Sections 161.211 and 162.012 Six-Month Bar | Toliver v. Norton (2026)

Toliver v. Norton, 07-25-00258-CV, October 22, 2026.

On appeal from 287th District Court, Parmer County, Texas

Synopsis

Texas Family Code §§ 161.211 and 162.012 deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a bill of review and declaratory-judgment action filed more than six months after the termination and adoption orders were signed. The six-month bar applied even though the challenger alleged defects in UCCJEA jurisdiction and notice; accordingly, the court of appeals vacated the judgment on the bill of review and rendered a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.

Relevance to Family Law

Toliver imposes a severe timing constraint on post-judgment challenges to termination and adoption orders. Family-law litigators should not assume that characterizing an order as “void,” invoking the UCCJEA, alleging defective notice, or filing an equitable bill of review will avoid the six-month restrictions in Texas Family Code §§ 161.211 and 162.012. In the Seventh Court of Appeals, those provisions operate as jurisdictional bars that may be raised for the first time on appeal and cannot be waived by the opposing party.

The decision has its most direct effect on termination, adoption, SAPCR, and interstate-custody litigation. It also carries a broader lesson for divorce and property cases: counsel must identify any statute-specific restriction on post-judgment relief before relying on the ordinary four-year bill-of-review period. Although Toliver does not impose a six-month deadline on an ordinary attack against a divorce decree or property division, it illustrates that a specialized Family Code deadline may displace generally available equitable remedies and prevent a court from reaching otherwise substantial jurisdictional or due-process arguments.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

In 2016, a New Mexico court appointed Daina Norton, the child’s paternal grandmother, as the child’s kinship guardian. Edward Toliver, the child’s paternal grandfather and Daina’s former spouse, was not a party to that proceeding and received no rights, responsibilities, or duties under the New Mexico order.

The Nortons later moved with the child to Parmer County, Texas. In 2023, they filed a Texas proceeding to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents and adopt the child. The Texas court signed an order granting termination and adoption on September 14, 2023. The order recited that no other court possessed continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Toliver was not served with the Texas suit.

Toliver subsequently sought relief in the New Mexico proceeding. After the Nortons’ counsel received notice of Toliver’s New Mexico filing, counsel informed Toliver of the Texas termination and adoption orders. Although the New Mexico court initially entered an ex parte order appointing Toliver as the child’s kinship guardian, it later dissolved that order and dismissed the New Mexico proceeding based on the Texas termination and adoption.

On August 21, 2024—approximately eleven months after the Texas order was signed—Toliver filed a petition for bill of review and declaratory judgment in Parmer County. He alleged, among other things, that the Texas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and that he had not received notice of the termination and adoption proceeding. He separately filed a SAPCR seeking shared custody of the child.

The trial court dismissed both proceedings for lack of standing. Toliver appealed separately, resulting in the consolidated opinion addressing the bill-of-review proceeding in Cause No. 07-25-00257-CV and the SAPCR in Cause No. 07-25-00258-CV.

Issues Decided

• Whether Texas Family Code §§ 161.211 and 162.012 impose a jurisdictional six-month bar against direct or collateral attacks on termination and adoption orders.

• Whether the six-month bar applies to a bill of review and declaratory-judgment action alleging that the underlying orders were invalid because of UCCJEA and notice defects.

• Whether the timeliness issue could be raised for the first time on appeal when the appellees had not obtained a trial-court ruling on that ground.

• Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the separate SAPCR for lack of standing should be affirmed.

Rules Applied

Texas Family Code § 161.211(a) provides that, subject to its statutory terms, the validity of an order terminating parental rights is not subject to direct or collateral attack after the sixth month following the date the order was signed. Texas Family Code § 162.012(a) establishes a comparable six-month restriction for challenges to adoption orders.

A bill of review ordinarily constitutes an equitable, collateral attack on a judgment that is no longer subject to a motion for new trial or direct appeal. Although the residual limitations period for a conventional bill of review is generally four years under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.051, the more specific six-month provisions governing termination and adoption orders control over that general period.

The court relied on the policy recognized in In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. 2020), that finality is uniquely important in termination and adoption proceedings. Children and adoptive families should not remain indefinitely exposed to challenges while judicial proceedings continue.

The court also relied on decisions treating § 161.211 as a jurisdictional restriction rather than an ordinary statute of limitations, including:

• Von Falkenhorst v. Ford, No. 01-20-00864-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 4915 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 19, 2022, no pet.).

• C.M.C. v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, 696 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, pet. denied).

• In re E.R., 335 S.W.3d 816 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012).

• In re M.E., No. 07-16-00039-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 195 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 8, 2018, no pet.).

Because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, a jurisdictional defect may be raised for the first time on appeal. The court acknowledged a split among Texas appellate courts regarding whether the statutory period is jurisdictional or instead operates as an affirmative limitations defense. It nevertheless adhered to the Seventh Court of Appeals’ jurisdictional treatment of the six-month bar.

The UCCJEA generally allocates jurisdiction among states concerning child-custody determinations. But Texas Family Code § 152.103 expressly provides that the UCCJEA does not govern an adoption proceeding. The Family Code also permits a termination proceeding to be joined with an adoption under § 162.001(b)(1).

Application

Toliver filed his bill of review and request for declaratory relief approximately eleven months after the termination and adoption order was signed. His filing therefore fell outside the six-month period established by §§ 161.211 and 162.012.

Toliver attempted to avoid the statutory bar by attacking the authority of the Texas court to render the underlying orders. He maintained that New Mexico had made the initial child-custody determination and that the Texas court did not conduct the jurisdictional inquiry required by the UCCJEA. He also emphasized that he had not been served with or otherwise notified of the Texas termination and adoption proceeding.

The court treated those theories as challenges to the validity of the termination and adoption orders—the precise type of direct or collateral attack governed by the six-month statutes. Calling the orders void, invoking the UCCJEA, or alleging lack of notice did not convert the untimely proceeding into one the trial court could adjudicate. Because the six-month restriction was jurisdictional under the Seventh Court’s precedent, the trial court lacked authority to reach the merits of Toliver’s bill of review or declaratory claims.

The fact that the Nortons first asserted the six-month bar on appeal did not alter the result. Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be created by waiver, agreement, or the parties’ failure to raise the issue in the trial court. Once the court of appeals determined that the challenge was untimely, dismissal for want of jurisdiction was required.

The trial court had dismissed the bill-of-review proceeding for lack of standing. The appellate court concluded that the proper disposition was instead based on the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction created by the untimely filing. It therefore vacated the trial court’s judgment in the bill-of-review case and rendered the judgment the trial court should have rendered.

Holding

Texas Family Code §§ 161.211 and 162.012 barred Toliver’s bill of review and declaratory-judgment action because he filed them more than six months after the termination and adoption order was signed. Under controlling Seventh Court precedent, that statutory bar deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Toliver’s allegations concerning the UCCJEA and lack of notice did not permit the court to adjudicate his untimely collateral attack. Those allegations challenged the validity of the termination and adoption orders and remained subject to the six-month bar.

Because the defect concerned subject-matter jurisdiction, the Nortons could raise the statutory bar for the first time on appeal. Their failure to obtain a trial-court ruling on that issue did not waive it.

In Cause No. 07-25-00257-CV, the court of appeals vacated the trial court’s judgment and rendered judgment dismissing Toliver’s petition for bill of review and declaratory judgment for want of jurisdiction. In Cause No. 07-25-00258-CV, the court affirmed the judgment dismissing Toliver’s separate SAPCR for lack of standing.

Practical Application

Calendar from the date of signature, not from discovery. Sections 161.211 and 162.012 measure the six-month period from the date the termination or adoption order was signed. Counsel should not assume that the period begins when the client learns of the judgment, obtains the clerk’s record, or discovers the alleged jurisdictional defect.

Treat a voidness argument as subject to the statutory bar. In the Seventh Court of Appeals, pleading that a termination or adoption order is void does not necessarily permit an attack outside the six-month period. The court treated alleged defects involving interstate jurisdiction and notice as challenges subject to the same statutory deadline.

Do not rely on the ordinary bill-of-review period. The general four-year period commonly associated with bills of review does not supersede the Family Code’s specific six-month restrictions on challenges to termination and adoption orders.

Investigate interstate proceedings before judgment. When a child has lived in another state or has been the subject of a guardianship, custody, dependency, or similar proceeding, counsel should obtain the foreign pleadings and orders immediately. Any dispute over continuing, exclusive jurisdiction should be developed before the Texas court signs termination or adoption orders.

Address both the UCCJEA and adoption statutes. The UCCJEA does not govern an adoption proceeding, but termination and adoption may be joined. Counsel confronting a combined proceeding should separately analyze the jurisdictional basis for each component rather than treating the entire case as a conventional custody dispute.

Preserve challenges through every available procedural vehicle. If counsel learns of a potentially defective termination or adoption order within six months, the safest course is to file the appropriate challenge immediately while also evaluating a motion for new trial, restricted appeal, direct appeal, bill of review, or other available remedy. The existence of a strong merits argument does not justify delay.

Account for the appellate split. Some Texas appellate courts have treated § 161.211 as an affirmative limitations defense rather than a jurisdictional bar. Practitioners should determine which court of appeals will hear the case, preserve arguments under both approaches, and avoid relying on the conflict as a substitute for timely filing.

Distinguish downstream SAPCR relief from an attack on the adoption. A litigant ordinarily cannot evade the finality of a termination or adoption order merely by filing a new SAPCR and requesting possession, conservatorship, or modification. Standing must be established independently, and the requested relief cannot function as an impermissible collateral attack on the prior orders.

Apply the broader lesson in divorce and property litigation. Although the six-month statutes at issue are specific to termination and adoption, divorce counsel should conduct the same threshold analysis whenever seeking post-judgment relief: identify the controlling statutory deadline, determine whether it is jurisdictional, and assess whether the proposed claim is actually an attack on an earlier final order.

Checklists

Challenging a Termination or Adoption Order

• Obtain a file-stamped copy of every termination and adoption order immediately.
• Confirm the exact date each order was signed.
• Calculate six months from the signature date without relying on the date of notice or discovery.
• Determine whether the proposed pleading constitutes a direct or collateral attack.
• Evaluate a motion for new trial, direct appeal, restricted appeal, bill of review, and declaratory relief.
• File the appropriate challenge before the six-month deadline whenever possible.
• Plead jurisdictional, notice, service, due-process, and merits grounds expressly.
• Do not assume that labeling an order “void” eliminates the statutory deadline.
• Preserve arguments under both the jurisdictional-bar and affirmative-defense interpretations.
• Request expedited consideration when the deadline or the child’s placement is at issue.

Handling an Interstate Termination or Adoption

• Identify every state in which the child has lived during the relevant period.
• Ask the client about prior custody, guardianship, dependency, kinship-care, and adoption proceedings.
• Search for existing out-of-state orders before final judgment.
• Obtain certified copies of all foreign orders and relevant pleadings.
• Determine whether a court has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child-custody determination.
• Analyze separately whether the UCCJEA governs each claim in the Texas proceeding.
• Address Texas Family Code § 152.103 when adoption is requested.
• Determine whether termination and adoption have been joined under § 162.001(b)(1).
• Request interstate judicial communication when authorized and strategically appropriate.
• Ensure the final order accurately identifies prior proceedings and the basis for Texas jurisdiction.

Evaluating Notice and Service

• Identify every parent, alleged father, managing conservator, possessory conservator, guardian, and other person potentially entitled to notice.
• Compare the pleadings, returns of service, waivers, and citation records.
• Verify compliance with statutory service requirements and substituted-service orders.
• Review any service by publication and the appointment and performance of an attorney ad litem.
• Determine when the client actually learned of the proceeding and document that date.
• Preserve constitutional due-process objections in addition to statutory objections.
• Do not postpone filing while investigating every factual detail if the six-month deadline is approaching.
• Seek temporary or emergency relief separately if necessary to protect the child or preserve the controversy.

Defending a Final Termination or Adoption Order

• Confirm the date the challenged order was signed.
• Determine whether the attacking pleading was filed more than six months later.
• Plead §§ 161.211 and 162.012 at the earliest opportunity.
• Assert lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where controlling appellate precedent treats the bar as jurisdictional.
• Alternatively plead limitations, repose, waiver, standing, and failure to state a viable bill-of-review claim.
• Identify whether the requested relief would invalidate or undermine the termination or adoption order.
• Challenge attempts to recast a barred attack as a SAPCR, declaratory action, or modification proceeding.
• Preserve the issue for appeal even if the trial court rules on another threshold ground.
• Request dismissal rather than a merits judgment when subject-matter jurisdiction is absent.

Assessing a Post-Adoption SAPCR

• Identify the legal relationship between the proposed petitioner and the child after adoption.
• Determine whether the petitioner satisfies a specific statutory basis for standing.
• Analyze whether termination extinguished the legal relationship on which standing is asserted.
• Determine whether the requested conservatorship or possession would conflict with the adoption order.
• Evaluate whether the SAPCR is, in substance, a collateral attack on the adoption.
• Address jurisdiction, standing, and the statutory six-month bar as separate threshold issues.
• Develop evidence supporting or defeating standing before litigating the child’s best interest.

Citation

Toliver v. Norton, Nos. 07-25-00257-CV & 07-25-00258-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 22, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

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