Six-Month Bar Under Sections 161.211 and 162.012 | Toliver v. Norton (2026)

Toliver v. Norton, 07-25-00257-CV, October 22, 2026.

On appeal from 287th District Court, Parmer County, Texas

Synopsis

Texas Family Code §§ 161.211 and 162.012 impose a jurisdictional six-month bar against direct or collateral attacks on termination and adoption orders. Because Toliver filed his bill of review approximately eleven months after the orders were signed, the trial court lacked jurisdiction—even though he characterized the orders as void for lack of UCCJEA jurisdiction and constitutionally deficient notice.

Relevance to Family Law

Toliver is principally a termination-and-adoption case, but its strategic significance extends to custody and divorce litigation involving prior orders, interstate proceedings, grandparents, and blended-family adoptions. Counsel cannot assume that labeling an order “void,” alleging defective service, or identifying a UCCJEA problem will avoid a Family Code deadline expressly governing attacks on termination or adoption orders.

The decision is particularly important when a divorce or custody file intersects with an adoption, termination order, out-of-state custody determination, or claimed continuing jurisdiction in another state. Attorneys must identify the challenged order and the governing statutory deadline before relying on the ordinary bill-of-review framework or the residual four-year limitations period. Although Toliver does not establish a comparable six-month rule for ordinary divorce property divisions, it reinforces the need to distinguish between limitations, repose, and jurisdictional restrictions because that classification determines waiver, pleading requirements, and whether the issue may be raised for the first time on appeal.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

In 2016, a New Mexico court appointed Daina Norton, the child’s paternal grandmother, as the child’s kinship guardian. Edward Toliver, the child’s paternal grandfather and Daina Norton’s former spouse, was not a party to that proceeding and received no rights, responsibilities, or duties under the New Mexico order.

The Nortons later moved with the child to Parmer County, Texas. Although they allowed Toliver to maintain contact with the child for several years, the relationship deteriorated following an argument at a baseball game.

In September 2023, the Texas district court signed an order terminating the biological parents’ rights and granting the Nortons’ adoption of the child. The order recited that no other court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Toliver was not served with the Texas proceeding.

Toliver subsequently sought relief in the New Mexico case. After learning of the Texas termination and adoption orders, he filed a Texas petition for bill of review and declaratory judgment on August 21, 2024—approximately eleven months after the Texas order was signed. He also filed a separate SAPCR seeking shared custody of the child.

Toliver argued that the Texas orders were subject to attack because the Texas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and because he had not received notice of the proceeding. The trial court dismissed his claims for lack of standing. On appeal, the Nortons additionally invoked the six-month bars in Texas Family Code §§ 161.211 and 162.012.

Issues Decided

• Whether the six-month restrictions in Texas Family Code §§ 161.211 and 162.012 are jurisdictional or merely affirmative defenses subject to waiver.

• Whether the restrictions may be raised for the first time on appeal.

• Whether a bill of review filed more than six months after rendition may proceed when the challenger alleges that the termination and adoption orders are void for lack of UCCJEA jurisdiction.

• Whether an allegation of inadequate notice permits an otherwise untimely attack on the termination and adoption orders.

• Whether the trial court’s judgment denying the bill of review should remain in place or be vacated and replaced with a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.

• In the companion SAPCR appeal, whether the dismissal of Toliver’s petition for lack of standing should be affirmed.

Rules Applied

Texas Family Code § 161.211(a) provides that, notwithstanding Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329, the validity of a termination order affecting a person within the statute’s specified categories is not subject to direct or collateral attack after the sixth month following the date the order was signed.

Texas Family Code § 162.012(a) similarly restricts direct or collateral attacks on adoption orders after six months. These specific Family Code provisions take precedence over the residual four-year limitations period that ordinarily governs a bill of review under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.051.

The court recognized that a bill of review is ordinarily an equitable proceeding used to attack a judgment that is no longer subject to a motion for new trial or direct appeal. See Katy Venture, Ltd. v. Cremona Bistro Corp., 469 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. 2015), and Valdez v. Hollenbeck, 465 S.W.3d 217, 220–21 (Tex. 2015). In termination and adoption cases, however, the Legislature has imposed a substantially shorter period to advance the uniquely important interest in finality for children and adoptive families. See In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 512–18 (Tex. 2020).

The court followed authority treating § 161.211 as a jurisdictional bar rather than an ordinary statute of limitations. It relied in part on its prior decision in In re M.E., No. 07-16-00039-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 195 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 8, 2018, no pet.), which held that the six-month restriction deprives a trial court of authority to review an untimely direct or collateral challenge.

Because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, a challenge under these provisions may be raised for the first time on appeal. The court acknowledged a split among the courts of appeals over whether § 161.211 is jurisdictional or instead creates an affirmative defense, but adhered to the jurisdictional approach.

The court also considered the UCCJEA. Although the UCCJEA ordinarily allocates child-custody jurisdiction among states, Texas Family Code § 152.103 states that the UCCJEA does not govern an adoption proceeding. Sections 152.201 and 152.203 otherwise address initial and modification jurisdiction in child-custody matters.

Application

Toliver filed his bill of review roughly eleven months after the Texas termination and adoption order was signed. That filing occurred well beyond the six-month periods prescribed by §§ 161.211 and 162.012.

Toliver attempted to avoid the statutory bar by arguing that the underlying orders were void, not merely voidable. In his view, the New Mexico guardianship proceeding implicated the UCCJEA and prevented the Texas court from exercising jurisdiction without first addressing New Mexico’s claimed jurisdiction. He also argued that the absence of notice deprived the Texas court of authority to adjudicate interests affecting him.

The Seventh Court of Appeals treated those arguments as attacks on the validity of the termination and adoption orders. Regardless of whether Toliver characterized the attack as direct, collateral, constitutional, jurisdictional, or equitable, the requested relief required the Texas court to set aside or declare invalid orders that had been signed more than six months earlier.

The court therefore began and ended its analysis with the statutory deadline. Because it regarded that deadline as jurisdictional, the Nortons did not waive the issue by failing to obtain a ruling on it in the trial court. Nor could the trial court reach the merits of Toliver’s UCCJEA, notice, or bill-of-review arguments after jurisdiction had expired.

The trial court had dismissed the bill-of-review proceeding based on standing. The court of appeals concluded, however, that the proper disposition was not a merits-based denial or a standing dismissal. Once the six-month jurisdictional bar applied, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the untimely challenge. The appellate court accordingly vacated the judgment in the bill-of-review case and rendered a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.

Holding

Texas Family Code §§ 161.211 and 162.012 impose a jurisdictional six-month bar on direct and collateral attacks against termination and adoption orders. The restriction is not merely an affirmative defense and may therefore be raised for the first time on appeal.

Toliver’s bill of review was untimely because it was filed approximately eleven months after the termination and adoption order was signed. The ordinary four-year period potentially applicable to bills of review did not supersede the specific six-month Family Code provisions.

Allegations that the orders were void for lack of UCCJEA jurisdiction did not permit Toliver to evade the six-month bar. The statutory restriction prevented the court from considering the merits of that jurisdictional theory once the deadline had passed.

Toliver’s allegation that he received no notice likewise did not restore jurisdiction over his untimely attack. Under the court’s application of §§ 161.211 and 162.012, the asserted notice defect did not authorize a bill of review filed outside the six-month period.

The court vacated the judgment in Cause No. 07-25-00257-CV and rendered judgment dismissing Toliver’s petition for bill of review and declaratory judgment for want of jurisdiction. In the companion appeal, Cause No. 07-25-00258-CV, the court affirmed the dismissal of Toliver’s SAPCR for lack of standing.

Practical Application

The primary lesson is docket control. When counsel learns of a potentially defective termination or adoption order, the operative date is the date the order was signed—not the date the client discovered the order, obtained the file, or appreciated the alleged jurisdictional defect. Counsel should immediately calculate six months under both §§ 161.211 and 162.012 and file before the earliest arguably applicable deadline.

The case also counsels against assuming that a voidness allegation has no temporal boundary. In other civil contexts, a genuinely void judgment may be attacked outside ordinary limitations periods. Toliver holds that, within the Amarillo court’s jurisdiction, the Legislature’s termination-and-adoption finality provisions foreclose even attacks framed around UCCJEA jurisdiction or lack of notice after six months.

In interstate custody disputes, counsel should investigate existing orders before a termination or adoption petition is filed. That investigation should include UCCJEA affidavits, prior guardianships, kinship placements, custody registrations, and communications with courts in other states. Section 152.103 excludes adoption proceedings from the UCCJEA, but termination, custody, and adoption issues may be joined or factually intertwined. The resulting jurisdictional analysis should be completed before rendition rather than left for a later attack.

For respondents and adoptive parents, Toliver provides a potentially dispositive threshold defense. Before litigating the elements of a bill of review, examine the date of the challenged orders and determine whether the requested relief constitutes a direct or collateral attack. If more than six months have elapsed, a plea to the jurisdiction or motion to dismiss should squarely invoke §§ 161.211 and 162.012.

For challengers, the pleading should not wait until the factual investigation is complete. If the deadline is approaching, file the appropriate proceeding and seek expedited discovery, temporary relief, or supplementation as necessary. A comprehensive but late petition cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.

Finally, practitioners should account for the acknowledged split in appellate authority. Until the Supreme Court of Texas definitively resolves the characterization of these provisions, counsel should preserve both positions: argue jurisdiction when defending the order, plead the statutory bar as an affirmative defense in the alternative, and file any challenge within six months regardless of the controlling intermediate appellate court.

Checklists

Evaluating a Potential Challenge

• Obtain certified copies of every termination, adoption, custody, guardianship, and SAPCR order.

• Confirm the date each challenged order was signed.

• Calculate six months from the signing date without relying on the client’s discovery date.

• Determine whether the requested relief would invalidate, reopen, or impair a termination or adoption order.

• Analyze §§ 161.211 and 162.012 separately because both may apply.

• Identify how the affected person fits within the statutory language of § 161.211.

• Investigate service, citation, waiver, relinquishment affidavits, publication, and appointment of any attorney ad litem.

• Identify all prior Texas and out-of-state custody proceedings.

• File before the six-month deadline even if the jurisdictional investigation remains incomplete.

Preparing an Interstate Termination or Adoption

• Obtain the client’s complete residence and custody history for the child.

• Search for existing guardianship, kinship-care, custody, and protection orders.

• Review the UCCJEA affidavit for accuracy and completeness.

• Determine whether another state has made a child-custody determination.

• Analyze whether the requested relief involves adoption, termination, custody, or a combination of those matters.

• Address Texas Family Code § 152.103 and the UCCJEA’s exclusion of adoption proceedings.

• Confirm the identity and status of every parent, guardian, managing conservator, alleged father, and other potentially interested person.

• Perfect service and preserve the supporting returns, affidavits, and publication record.

• Request express jurisdictional findings when interstate orders are implicated.

• Ensure the final order accurately identifies prior proceedings and the basis for Texas jurisdiction.

Defending a Final Termination or Adoption Order

• Identify the signing date and attach a certified copy of the order.

• Determine whether the challenge was filed more than six months later.

• Characterize the requested relief as a direct or collateral attack where appropriate.

• Invoke both § 161.211 and § 162.012 if the proceeding involved termination and adoption.

• Raise the statutory bar through a plea to the jurisdiction or other appropriate dispositive motion.

• Plead limitations or repose in the alternative because appellate courts disagree about the provisions’ classification.

• Preserve the argument that subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal.

• Avoid unnecessarily litigating bill-of-review elements before obtaining a ruling on the threshold jurisdictional issue.

• Request dismissal for want of jurisdiction rather than an adjudication on the merits if the bar is jurisdictional.

Preserving a Bill-of-Review Challenge

• Do not assume the residual four-year limitations period controls.

• Do not rely on the label “void judgment” to extend the filing deadline.

• Plead the precise jurisdictional, service, and due-process defects.

• Explain when and how the client learned of the order, while recognizing that discovery may not extend the statutory deadline.

• File a verified petition if required by the procedural posture.

• Seek emergency or temporary relief when enforcement or placement issues are imminent.

• Preserve arguments under both constitutional and statutory law.

• Develop the record regarding notice, service, prior proceedings, and the client’s claimed legal interest.

• Calendar appellate deadlines separately from the six-month statutory bar.

Citation

Toliver v. Norton, No. 07-25-00257-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 22, 2026).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion in Toliver v. Norton

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