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CROSSOVER: A “Permanent” Restraint Entered Midcase Is a Temporary Injunction—and Rule 683 Requires a Merits Trial Setting

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Anderson v. Sakiewicz, 04-26-00421-CV, November 10, 2026.

On appeal from 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Synopsis

An injunction that operates while the underlying suit remains unresolved is a temporary injunction, regardless of whether the order labels its restraints “permanent.” Because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 requires every temporary-injunction order to set the cause for trial on the merits—and Rule 684 requires the order to fix security—the order’s failure to include those provisions rendered it void and required dissolution.

Relevance to Family Law

The holding directly affects injunctions entered during divorce, custody, and marital-property litigation. A trial court may impose immediate restraints concerning children, residences, accounts, businesses, personal property, communications, or access to disputed assets, but calling those restraints “permanent” does not eliminate the procedural requirements governing temporary injunctions when the merits remain pending. Family-law litigators must distinguish statutory temporary orders under the Family Code from injunctions governed by Rules 680 through 693 and must ensure that any order functioning as a temporary injunction satisfies Rule 683, Rule 684, and other applicable procedural requirements.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The underlying litigation concerned property held by the Barbara Tolbert Revocable Trust. Suzanne Sakiewicz, a co-trustee, and her niece, Jensen Chelsea Anderson, both claimed interests associated with the Trust. The original dispute began between Suzanne and her brother and co-trustee, Gordon Tolbert, with claims and counterclaims concerning alleged management of Trust property. The appellate record did not show that those claims had been fully and finally resolved.

In April 2026, Suzanne and Edward Sakiewicz filed a “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction” seeking relief directly against Anderson. Among other requested relief, the motion sought to prevent Anderson from acting or representing herself as trustee, exercising control over Trust property, spending Trust funds, or alienating Trust assets. It also sought access to Trust property and a sworn accounting.

After a brief hearing, the trial court signed an “Order Granting Restraining Order and Issuing Writ of Injunction.” The order commanded Anderson to refrain from multiple activities, including coming within 500 feet of the Gonzales property or the Sakiewiczes, affecting the property, controlling Trust property, excluding the Sakiewiczes from the property, or representing that she had authority under or was a beneficiary of the Trust.

Although the order stated that Anderson was “permanently enjoined,” the underlying claims had not been resolved by final judgment. The order also did not set the cause for trial on the merits and did not fix the amount of security to be provided by the applicants.

Anderson filed an interlocutory appeal. The Fourth Court of Appeals treated the order according to its character and function rather than its label.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(4) authorizes an interlocutory appeal from an order granting or refusing a temporary injunction. In deciding whether an order falls within that provision, an appellate court examines the order’s character and function, not merely its caption or terminology.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 requires every temporary-injunction order to state the reasons for its issuance, describe the restrained conduct in specific terms, and “include an order setting the cause for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought.” The trial-setting requirement prevents ostensibly temporary relief from continuing indefinitely without an adjudication of the merits.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 684 requires a temporary-injunction order to fix the amount of security the applicant must provide. The bond or security requirement must be addressed in the injunction order itself.

The court relied principally on Qwest Communications Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. 2000), which directs courts to look beyond an order’s form when determining whether it functions as a temporary injunction. Qwest also holds that the requirements of Rules 683 and 684 are mandatory and that a noncompliant temporary injunction is subject to being declared void and dissolved.

The court also relied on In re Matter of Marquart Trust, 675 S.W.3d 57 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied), which applied the character-and-function analysis and dissolved an injunction that did not comply with mandatory procedural requirements. The court cited EOS Resources, Inc. v. Gutierrez, 75 S.W.3d 50 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.), for the purpose of Rule 683’s trial-setting requirement.

Application

The court first considered whether the challenged order was appealable as a temporary injunction. Although the order purported to impose “permanent” restraints, that label did not control. The Sakiewiczes had requested temporary injunctive relief, the trial court entered the order following a hearing on that request, and the order imposed immediately effective restrictions while the underlying litigation remained unresolved.

Those features established the order’s operative character. Because the restraints governed the parties during the pendency of an unresolved suit, the order functioned as a temporary injunction. Treating it otherwise based solely on its use of the word “permanently” would allow a drafting defect—or an inaccurate label—to defeat appellate review of the very procedural deficiencies alleged to make the order void.

Once the order was classified as a temporary injunction, Rules 683 and 684 applied. The written order did not set the cause for trial on the merits. It likewise did not fix an amount of security to be provided by the applicants. Both omissions concerned mandatory requirements appearing in the rules’ operative language.

The court therefore concluded that the order was void. It did not matter that the restraints had been described as permanent or that the order was entered before a final resolution of the parties’ substantive Trust dispute. The injunction could not remain in effect without compliance with the procedural rules governing temporary injunctive relief.

The court also recognized Anderson’s ability to appeal. The order specifically named her and commanded her to take or refrain from taking particular actions. A person who has an interest in an order and is bound by it may seek appellate review even when questions exist about whether that person formally became a party in the trial court.

Holding

The court held that the May 14, 2026 order was a temporary injunction. Its character and function controlled over its description of Anderson as “permanently enjoined” because the order imposed immediate restraints during the pendency of an unresolved lawsuit.

The court further held that the temporary injunction was void because it did not set the cause for trial on the merits as required by Rule 683. The omission created the precise risk Rule 683 is designed to prevent: temporary relief continuing indefinitely without a merits adjudication.

The court also concluded that the order failed to comply with Rule 684 because it did not fix the amount of security to be provided by the injunction applicants. The mandatory defects required dissolution of the injunction.

Accordingly, the Fourth Court of Appeals reversed the challenged order, dissolved the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court expressed no opinion on the merits of the competing claims to Trust status or property.

Practical Application

In a divorce, an order entered before the final decree may restrain a spouse from transferring community assets, changing business records, accessing financial accounts, selling real property, cancelling insurance, or damaging property. If the order functions as a temporary injunction under the Rules of Civil Procedure, counsel should not assume that using “permanent” language—or omitting an expiration date—removes it from Rule 683. Unless the merits have actually been adjudicated, the order’s temporary function remains controlling.

The same analysis can arise in a custody case when an order restrains contact, communications, travel, relocation, access to a residence, or conduct affecting a child. Counsel must first identify the legal source of the relief. Some temporary orders in suits affecting the parent-child relationship arise under Family Code section 105.001 and are generally not subject to interlocutory appeal. Other restraints may constitute temporary injunctions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The substance of the order, the pleadings, the statutory basis, and the procedural posture all matter.

For property disputes, practitioners should review whether the requested injunction preserves the status quo or effectively awards ultimate relief before trial. Even when the requested restraints are otherwise supportable, the order should set a definite merits-trial date and fix security. Reciting that a prior scheduling order contains a trial setting may invite a dispute over whether the injunction order itself satisfies Rule 683; the safer practice is to place the setting directly in the signed injunction order.

Counsel defending against a proposed injunction should provide the trial court with written objections and a proposed alternative order identifying all mandatory provisions. But because a Rule 683 or Rule 684 defect renders an injunction void, the appellate issue is not treated like an ordinary discretionary complaint. The most efficient strategy remains preventing the defect before signature rather than relying on an interlocutory appeal or mandamus proceeding after restraints have taken effect.

Finally, practitioners should evaluate the proper review mechanism. Section 51.014(a)(4) permits an interlocutory appeal from a temporary injunction, but the Family Code restricts interlocutory review of certain statutory temporary orders. Depending on the nature of the order, the available path may be direct interlocutory appeal, mandamus, or review following final judgment.

Checklists

Drafting a Temporary Injunction

Reviewing a Proposed Family-Law Restraint

Evaluating Appellate Review

Preparing for the Injunction Hearing

Citation

Anderson v. Sakiewicz, No. 04-26-00421-CV, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 10, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion

Family Law Crossover

The crossover principle is functional classification. When a trial court imposes injunctive restraints before resolving the underlying divorce, custody, or property claims, the order may function as a temporary injunction even if it uses “permanent” terminology. If Rules 683 and 684 govern, the order must include a merits-trial setting and fix the applicant’s security; omission of those mandatory terms renders the injunction void and requires dissolution.

In a divorce, the issue could arise through restraints on transferring marital assets, operating a closely held business, accessing a residence, disposing of personal property, or representing authority over disputed accounts. In a SAPCR, similar questions may arise from restraints concerning travel, communications, contact, or access to property. The practitioner must determine whether the provision is a statutory temporary order under the Family Code or a temporary injunction under the Rules of Civil Procedure because that classification affects both the order’s required contents and the available method of appellate review.

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