Section 153.004 Bars Joint Conservatorship | In re Coronado (2026)

In re Jessica Coronado, 11-26-00247-CV, October 29, 2026.

On appeal from 318th District Court of Midland County

Synopsis

Texas Family Code Section 153.004(b) prohibits appointing parents as joint managing conservators when credible evidence establishes a history or pattern of physical abuse. After the Eleventh Court had already determined in an earlier mandamus proceeding that the statutory prohibition applied, the trial court could not treat a second temporary-orders hearing as a clean slate and reconsider that determination.

Relevance to Family Law

Coronado is important to divorce and SAPCR litigators because it limits the discretion ordinarily afforded trial courts in temporary conservatorship proceedings. Although joint managing conservatorship is generally presumed to serve a child’s best interest, that presumption is expressly subject to Section 153.004. Once credible evidence triggers the statute, joint managing conservatorship is not simply disfavored—it is prohibited.

The opinion also demonstrates the continuing force of an appellate ruling issued during an ongoing family-law case. When mandamus relief results in an appellate determination that a statutory conservatorship bar applies, the trial court cannot avoid that ruling by vacating its order, convening another temporary-orders hearing, and announcing that the case is beginning “from scratch.” Unless the material facts or governing law have changed, law of the case controls the subsequent proceeding.

For practitioners, the procedural posture is equally significant. Temporary SAPCR orders generally are not subject to interlocutory appeal. Mandamus therefore remains the principal mechanism for addressing a temporary order that violates a mandatory Family Code provision.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Jessica Coronado and Hiram Coronado were involved in a divorce and SAPCR concerning their young child, L.J.C. Jessica also had two older children from before the marriage. After separating from Hiram, Jessica moved with the children from Midland County to Hidalgo County.

At the initial temporary-orders hearing, Jessica testified that Hiram had physically disciplined one of her older children with sufficient force to cause bruising on two occasions. She also testified that he had physically disciplined her other son and threatened to punish and humiliate that child in a manner Hiram associated with county jail. Jessica presented photographs of the injuries and text messages in which Hiram discussed physically disciplining the children. The allegations resulted in an emergency protective order and Hiram’s arrest for felony injury to a child.

When questioned about the injuries, Hiram invoked the Fifth Amendment several times. He acknowledged sending text messages graphically describing how he intended to discipline one of Jessica’s children.

Despite this evidence, the trial court appointed Jessica and Hiram temporary joint managing conservators of L.J.C. Hiram’s possession initially was supervised, and Jessica was required to transport the young child between Hidalgo County and Midland for visitation.

Jessica sought mandamus relief. In the first proceeding, In re Coronado, No. 11-26-00196-CV, 2026 WL 2117287 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 23, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“Coronado I”), the Eleventh Court determined that credible evidence established physical abuse and that Section 153.004(b) prohibited appointing the parents as joint managing conservators. The appellate court also held that the transportation requirement constituted an abuse of discretion and directed the trial court to vacate the temporary orders.

The trial court vacated those orders and held another temporary-orders hearing. At the beginning of that hearing, the trial court stated that the parties were “starting over from scratch.” The transcript from the first hearing was not reintroduced into evidence. After the second hearing, the court again appointed the parents temporary joint managing conservators, imposed a Midland County geographic restriction, and granted Hiram unsupervised possession under a standard possession order. The trial court also found that no family violence had occurred.

Jessica filed a second mandamus petition. The principal issue was whether the trial court could reconsider the abuse determination that had already formed the basis of the Eleventh Court’s first mandamus decision.

Issues Decided

• Whether Section 153.004(b) permitted the trial court to reappoint the parents as temporary joint managing conservators after the court of appeals had already determined that credible evidence of physical abuse triggered the statutory prohibition.

• Whether the law-of-the-case doctrine bound the trial court to the abuse determination made in Coronado I.

• Whether the absence of the first hearing’s transcript from the evidentiary record at the second hearing allowed the trial court to disregard the prior appellate determination.

• Whether mandamus was available to challenge the second set of temporary orders when those orders were not subject to interlocutory appeal.

• Whether the remaining geographic-restriction and possession complaints established a separate entitlement to mandamus relief.

Rules Applied

• Texas Family Code Section 153.004(b). A trial court may not appoint parents as joint managing conservators if credible evidence establishes a history or pattern of past or present child neglect or physical or sexual abuse by one parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child.

• Texas Family Code Section 153.131. Although appointment of parents as joint managing conservators is ordinarily presumed to be in the child’s best interest, that presumption is expressly subject to Section 153.004.

• A single act may satisfy the statute. Texas courts have recognized that one act of violence or abuse may be sufficient to establish a history of physical abuse for purposes of Section 153.004. See In re J.M., No. 02-16-00428-CV, 2017 WL 3821863, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).

• Texas Family Code Sections 105.001(a) and 105.001(e). Trial courts possess broad authority to enter temporary orders for a child’s safety and welfare, but temporary SAPCR orders generally are not subject to interlocutory appeal.

• Mandamus standard. Mandamus requires a clear abuse of discretion and the absence of an adequate appellate remedy. A trial court has no discretion to misinterpret or misapply a mandatory statute. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–42 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).

• Law of the case. A legal determination made by an appellate court ordinarily governs later proceedings in the same case. The doctrine promotes consistency and prevents relitigation of matters resolved at an earlier appellate stage.

• Oral orders. A sufficiently clear, specific, and enforceable oral ruling may be reviewed by mandamus when the ruling is adequately established by the record.

Application

The Eleventh Court had already determined in Coronado I that the evidence presented at the first temporary-orders hearing constituted credible evidence of physical abuse. That determination had a direct statutory consequence: Section 153.004(b) prohibited the appointment of Jessica and Hiram as joint managing conservators.

Vacating the first temporary order did not erase the appellate court’s legal determination. Nor did the trial court obtain authority to reconsider the issue merely because it held another temporary-orders hearing. The trial court’s statement that the parties were “starting over from scratch” overlooked the procedural effect of Coronado I. The earlier appellate ruling remained part of the same case and controlled the subsequent temporary-orders proceeding under the law-of-the-case doctrine.

The fact that the first hearing’s transcript was not formally offered at the second hearing did not authorize a contrary result. The operative point was not whether Jessica rebuilt the same evidentiary record at the second hearing. The Eleventh Court had already reviewed that evidence and decided that it triggered Section 153.004(b). On the record presented, there had been no intervening change in law or material circumstance that displaced the prior ruling.

The trial court therefore had no discretion to find that no relevant abuse had occurred and then reappoint the parents as joint managing conservators. Broad discretion over temporary orders does not include discretion to disregard a mandatory statutory prohibition or a controlling appellate determination.

The court separately considered Jessica’s challenges to the geographic restriction and Hiram’s unsupervised possession. The petition was conditionally granted only in part, reflecting the distinction between the mandatory conservatorship prohibition and matters that otherwise remain committed to the trial court’s discretion. The appellate court did not treat Section 153.004(b)’s bar against joint managing conservatorship as automatically resolving every issue concerning possession, access, or geographic restrictions.

Holding

The Eleventh Court held that Section 153.004(b) barred the trial court from appointing Jessica and Hiram as temporary joint managing conservators. Once credible evidence established the requisite history or pattern of physical abuse, the statutory prohibition displaced the ordinary presumption favoring joint managing conservatorship.

The court further held that its determination in Coronado I controlled the second temporary-orders proceeding under the law-of-the-case doctrine. The trial court could not evade the first mandamus ruling by vacating its order, conducting a new hearing, and reconsidering whether the same abuse had occurred.

Mandamus was procedurally available because temporary SAPCR orders are not subject to interlocutory appeal. The court conditionally granted relief from the portion of the temporary orders that conflicted with Section 153.004(b) and the prior appellate mandate, while denying relief as to matters for which Jessica did not establish an independent entitlement to mandamus.

Practical Application

Treat Section 153.004 as a statutory gatekeeping provision. Counsel should address Section 153.004 before moving to conventional best-interest arguments. If credible evidence establishes the required abuse, the court does not retain discretion to appoint the parents as joint managing conservators based on generalized considerations such as parental involvement, successful visits, or the desirability of co-parenting.

Do not assume the abuse must have been directed at the child who is the subject of the SAPCR. The statutory language extends to abuse directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child. Evidence that a parent physically abused a stepchild or another child in the household may therefore foreclose joint managing conservatorship of the parties’ child.

Develop the temporary-orders record as though mandamus will follow. Because temporary orders are generally unappealable, the reporter’s record, exhibits, offers of proof, and the wording of the trial court’s ruling are critical. Photographs, medical records, protective orders, criminal records, forensic-interview evidence, electronic communications, and admissions should be organized around the precise statutory elements.

Separate conservatorship from possession and access. Proof sufficient to prohibit joint managing conservatorship does not necessarily dictate a particular possession schedule. Counsel seeking supervised possession or additional safeguards should separately develop the applicable evidence and statutory findings rather than relying exclusively on the joint-conservatorship prohibition.

Enforce the appellate ruling at the next hearing. After obtaining mandamus relief, counsel should file the appellate opinion, identify the specific determinations that constitute law of the case, and request an order consistent with those determinations. A trial court’s compliance obligation is not limited to formally vacating the challenged order; the replacement order must also conform to the appellate ruling.

Identify genuinely new evidence. Law of the case does not necessarily prevent litigation of materially changed circumstances arising after the appellate decision. The distinction is between presenting new facts relevant to current conditions and attempting to relitigate a historical determination the appellate court has already resolved.

Request clear rulings. If the trial court announces an oral ruling, ensure that the reporter’s record captures its complete terms. Counsel should promptly submit a proposed written order but should not assume that mandamus must await signature when the oral order is clear, specific, and enforceable.

Checklists

Establishing the Section 153.004 Prohibition

• Identify the alleged perpetrator and the person against whom the abuse was directed.
• Connect the evidence to the statutory categories of child neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, or family violence.
• Obtain photographs, medical records, police reports, protective orders, and criminal charging documents.
• Preserve text messages, emails, recordings, social-media communications, and other admissions.
• Present testimony establishing when, where, and how each incident occurred.
• Address whether a single incident is sufficiently established to satisfy the governing authorities.
• Request an express finding that credible evidence triggers Section 153.004(b).
• Emphasize that the statutory text uses “may not,” leaving no discretion to appoint joint managing conservators.

Building a Mandamus-Ready Record

• Arrange for a court reporter at every temporary-orders hearing.
• Formally offer all material exhibits and obtain rulings on admissibility.
• Make offers of proof when evidence is excluded.
• Obtain a clear ruling on conservatorship, possession, geographic restrictions, and transportation.
• Request written findings or ensure the trial court’s oral findings appear in the reporter’s record.
• Include the challenged order or a record establishing any reviewable oral ruling.
• Explain why no adequate remedy by appeal exists under Section 105.001(e).
• Distinguish legal error from disputed factual determinations committed to the trial court’s discretion.
• Seek prompt relief when the temporary order creates an immediate safety or statutory concern.

Enforcing a Prior Mandamus Decision

• File the appellate opinion in the trial court’s record.
• Identify each legal determination made in the prior proceeding.
• Explain why the determination applies under the law-of-the-case doctrine.
• Compare the proposed replacement order with the appellate court’s instructions.
• Object immediately if the trial court attempts to “start over” on a settled issue.
• Clarify that vacatur of the original order does not vacate the appellate court’s reasoning or holding.
• Determine whether the opposing party claims materially changed facts or an intervening change in law.
• Create a record showing why any purported new evidence does not alter the settled statutory issue.
• Request a ruling that expressly complies with the appellate mandate.

Addressing Possession and Geographic Restrictions

• Analyze possession and access separately from conservatorship status.
• Present evidence concerning the child’s age, developmental needs, travel tolerance, and established routine.
• Document the distance, cost, duration, and practical burden of exchanges.
• Offer evidence regarding prior supervised visits and any safety incidents or concerns.
• Request specific safeguards if unrestricted possession would endanger the child.
• Propose workable exchange locations and transportation allocations.
• Tie each requested restriction to the child’s safety and welfare rather than parental convenience.
• Request findings supporting any deviation from an age-appropriate possession schedule.
• Preserve separate objections to conservatorship, possession, geographic restrictions, and transportation.

Avoiding the Errors That Required Mandamus

• Do not rely on the general joint-conservatorship presumption without first addressing Section 153.004.
• Do not treat a second temporary-orders hearing as eliminating a prior appellate determination.
• Do not enter findings inconsistent with the law of the case absent materially changed facts or controlling law.
• Do not use a new order to recreate the substance of an order already held unlawful.
• Do not assume that broad temporary-orders discretion overrides mandatory statutory language.
• Do not conflate evidence supporting joint-conservatorship restrictions with the separate standards governing possession and access.
• Do not leave material oral rulings ambiguous or inadequately documented.

Citation

In re Jessica Coronado, No. 11-26-00247-CV, slip op. (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 29, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion in In re Jessica Coronado.

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