and 27.2 to preserve the appeal, abate the proceeding, and permit the trial court to enter a final order. That remedy is discretionary, however, and should not substitute for a deliberate finality review before filing the notice of appeal.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The trial court granted a traditional motion for summary judgment filed by Arthur and Rebecca Andersson. The order stated: “Defendants’ traditional motion for summary judgement is GRANTED. This is a final appealable order that disposes of all claims.”

The summary-judgment motion had not been filed by another defendant, Sunniva LLC d/b/a Aqua Clear Pool Care. Accordingly, Burgess’s claims against Sunniva remained pending when the trial court signed the summary-judgment order on April 29, 2026.

Burgess subsequently filed a notice of nonsuit concerning Sunniva on May 7, 2026. He then filed a notice of appeal on May 14, stating that the nonsuit had made the summary-judgment order final and appealable. The appellate record, however, did not contain a signed order dismissing the claims against Sunniva.

The Third Court of Appeals also observed that the summary-judgment order lacked decretal language specifying the relief granted. Although the order characterized itself as final and appealable and stated that it disposed of all claims, it did not state that it disposed of all parties, did not actually dispose of Sunniva, and did not set out the specific adjudicative relief.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Application

The April 29 order did not actually dispose of every pending claim and party. The Anderssons’ summary-judgment motion did not encompass Sunniva, and Burgess’s claims against Sunniva remained pending when the court signed the order. The order’s statement that it disposed of “all claims” did not cure the problem because it neither disposed of Sunniva nor clearly and unequivocally stated that it disposed of all claims and all parties.

The appellate court identified a second finality concern: the order granted the summary-judgment motion but did not contain decretal language specifying the relief awarded. An order that merely grants a motion may leave uncertainty about what claims were adjudicated and what relief was rendered. That concern reinforced the need for a properly drafted final order.

Burgess’s later notice of nonsuit disposed of his remaining claims against Sunniva, but the filing did not commence the appellate timetable. Under Farmer and In re Bennett, a signed dismissal order or final judgment was still necessary. Consequently, Burgess’s May 14 notice of appeal preceded the event that would trigger the deadline for perfecting the appeal.

Rather than dismiss immediately, the Third Court concluded that this was an appropriate case for abatement under Rule 27.2. The court remanded to permit Burgess to obtain a signed final and appealable order and directed that the order—or a status report—be filed in a supplemental clerk’s record. The court further explained that, if the trial court signed a final order, the May 14 notice of appeal would be treated as a premature notice under Rule 27.1, and prior appellate actions could be related to the final order under Rule 27.2.

Holding

The court held that the summary-judgment order was not yet final and appealable. It did not actually dispose of the claims against Sunniva, did not clearly state that it disposed of all claims and all parties, and lacked sufficiently specific decretal language.

The court further held that the filing of the notice of nonsuit did not begin the appellate timetable. Under Farmer and In re Bennett, the timetable would begin when the trial court signed an order dismissing the remaining claims or otherwise entered a final judgment.

Finally, the court exercised its authority under Rule 27.2 to abate the appeal and remand for entry of a signed final order. If such an order were signed, the court would treat the existing notice of appeal as premature under Rule 27.1 and give prior appellate actions effect as relating to the final order.

Practical Application

Family-law litigators should distinguish between the substantive effect of a nonsuit and the event that begins the appellate timetable. Even when a nonsuit removes the last unresolved claim, a signed order or judgment remains essential for appellate-deadline purposes.

Several recurring family-law scenarios warrant particular attention:

Rule 27.2 is a safety mechanism, not an automatic entitlement. The appellate court may dismiss an appeal for want of jurisdiction rather than hold it open indefinitely. The better practice is to secure a facially final, signed order before relying on relation-forward principles.

Checklists

Finality Review Before Filing a Family-Law Appeal

Nonsuiting the Last Remaining Claim

Responding to a Premature Notice of Appeal

Drafting a Final Divorce Decree or SAPCR Order

Citation

Burgess v. Andersson, No. 03-26-00462-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 25, 2026, order & mem. op.) (per curiam).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion in Burgess v. Andersson.

Family Law Crossover

The crossover mechanism is the interaction between Rules 27.1 and 27.2 when a family-law order is substantively close to final but lacks a signed disposition of a remaining claim or party. Rule 27.2 allows the appellate court to abate and remand so the trial court may modify the appealed order or sign an additional order that makes the judgment final. Once that final order is signed, Rule 27.1 permits the premature notice of appeal to be treated as filed on the date of, but after, the event that triggered the appellate timetable, while Rule 27.2 permits prior appellate proceedings to be treated as relating to the final order.

In a divorce, this procedure could apply when the court resolves the principal property and marital claims but a claim involving a joined business entity remains pending and is later nonsuited. In a SAPCR, it could arise when an order resolves conservatorship and support but does not dispose of a pending intervention or consolidated civil claim. In a post-divorce proceeding, it could arise when the court adjudicates a modification claim while an accompanying enforcement or fee claim remains unresolved.

The procedural sequence is critical: identify the unresolved matter, obtain a signed dismissal order or final judgment, supplement the appellate record, and ask the court of appeals to give the premature notice and prior appellate actions relation-forward effect. Until the signed final order exists, the appellate deadline has not begun merely because a nonsuit was filed, and the trial court retains authority to enter or modify the order necessary to establish finality.

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