Site icon Thomas J. Daley

CROSSOVER: Rule 193.6 Has Teeth: Untimely Attorney’s-Fee Evidence Must Be Excluded Absent Good Cause or No Unfair Surprise

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Rebecca Isaac v. Jon Wright d/b/a Jon Wright Industries, Roofing, Siding, and Windows, 05-24-00340-CV, October 20, 2026.

On appeal from 471st Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas

Synopsis

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6 requires exclusion of untimely disclosed attorney’s-fee evidence unless the offering party establishes good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. Because JWI made neither showing and its untimely evidence was the only support for the fee award, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the $108,020 award and rendered judgment that JWI take nothing on attorney’s fees.

Relevance to Family Law

Attorney’s-fee claims are routine in divorces, suits affecting the parent-child relationship, enforcement proceedings, property disputes, and post-decree litigation. This opinion confirms that a trial court’s broad discretion to award fees does not excuse a party from complying with discovery obligations governing fee witnesses, opinions, documents, and calculations. Even when the parties agree to submit fees after the merits phase, Rule 193.6 may still require exclusion if the evidence was not timely disclosed and the proponent cannot carry its burden to establish good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice.

For family-law litigators, the practical consequence is significant: entitlement to fees and admissible proof of fees are separate matters. A statutory or equitable basis for an award does not supply the evidence necessary to support the amount awarded.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Rebecca Isaac retained Jon Wright d/b/a Jon Wright Industries, Roofing, Siding, and Windows (“JWI”) to replace the roof on her residence. During the project, workers punctured water and gas lines that had been installed close to the underside of the roof deck. A plumbing contractor, Ed Kelly, was retained to address the gas-line problem and perform additional work, but disputes arose concerning who hired Kelly, the quality and scope of his work, and responsibility for his invoices.

Kelly eventually filed a lien against the property. Isaac obtained injunctive relief and pursued separate litigation against Kelly to invalidate the lien, incurring substantial attorney’s fees. She prevailed in that litigation and received an award of fees.

JWI later sued Isaac for the unpaid balance under the roofing contract and asserted several alternative theories of recovery. Isaac counterclaimed, including on a promissory-estoppel theory based on alleged promises that JWI would handle legal matters involving Kelly. JWI asserted waiver as an affirmative defense.

Before trial, the parties executed a Rule 11 agreement stating that they intended to ask the trial court to bifurcate attorney’s fees and establish a post-verdict briefing schedule. The liability issues were tried to a jury, while the attorney’s-fee issue was reserved for submission to the court.

JWI subsequently offered attorney’s-fee evidence in support of its request. Isaac objected under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6, contending that the evidence had not been timely disclosed. The trial court did not expressly sustain the objection and considered the evidence in awarding JWI $108,020 in attorney’s fees.

The amended final judgment also awarded JWI $44,347.05 in damages and denied Isaac relief on her counterclaims. Isaac appealed, challenging the waiver finding and the attorney’s-fee award.

Issues Decided

The Dallas Court of Appeals decided:

Rules Applied

Rule 193.6’s mandatory-exclusion rule. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6 generally prohibits a party from introducing material or information that was not timely disclosed in a discovery response. The rule is mandatory unless the offering party establishes either:

  1. good cause for the failure to make, amend, or supplement the discovery response timely; or
  2. that the failure will not unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the opposing party.

Burden on the proponent. The party seeking to use the untimely evidence bears the burden of proving an exception to exclusion. The trial court must be able to find support in the record for good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice.

Bifurcation does not eliminate discovery obligations. An agreement to try or submit attorney’s fees after the merits does not, standing alone, establish that fee evidence need not be disclosed in accordance with the governing discovery rules and deadlines. The procedure for presenting evidence and the obligation to disclose that evidence are distinct.

Abuse-of-discretion review. A trial court’s ruling concerning admission or exclusion under Rule 193.6 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it considers evidence that Rule 193.6 required it to exclude without the necessary predicate showing.

Preservation through an implicit ruling. When a trial court proceeds to consider challenged evidence and bases its judgment on that evidence, its action may constitute an implicit adverse ruling sufficient to preserve the complaint for appellate review.

Harm and appellate disposition. Erroneous consideration of evidence is reversible when it probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. When the excluded evidence constitutes the only evidentiary support for an attorney’s-fee award, the proper disposition is rendition of a take-nothing judgment on that claim rather than a remand for another opportunity to supply the missing proof.

The court also applied the governing legal- and factual-sufficiency standards to the jury’s waiver finding. It reviewed the evidence supporting the finding and deferred to the jury’s resolution of evidentiary conflicts within the limits of those standards.

Application

The parties’ Rule 11 agreement addressed how attorney’s fees would be presented: the issue would be separated from the liability trial and submitted afterward under a schedule established by the trial court. But that procedural agreement did not resolve whether JWI had timely disclosed the evidence it intended to use in the later submission.

When JWI offered its fee evidence, Isaac invoked Rule 193.6. That objection shifted the focus to the rule’s exceptions. JWI, as the proponent of the untimely evidence, was required to establish good cause for the disclosure failure or demonstrate that the failure would not unfairly surprise or prejudice Isaac. The appellate court concluded that JWI did not make the required showing.

The trial court nevertheless considered the evidence and included $108,020 in attorney’s fees in the amended judgment. Whether characterized as an implicit overruling of the objection or a failure to make an express ruling before considering the evidence, the result was the same: the trial court relied on evidence that Rule 193.6 required it to exclude.

The error was harmful because the untimely evidence was not cumulative of other admissible fee proof. Once that evidence was removed from the record, no admissible evidence remained to support the amount of the fee award. The court therefore did not merely reverse and remand for a new fee presentation. It rendered judgment that JWI take nothing on its attorney’s-fee claim.

Separately, the court reviewed Isaac’s challenge to the jury’s waiver finding. It concluded that the record contained legally and factually sufficient evidence supporting the finding and left the judgment intact on that issue. Because the fee award failed entirely under Rule 193.6, the alternative complaint concerning segregation did not provide a basis for preserving any part of the award.

Holding

The court held that Rule 193.6 required exclusion of JWI’s untimely attorney’s-fee evidence because JWI failed to establish either good cause for the untimely disclosure or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. The trial court abused its discretion by considering that evidence on submission.

The court further held that the error was reversible. Because the excluded evidence was the only evidence supporting the $108,020 attorney’s-fee award, the court reversed that portion of the amended judgment and rendered judgment that JWI take nothing on its claim for attorney’s fees.

The court also held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the jury’s waiver finding against Isaac. It therefore affirmed the remainder of the judgment addressed by that challenge.

Practical Application

In family-law litigation, fee issues are often postponed until after the merits, heard by the court after a jury verdict, or resolved through affidavits and briefing. This opinion cautions that a later fee hearing or submission is not a discovery safe harbor. Counsel should identify fee witnesses, opinions, billing records, allocation methodologies, and anticipated amounts within the applicable discovery framework and supplement those disclosures as the case develops.

The rule can be outcome-determinative in several recurring settings:

Counsel opposing untimely fee evidence should make a specific Rule 193.6 objection before the trial court considers the evidence. The objection should identify the deficient discovery response or missed deadline and emphasize that the proponent bears the burden of establishing an exception. Counsel should also obtain an express ruling when possible and object to any proposed judgment incorporating the challenged fees.

Checklists

Preparing Your Attorney’s-Fee Proof

Structuring a Post-Trial Fee Submission

Responding to Untimely Fee Evidence

Establishing a Rule 193.6 Exception

Preserving the Issue for Appeal

Citation

Rebecca Isaac v. Jon Wright d/b/a Jon Wright Industries, Roofing, Siding, and Windows, No. 05-24-00340-CV, slip op. (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 20, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion.

Family Law Crossover

The crossover mechanism is Rule 193.6’s mandatory exclusion of evidence that was not timely disclosed in response to a proper discovery request. Once an opponent demonstrates that the evidence was not timely disclosed, the proponent must establish good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. Without that predicate, the court may not simply consider the evidence because it is relevant, because fees were reserved for a later hearing, or because all parties knew that attorney’s fees would be requested.

In a Texas family-law matter, the issue may arise when a party waits until trial or a post-trial submission to provide a fee affidavit, billing records, expert opinions, segregation analysis, or conditional appellate-fee testimony. It may also arise when the amount sought increases substantially without supplementation or when a newly retained attorney attempts to offer previously undisclosed fee opinions.

The procedural lesson is to treat the fee phase as an evidentiary proceeding governed by the same disclosure and admissibility rules as the merits. If fee evidence is late, the proponent should request a Rule 193.6 determination and build a record supporting an exception before the evidence is considered. If the evidence is excluded and no other admissible proof supports the amount awarded, the resulting appellate remedy may be rendition of a take-nothing judgment on fees—not another opportunity to prove them.

~~9bf44263-5879-45e5-a64d-cc7db44d7d9e~~

Share this content:

Exit mobile version