CROSSOVER: Texas Supreme Court: Parents May Bind Minor Children to Arbitration—Including Enforcement by Nonsignatory Beneficiaries

UATP Management, LLC v. Geter, 24-0905, October 16, 2026.

On appeal from Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas

Synopsis

A parent may execute an arbitration agreement on behalf of a minor child when making a decision of substantial legal significance, absent an applicable exception such as adversity between the parent’s and child’s interests. Nonsignatories expressly identified as “protected parties” entitled to a release, covenant not to sue, and indemnification are third-party beneficiaries who may enforce the agreement’s arbitration provision, even if the arbitration clause does not separately name them.

Relevance to Family Law

The opinion has two significant family-law implications. First, it confirms that Texas Family Code section 151.001(a)(7) generally authorizes a parent to make decisions of substantial legal significance for a child, including signing an arbitration agreement on the child’s behalf. That principle may arise when a parent contracts for medical care, counseling, educational services, recreational activities, childcare, transportation, or other services that later become relevant to a custody or child-related dispute. The Court cautioned, however, that exceptions may apply in rare cases, including when the parent’s interests are adverse to the child’s interests.

Second, the Court’s third-party-beneficiary analysis reaches beyond child-related contracts. Divorce and property litigation frequently involves agreements benefiting nonsignatory entities or professionals, including closely held companies, trusts, affiliates, fiduciaries, valuation professionals, parenting professionals, and related service providers. If the agreement clearly and fully expresses an intent to confer a direct benefit on those parties, they may be able to invoke the agreement’s arbitration provision. Conversely, a family-law agreement that merely refers to another person or entity, without expressly conferring a direct contractual benefit, may not support nonsignatory enforcement.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Chiniqua Geter took her minor daughter, K.G., to an Urban Air trampoline park in Beaumont. Before K.G. entered the play area, Geter signed a release and indemnification agreement on K.G.’s behalf. The agreement identified Beaumont Adventure Park Urban Air LLC as well as UATP Management, LLC, UATP IP, LLC, UA Attractions, LLC, and other affiliated persons and entities as “protected parties.” Geter agreed to release, refrain from suing, and indemnify those protected parties.

The agreement also contained a broad arbitration provision governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. It required arbitration of any dispute or claim arising out of or relating to the agreement, the premises, the activities, property damage, personal injury, or the scope, arbitrability, or validity of the arbitration agreement.

K.G. was injured while playing at the park. Geter, acting as K.G.’s next friend, sued Beaumont Urban Air and the affiliated protected parties. The defendants moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion.

On interlocutory appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that K.G. was bound to arbitrate with Beaumont Urban Air under direct-benefits estoppel because she had accepted the contractual benefit of entering the park. The court of appeals nevertheless held that the nonsignatory protected parties could not compel arbitration because the tort claims existed independently of the contract and the arbitration clause did not expressly identify the protected parties.

The nonsignatory protected parties petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for review. Geter did not timely seek review of the judgment compelling arbitration with Beaumont Urban Air, so that portion of the court of appeals’ judgment became final.

Issues Decided

• Whether a parent may bind a minor child to an arbitration agreement by signing the agreement on the child’s behalf.

• Whether the child could disaffirm the agreement after accepting its benefit by entering and using the trampoline park.

• Whether a court or an arbitrator must decide if nonsignatories have a contractual right to invoke the arbitration agreement.

• Whether affiliates expressly identified as “protected parties” benefiting from a release, covenant not to sue, and indemnification provision are third-party beneficiaries entitled to enforce the agreement’s arbitration clause.

• Whether the arbitration clause had to name the protected parties separately when the agreement, construed as a whole, expressly conferred direct benefits on them.

Rules Applied

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, governed the arbitration provision. A party moving to compel arbitration generally must establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and demonstrate that the claims fall within its scope. Whether an arbitration agreement exists is a legal question for the court.

Texas Family Code section 151.001(a)(7) recognizes a parent’s right to make decisions of substantial legal significance concerning the parent’s child. Relying on Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Ha, 660 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. 2023), the Court explained that this authority generally includes signing an arbitration agreement on a child’s behalf. Exceptions may apply in rare circumstances, such as when the parent’s interests are adverse to the child’s interests.

Under Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. of Texas v. Roman, 498 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1973), a contract obligating a minor is ordinarily voidable at the minor’s election. But a minor may not retain a contract’s benefits while repudiating its corresponding obligations.

The Court also applied the following arbitration and contract principles:

• A delegation clause may assign certain questions of scope or arbitrability to an arbitrator, but whether an arbitration agreement exists between particular parties remains a gateway issue for the court.

• Under Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Group, Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018), six recognized contract doctrines may permit application of an arbitration agreement to a nonsignatory: incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, alter ego, equitable estoppel, and third-party-beneficiary status.

• A third-party beneficiary may enforce an arbitration agreement if the contracting parties intended to secure a direct benefit for that third party and entered the contract, at least in part, for the third party’s benefit.

• The intent to confer a direct benefit must be clearly and fully expressed. An incidental benefit is insufficient.

• Courts construe a contract as a whole and harmonize its provisions rather than isolating individual clauses.

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.016 and 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B) authorized an interlocutory appeal from the order denying arbitration. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.1 also affected the scope of review because a party seeking to alter the court of appeals’ judgment must file a petition for review.

Application

The Supreme Court first concluded that direct-benefits estoppel was unnecessary to bind K.G. Geter did not merely sign a contract for herself from which K.G. later received an incidental benefit. She signed the agreement expressly on K.G.’s behalf so that K.G. could enter and use the trampoline park. Under Family Code section 151.001(a)(7), a parent generally possesses authority to make that type of legally significant decision for a child.

No party established an exception to that general rule. In particular, the case did not present an adjudicated conflict in which Geter’s interests were adverse to K.G.’s interests at the time of contracting. K.G. therefore was bound by her mother’s execution of the arbitration agreement without resort to direct-benefits estoppel.

The Court also rejected the argument that K.G. could disaffirm the agreement simply because she was a minor. Although Texas law ordinarily allows a minor to avoid contractual obligations, it does not permit a minor to retain the contract’s benefits and reject its burdens. K.G. received the contemplated benefit when she gained entry to the trampoline park. Having accepted that benefit, she could not disavow the arbitration obligation.

The Court next addressed who should decide whether the nonsignatory protected parties could compel arbitration. Although the agreement delegated disputes concerning arbitrability to the arbitrator, the protected parties’ right to invoke the agreement presented a more fundamental contract-formation question: whether an arbitration agreement existed between K.G. and those particular parties. That gateway issue remained for the court to decide.

Turning to third-party-beneficiary status, the Court read the agreement as a whole. The release and indemnification language expressly named the nonsignatory affiliates as “protected parties” whom Geter released, agreed not to sue, and agreed to indemnify. Those were direct and substantial contractual benefits, not incidental advantages.

The fact that the arbitration paragraph did not repeat the names of each protected party did not alter the analysis. The arbitration provision broadly governed disputes arising from the agreement, the premises, the activities, and personal injuries. It did not exclude the protected parties identified elsewhere. When the release, indemnity, covenant-not-to-sue, and arbitration provisions were harmonized, arbitration was the contractually selected mechanism for resolving disputes concerning the benefits conferred on the protected parties.

Holding

A parent may sign an arbitration agreement on behalf of a minor child under the parent’s statutory authority to make decisions of substantial legal significance. Direct-benefits estoppel is unnecessary when the parent executes the agreement expressly for the child, although an exception may apply if the parent’s and child’s interests are adverse.

A minor who accepts the benefit of a contract may not retain that benefit while repudiating the contract’s arbitration obligation. K.G.’s entry into and use of the trampoline park prevented her from disaffirming the agreement on the facts presented.

Whether a nonsignatory has a contractual right to compel arbitration is a gateway question for the court, notwithstanding a clause delegating questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The court must first determine whether an arbitration agreement exists between the specific parties.

The protected parties were intended third-party beneficiaries because the agreement expressly named them and directly afforded them a release, covenant not to sue, and indemnification. They therefore possessed a contractual right to enforce the agreement’s arbitration provision, even though the arbitration paragraph did not separately repeat their names.

The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of appeals’ judgment denying the protected parties the right to compel arbitration and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, the opinion requires careful attention to both parental authority and the complete architecture of an agreement. A court will not necessarily isolate an arbitration paragraph from the remainder of the contract. Express benefits conferred elsewhere may establish that a nonsignatory beneficiary can enforce the selected dispute-resolution procedure.

In child-related litigation, counsel should determine whether the parent signed only individually or expressly on the child’s behalf. That distinction may determine whether parental authority supplies the basis for enforcement or whether the movant must rely on direct-benefits estoppel or another nonsignatory doctrine. Counsel also should assess whether a genuine adversity of interests existed when the agreement was made.

The opinion may apply in disputes concerning contracts for counseling, medical treatment, educational services, childcare, camps, extracurricular programs, recreational facilities, and parenting-related services. When such contracts contain arbitration provisions, the first questions should be who signed, in what capacity, who received the contractual benefit, and which persons or entities were expressly protected.

In divorce and marital-property litigation, the third-party-beneficiary analysis may arise under premarital agreements, partition or exchange agreements, settlement agreements, entity-governance documents, trust instruments, and contracts involving marital businesses. A spouse’s affiliate, trust, manager, employee, fiduciary, or related entity will not receive enforcement rights merely because it is affected by the agreement. The document must clearly and fully express an intent to confer a direct benefit.

The decision does not mean that every child-related issue may be conclusively removed from judicial supervision. Texas statutes governing conservatorship, possession, child support, and the child’s best interest may impose independent limitations or standards. For example, arbitration of conservatorship and possession issues implicates the procedures and safeguards in Texas Family Code section 153.0071. Counsel should therefore analyze both general arbitration law and the Family Code provisions governing the specific dispute.

Checklists

Evaluating Whether a Parent Bound a Child

• Identify the exact person who executed the agreement.

• Determine whether the signature block states that the parent signed individually, as parent or guardian, on the child’s behalf, or in multiple capacities.

• Confirm whether the contract concerns a decision of substantial legal significance under Texas Family Code section 151.001(a)(7).

• Determine whether the child received and retained the contemplated contractual benefit.

• Investigate whether the parent’s interests were adverse to the child’s interests when the agreement was executed.

• Separate the enforceability of the arbitration provision from the enforceability of the agreement’s substantive release or indemnity provisions.

• Analyze whether a child-specific Family Code provision imposes additional requirements or judicial review.

Establishing Nonsignatory Enforcement

• Identify every nonsignatory seeking to compel arbitration.

• Determine whether each nonsignatory is expressly named or objectively identifiable in the agreement.

• Locate any release, indemnity, covenant-not-to-sue, defense, reimbursement, or limitation-of-liability provision benefiting the nonsignatory.

• Confirm that the benefit is direct rather than incidental.

• Read the arbitration provision together with the entire agreement.

• Determine whether the arbitration provision expressly excludes any class of beneficiaries.

• Evaluate all six recognized nonsignatory theories: incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, alter ego, equitable estoppel, and third-party beneficiary.

• Develop a separate evidentiary and legal basis for each nonsignatory seeking enforcement.

Challenging Nonsignatory Enforcement

• Require the movant to identify the precise contract doctrine authorizing enforcement.

• Examine whether the agreement clearly and fully expresses an intent to benefit the nonsignatory.

• Distinguish a direct contractual benefit from a practical or economic benefit.

• Determine whether the purported beneficiary is named only in background provisions rather than operative language.

• Identify any limiting language in the arbitration clause or definitions section.

• Preserve the argument that the existence of an arbitration agreement between the specific parties is a gateway matter for the court.

• Address each asserted nonsignatory doctrine rather than relying solely on the fact that the movant did not sign.

Drafting Family-Law and Child-Related Agreements

• State expressly the capacity in which each person signs.

• Identify all intended third-party beneficiaries by name, category, or an objectively definite description.

• State whether third-party beneficiaries may enforce the arbitration provision.

• Define “party,” “protected party,” “affiliate,” and “beneficiary” consistently throughout the agreement.

• Specify whether arbitration applies to disputes involving releases, indemnity obligations, covenants not to sue, and related claims.

• Include any intended exclusions from arbitration expressly.

• Address who decides gateway questions, while recognizing that courts ordinarily decide whether an arbitration agreement exists between particular parties.

• Consider potential conflicts between a parent’s interests and the child’s interests.

• Confirm compliance with Family Code provisions governing arbitration of conservatorship, possession, support, and other child-related issues.

Preserving Appellate Review

• Determine whether the arbitration order is subject to interlocutory appeal under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.016 or federal law.

• File a timely notice of appeal from an appealable order denying arbitration.

• Challenge every adverse portion of the court of appeals’ judgment that the client seeks to alter.

• File a timely petition for review under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.1.

• Do not assume that another party’s petition preserves relief for a nonpetitioning party.

• Separate arguments concerning contract formation, scope, delegation, waiver, and nonsignatory enforcement.

Citation

UATP Management, LLC v. Geter, No. 24-0905, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. Oct. 16, 2026) (per curiam).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion.

Family Law Crossover

The procedural mechanism established by the decision is nonsignatory enforcement of arbitration through third-party-beneficiary doctrine. The trial court—not the arbitrator—first determines whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the resisting party and the nonsignatory seeking enforcement. To prevail, the nonsignatory must show that the agreement clearly and fully expresses an intent to confer a direct contractual benefit on that nonsignatory. If that showing is made, the court construes the agreement as a whole to determine whether the arbitration provision supplies the agreed procedure for enforcing the benefit.

In a Texas family-law matter, the issue could arise when a premarital agreement, partition agreement, mediated settlement agreement, business-ownership agreement, trust-related agreement, or contract for child-related services confers protections on persons who did not sign it. An affiliated entity, trustee, manager, parenting professional, treatment provider, or other expressly protected beneficiary may seek to compel arbitration when later litigation implicates the release, indemnification, covenant, or other direct benefit granted by the agreement.

The parental-authority component may arise when a contract containing an arbitration clause was signed expressly on a child’s behalf. The court must determine whether the parent had authority to enter the agreement, whether an exception such as adversity of interests applies, and whether the child accepted and retained the agreement’s benefit. If the underlying dispute concerns conservatorship or possession rather than an ordinary contractual claim, the court must additionally apply the specific Family Code procedures and best-interest protections governing arbitration of those issues.

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