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Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) Endangerment Finding Deleted | In re A.R. (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of A.R. and K.G., Children, 06-26-00075-CV, November 04, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law, Bowie County, Texas

Synopsis

The Sixth Court of Appeals held that generalized concerns about Father’s drug use, domestic violence, criminal history, and instability did not constitute clear and convincing evidence that he knowingly placed or allowed A.R. to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D). The court deleted the ground (D) finding but affirmed termination because Father did not challenge the independent ground (N) finding or the best-interest finding.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion reinforces an essential distinction in termination and conservatorship litigation: evidence that a parent has serious personal problems is not necessarily evidence that the parent knowingly placed a child in an endangering environment. In termination cases, counsel must connect alleged drug use, family violence, criminal conduct, or instability to the child’s conditions or surroundings and to the parent’s knowledge of those conditions.

The decision also matters in divorce and custody litigation. Allegations relevant to conservatorship, possession, geographic restrictions, supervised access, or injunctions should be supported by evidence showing how the alleged conduct affected the child or the child’s environment—not merely by labels such as “unstable,” “violent,” or “using drugs.” Although the burdens and governing statutes differ, the same evidentiary discipline applies: identify the requested relief, isolate its elements, and present facts establishing the required nexus.

The deletion of the ground (D) finding is particularly significant because an affirmed finding under ground (D) or (E) may affect a parent’s rights to other children in later proceedings. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(M). Thus, even when another predicate ground independently supports termination, appellate counsel should separately challenge an unsupported ground (D) or (E) finding.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The Department of Family and Protective Services sought termination of Father’s parental rights to A.R. The trial court found that Father knowingly placed or knowingly allowed A.R. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being under § 161.001(b)(1)(D). It also found that Father constructively abandoned A.R. under § 161.001(b)(1)(N) and that termination was in A.R.’s best interest.

The Department’s permanency specialist testified that she had never met Father, that he did not complete services, and that he did not submit to drug testing. Although she sent monthly letters, she had not been given what she understood to be a permanent address for him. She expressed concerns about Father’s stability, alleged drug use, and alleged domestic violence. She also referenced the removal affidavit, which identified Father as an offending parent and mentioned drug use and domestic violence.

The permanency specialist, however, did not know whether Father had been convicted of domestic violence or any other crime and could not testify that he had failed a drug test. Her testimony therefore established concerns and allegations, but it did not establish the specific conditions in which Father knowingly placed or allowed A.R. to remain.

The CASA coordinator likewise had minimal contact with Father. He identified domestic violence, alleged drug use, and Father’s arrest history during the case as barriers to reunification. The coordinator also testified that A.R. was bonded to his sibling, caregivers, and the other children in the foster home.

Father testified that he was sixteen when A.R. was born. He maintained that he had lived at the same address since childhood and had provided that address to the Department, although the house became vacant after his grandmother died. He had not seen A.R. during the case but received information about the child from Mother.

Father acknowledged that he missed court dates while attempting to avoid unresolved criminal matters. He denied having any drug charges. He testified that his incarceration during the case resulted from probation violations associated with a family-violence charge. He also acknowledged two domestic-violence charges, stating that he remained on probation for one and that the other had been dismissed.

Following trial, the court terminated Father’s parental rights under grounds (D) and (N). On appeal, Father challenged only the evidentiary sufficiency of the ground (D) finding. He did not challenge constructive abandonment under ground (N) or the best-interest finding.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Application

The Department’s evidence established that Father had minimal involvement in the case, failed to complete services, did not submit to drug testing, experienced criminal and probation-related difficulties, and had a history involving family-violence allegations or charges. Those facts could support substantial concern about Father’s fitness, compliance, or prospects for reunification. They did not, however, answer the particular question posed by ground (D): whether Father knowingly placed or allowed A.R. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

The witnesses largely described concerns rather than established environmental facts. The permanency specialist had never met Father, could not identify a failed drug test, and did not know the details of his criminal history. The CASA coordinator also had only minimal contact with him. While the record contained references to drug use, domestic violence, instability, and arrests, the evidence did not sufficiently connect those matters to conditions or surroundings in which Father knowingly placed or left A.R.

The statutory distinction mattered. Ground (D) is directed to the child’s environment and the parent’s knowing decision to place or leave the child in that environment. It does not permit termination merely because the factfinder has generalized concerns about a parent’s behavior, history, or present circumstances. Even serious allegations must be supported by evidence satisfying the specific statutory elements under the clear-and-convincing standard.

Father’s appellate success on ground (D), however, did not require reversal of the termination judgment. The trial court had also found constructive abandonment under ground (N), and Father did not challenge that independent predicate finding. He likewise did not challenge the best-interest finding. Those unchallenged findings remained sufficient to support termination.

Under In re N.G., the court could not simply decline to review ground (D) as unnecessary. Because Father expressly challenged that finding, the court was required to determine whether it was adequately supported. The potentially dispositive effect of a ground (D) finding in later litigation involving other children required meaningful appellate review and deletion of the finding if unsupported.

Holding

The court held that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support termination under § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Generalized concerns about drug use, domestic violence, criminal history, and instability did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Father knowingly placed or allowed A.R. to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.

The court further held that Father’s challenge to ground (D) required appellate review notwithstanding the unchallenged ground (N) finding. Under In re N.G., a challenged ground (D) or (E) finding cannot be left unreviewed merely because another predicate ground supports termination.

Finally, the court modified the judgment to delete the ground (D) finding. It otherwise affirmed termination because Father did not challenge the constructive-abandonment finding under ground (N) or the finding that termination was in A.R.’s best interest.

Practical Application

For Department and ad litem counsel, the opinion is a warning against presenting an undifferentiated “bad parent” case. Each predicate ground must be proved through evidence tied to its statutory language. When relying on ground (D), identify the actual environment, explain why it was dangerous, establish when the child was exposed to it, and prove that the parent knew of the dangerous conditions yet placed or allowed the child to remain there.

Drug allegations should be supported by test results, admissions, observed impairment, possession evidence, treatment records when admissible, or testimony connecting substance use to the child’s surroundings. A refusal or failure to test may be relevant, but counsel should not assume it proves either drug use or an endangering environment without the necessary evidentiary foundation and nexus.

Family-violence evidence should similarly be developed beyond the existence of an arrest, allegation, or charge. Counsel should establish the incident’s circumstances, whether the child was present or nearby, whether violence occurred in the child’s home, whether the child witnessed or heard it, and whether the parent knowingly returned the child to that environment.

For parent’s counsel, the case illustrates the value of attacking the statutory nexus rather than merely disputing every unfavorable fact. A parent may have criminal history, housing instability, incomplete services, or family-violence allegations without every circumstance satisfying ground (D). The appellate issue should focus on whether the record proves the child’s endangering conditions or surroundings and the parent’s knowledge—not simply whether the parent appeared irresponsible.

In custody litigation arising from divorce or a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the termination standard will not govern ordinary conservatorship and possession determinations. Nevertheless, the same analytical approach is useful. Evidence should be connected to the relief requested, whether that relief is sole managing conservatorship, supervised possession, a family-violence finding, a geographic restriction, or a protective injunction.

Property disputes are ordinarily separate from child-endangerment findings, but family-law litigators should resist allowing evidence of alleged misconduct to migrate indiscriminately between issues. Criminal conduct, substance use, or family violence may have substantial relevance to conservatorship while having little or no relevance to characterization, valuation, reimbursement, or just-and-right division. Organizing proof by claim, element, and requested remedy reduces that risk.

Appellate counsel should also review every ground (D) and (E) finding, even when reversal of termination is unlikely because another ground is unchallenged or conclusively supported. Deleting an unsupported finding can protect the parent from the finding’s potential use in a later termination proceeding involving another child.

Checklists

Proving Ground (D)

Defending Against Ground (D)

Building the Trial Record

Handling Multiple Predicate Grounds

Preparing the Appeal

Citation

In re A.R. & K.G., No. 06-26-00075-CV, slip op. (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 4, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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