Section 25.07 Knowledge of Changed Address Proven by Conduct | Julian v. State (2026)

Julian v. State, 01-24-00852-CR, October 16, 2026.

On appeal from County Criminal Court at Law No. 7, Harris County, Texas

Synopsis

Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A) does not require the State to prove that the respondent actually received the clerk’s statutory change-of-address notice before he may be convicted of knowingly going to or near a protected person’s new residence. Knowledge of the protected person’s residence may be established circumstantially, and Julian’s late-night arrival, conduct at the property, and approach toward Calixto’s vehicle permitted a rational jury to find the required knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

Relevance to Family Law

Although Julian is a criminal appeal, its reasoning matters directly to family-law attorneys who draft, obtain, defend, and enforce Chapter 85 protective orders. A protected person’s relocation does not render the order ineffective, and failure to prove the respondent’s actual receipt of the clerk’s notice is not necessarily fatal to a later prosecution. In divorce and custody litigation involving family violence, counsel should therefore treat the respondent’s knowledge of the protected person’s new residence as an evidentiary issue that may be proved through conduct, communications, tracking information, prior visits, admissions, or other surrounding circumstances.

The decision also has practical implications for conservatorship and possession disputes. Conduct supporting an inference that a party deliberately located and approached a protected parent’s residence may be relevant not only to a criminal prosecution, but also to temporary orders, geographic restrictions, supervised possession, injunctions, modification proceedings, and best-interest findings. At the same time, family-law counsel should not assume that circumstantial proof will cure deficient documentation in every case. Promptly filing the change-of-address notification, confirming the clerk’s compliance, and preserving evidence of delivery remain the better litigation practice.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Jennifer Calixto and Leonardo Julian had previously been in a long-term romantic relationship. After the relationship ended, Calixto obtained a family-violence protective order against Julian. The order prohibited Julian from going to or near Calixto’s residence and identified that residence as 9595 Westview Drive, Unit 703. Julian appeared remotely at the protective-order hearing, and the order indicated that the parties agreed to its issuance.

Approximately two months later, Calixto filed a notification of change of address under Texas Family Code § 87.004. The notification identified her new residence as 1605 Huge Oaks Street. Calixto did not request confidentiality for the new address. Section 87.004 required the clerk to attach the notification to the protective order and deliver a copy to Julian by registered or certified mail.

About three months after the notification was filed, Julian arrived at 1605 Huge Oaks Street sometime after midnight. Calixto awoke to loud music and the sound of an engine revving. She saw Julian park on the street, leave his vehicle, and approach her vehicle, which was parked in the driveway. Julian was playing a Spanish love song loudly enough for Calixto to hear it from inside the residence. Calixto interpreted the song as communicating that Julian missed her and had been unable to move on from their relationship. She called 9-1-1.

The State charged Julian with violating the protective order under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A). Calixto was the only witness at trial, and the jury found Julian guilty of the Class A misdemeanor offense.

Issues Decided

• Whether the State was required to prove that Julian actually received the change-of-address notification that the clerk was directed to mail under Texas Family Code § 87.004(b)(1).

• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to permit a rational jury to find that Julian knew 1605 Huge Oaks Street was Calixto’s residence when he went to or near that property.

• Whether the statutory mailing requirement constituted the exclusive method by which the State could establish Julian’s knowledge of the protected person’s new residence.

Rules Applied

Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A) makes it an offense for a person, in violation of a qualifying protective order, to knowingly or intentionally go to or near the protected person’s residence as specifically described in the order. Under subsection (g), the offense is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor.

Texas Family Code § 85.022(b)(3) authorizes a family-violence protective order to prohibit a respondent from going to or near the protected person’s residence. Sections 82.011 and 85.007 permit a protected person to request that address and residency information remain confidential.

When the address is not confidential, Texas Family Code § 87.004 permits the protected person to file a change-of-address notification to modify the information contained in the protective order. The clerk must attach the notification to the order and deliver a copy to the respondent by registered or certified mail. Filing or attaching the notification does not affect the protective order’s validity.

Under Harvey v. State, 78 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), the State must establish the accused’s knowledge of the protective order—or knowledge of the application and the hearing at which an order could issue—as well as the knowing or intentional commission of the prohibited conduct.

Under Hammack v. State, 622 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), a statute’s knowledge requirement does not necessarily require proof through a particular form of notice, delivery, or receipt. Knowledge may be established by circumstantial evidence.

Legal sufficiency is reviewed by considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and asking whether any rational juror could have found each essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. Jurors may draw reasonable inferences from the cumulative force of the evidence and may apply common sense, common knowledge, experience, and everyday observations. See Hernandez v. State, 727 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025); Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

Application

Julian did not dispute that he knew about the protective order or that it prohibited him from going to or near Calixto’s residence. The order reflected his appearance at the protective-order hearing, Calixto testified that he appeared by Zoom, and the order stated that its issuance was by agreement. The sufficiency dispute therefore centered on whether Julian knew that Calixto had moved to 1605 Huge Oaks Street.

Julian argued that the State could not establish that knowledge because it offered no direct proof that he received the clerk’s mailing under Family Code § 87.004(b)(1). The First Court of Appeals rejected the premise that proof of delivery was an element of the Penal Code offense. Receipt of the notification would have been one way to prove knowledge, but it was not the exclusive means of doing so.

The court instead examined the cumulative force of the circumstances. Calixto had filed a nonconfidential change-of-address notification identifying 1605 Huge Oaks Street. The notification itself recited the clerk’s duty to send it to Julian. Several months later, Julian drove to that specific address around midnight, played a Spanish love song loudly enough to be heard inside, parked on the street, left his vehicle, and approached Calixto’s car in the driveway.

No single fact independently compelled the conclusion that Julian knew Calixto lived at the property. Taken together, however, the circumstances supported a rational inference that his presence was neither accidental nor unrelated to Calixto. The time of the visit, the romantic message conveyed by the music, and his approach toward her vehicle supported the jury’s finding that Julian went to the address because he knew it was Calixto’s residence and intended to communicate with her.

The court did not resolve the case by applying a conclusive presumption that the clerk performed the statutory mailing duty or that Julian received the notice. Instead, it concluded that the jury could consider the clerk’s stated statutory duty along with all other circumstances. The charge correctly placed the burden of proof on the State and informed the jury that Julian had no obligation to prove his innocence or produce evidence.

Holding

The court held that legal sufficiency under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A) does not depend on direct proof that the respondent received the change-of-address notification required by Texas Family Code § 87.004(b)(1). The statutory mailing requirement provides a means of notifying the respondent, but actual receipt is not a separate element of the criminal offense.

The court further held that the State may prove the respondent’s knowledge of the protected person’s new residence through circumstantial evidence. A jury may consider the respondent’s conduct, the timing and purpose of the visit, and the cumulative force of the surrounding circumstances.

Finally, the court held that the evidence was legally sufficient. Julian’s arrival at the specific address after midnight, his playing of a romantic song associated with Calixto, and his approach toward her vehicle permitted a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the property was Calixto’s residence. The First Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.

Practical Application

For attorneys representing protected persons, Julian demonstrates that enforcement should not be abandoned merely because the file lacks a signed return receipt. Build a circumstantial case around how the respondent found the residence, why the respondent was present, what the respondent did upon arrival, and whether the conduct was directed toward the protected person. Text messages, location-sharing data, social-media activity, surveillance footage, license-plate records, witness testimony, and prior admissions may be especially probative.

For attorneys obtaining or administering protective orders, file a change-of-address notification promptly and decide carefully whether the new address should remain confidential. If safety concerns warrant confidentiality, counsel should not disclose the address merely to strengthen a possible future enforcement case. The Family Code provides mechanisms for maintaining confidential address information, and client safety should remain paramount.

For respondents and their counsel, the absence of direct proof of certified-mail receipt is not a safe harbor. Advise clients that prohibited conduct may be established without a signed receipt and that appearing at a protected person’s residence can itself supply powerful circumstantial evidence of knowledge. Counsel should also identify lawful mechanisms for handling exchanges, retrieving property, or addressing possession issues without approaching a prohibited residence.

In custody litigation, the same evidence may bear on temporary restraining orders, temporary conservatorship, supervised possession, exchange conditions, electronic communication restrictions, and findings concerning family violence or endangerment. A criminal conviction is not required before the family court may evaluate the underlying conduct under the applicable civil standards.

In divorce and property disputes, counsel should create structured procedures for retrieving personal property, accessing a marital residence, or transferring vehicles. Written agreements and court orders should specify neutral exchange sites, law-enforcement standbys, third-party intermediaries, and prohibited locations. A claimed property interest does not authorize conduct prohibited by an existing protective order.

Checklists

Updating a Protective Order After Relocation

• Determine whether the protected person’s new address should remain confidential under the Family Code.
• File the statutory change-of-address notification promptly.
• Verify that the notification accurately identifies the protective order and the new residence.
• Request confirmation that the clerk attached the notification to the protective order.
• Confirm that the clerk sent the notification by the statutorily required method.
• Preserve the mailing record, tracking information, returned envelope, and any delivery confirmation.
• Provide updated information to appropriate law-enforcement databases when permitted.
• Retain a complete, file-stamped copy of the notification and protective order.

Building Proof of Knowledge

• Identify all communications showing that the respondent knew or discussed the new address.
• Preserve texts, emails, call logs, voicemails, and social-media messages.
• Determine whether the respondent previously visited, delivered items to, or surveilled the property.
• Obtain available doorbell-camera, security-camera, or neighboring-property footage.
• Document the location of the protected person’s vehicle and whether it was visible from the street.
• Preserve 9-1-1 recordings, dispatch records, body-camera footage, and offense reports.
• Identify witnesses who observed the respondent’s arrival, conduct, or departure.
• Develop evidence explaining why the visit was directed toward the protected person rather than coincidental.
• Present the circumstances cumulatively rather than relying on any single fact.

Advising a Protective-Order Respondent

• Obtain and review the complete protective order, including attachments and later-filed notifications.
• Identify every prohibited address and any distance or location restrictions.
• Instruct the client not to investigate or visit a suspected new residence.
• Explain that lack of a signed return receipt does not negate circumstantial proof of knowledge.
• Arrange property retrieval through counsel, court order, law enforcement, or an authorized third party.
• Establish compliant procedures for possession exchanges and child-related communications.
• Warn against indirect contact through music, gifts, vehicles, social media, friends, or family members.
• Document any legitimate lack of notice without engaging in conduct that could independently demonstrate knowledge.
• Seek clarification or modification from the issuing court rather than relying on self-help.

Managing Related Divorce or Custody Litigation

• Determine whether the alleged conduct affects temporary conservatorship or possession terms.
• Evaluate whether supervised possession or neutral exchange locations are necessary.
• Coordinate protective-order provisions with SAPCR and divorce orders to avoid conflicting directives.
• Address access to the marital residence, vehicles, and personal property expressly.
• Preserve evidence for both criminal and family-court proceedings.
• Consider Fifth Amendment implications before eliciting testimony concerning pending criminal allegations.
• Avoid assuming that dismissal or weakness of a criminal charge resolves the family court’s independent inquiry.
• Tailor requested relief to the applicable burden of proof and best-interest standards.

Citation

Julian v. State, No. 01-24-00852-CR (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 16, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion in Julian v. State.

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