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CROSSOVER: Hidden Cameras in the Marital Home Are Not a Divorce-Litigation Shortcut: Texas Upholds the Invasive Visual Recording Statute

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Ex parte Mitchell Wasek, 03-26-00036-CR, November 20, 2026.

On appeal from 167th District Court of Travis County

Synopsis

The Third Court of Appeals held that the 2015 version of Texas Penal Code § 21.15(b) survives First Amendment strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored to protect individuals from nonconsensual, sexually invasive recording. The statute is not facially overbroad, and an as-applied takings challenge was not cognizable through pretrial habeas corpus.

Relevance to Family Law

Family-law litigators should not treat ownership, possession, or control of the marital residence as authorization to make hidden recordings of a spouse, paramour, child, guest, or other occupant in a bathroom, changing area, bedroom, or other private setting. Even when a recording could produce relevant evidence concerning adultery, conservatorship, reimbursement, waste, or credibility, the method of obtaining it may expose the client to criminal liability under Section 21.15 and potentially implicate other criminal and civil privacy laws. The opinion also limits a constitutional attack that might otherwise be used to justify covert visual surveillance: the First Amendment does not invalidate a narrowly drawn prohibition against intentionally capturing intimate images without consent under circumstances involving a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The State charged Mitchell Wasek with multiple violations of the 2015 version of Texas Penal Code § 21.15(b). That version made it an offense, without the other person’s consent and with intent to invade the person’s privacy, to record or transmit a visual image of an intimate area when the person had a reasonable expectation that the area was not subject to public view. It separately prohibited nonconsensual, privacy-invasive visual recording in a bathroom or changing room.

According to the probable-cause affidavit, hidden cameras were used to record thirteen men and women in multiple rooms—including bathrooms—at two properties owned by or rented to Wasek or his parents. Officers recovered sixty-eight audiovisual recordings that allegedly depicted individuals using the restroom, changing clothes, or engaging in sexual activity. The alleged victims were unaware of the cameras and had not consented to being recorded.

At least one camera was motion-activated and disguised as an electronic-device charger. Investigators also identified purchases of equipment described as spy cameras or hidden cameras, together with camera mounts, gaffer tape, tripods, high-capacity memory cards, and hard drives.

Wasek filed two pretrial applications for writ of habeas corpus. His facial challenge asserted that Section 21.15(b) was an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech and was substantially overbroad. His as-applied challenge asserted that the statute effected an unconstitutional taking by limiting a property owner’s authority within the owner’s property. The trial court denied both applications, and the Third Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues Decided

The court did not decide a vagueness challenge because Wasek abandoned that issue on appeal. It also did not reach the merits of the as-applied takings theory because that claim was not cognizable through the selected pretrial procedure.

Rules Applied

Texas Penal Code § 21.15(b), as applicable to the charged conduct, required both lack of consent and an intent to invade another person’s privacy. Subsection (b)(1) addressed visual images of statutorily defined intimate areas when the person had a reasonable expectation that the area was not subject to public view. Subsection (b)(2) addressed visual recording in bathrooms and changing rooms.

The court applied the following constitutional and procedural principles:

The court’s analysis aligned with Ex parte Metzger, 610 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. ref’d), and Ex parte Hamilton, 599 S.W.3d 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d), both of which sustained the 2015 statute against comparable constitutional challenges.

Application

The court assumed without deciding that Section 21.15(b) was content based and reached some expression protected by the First Amendment. That assumption placed the burden on the State to satisfy strict scrutiny.

The State met that burden because the statute served the compelling governmental interest of protecting individuals from nonconsensual, sexually invasive visual recording. The statute did not broadly prohibit photography or videography merely because the subject objected to being recorded. Its operative elements narrowed criminal liability to recordings made without consent and with the specific intent to invade another person’s privacy.

Subsection (b)(1) imposed additional objective limitations. The visual image had to depict a statutorily defined intimate area, and the recorded person had to possess a reasonable expectation that the intimate area was not subject to public view. Subsection (b)(2) was likewise limited by location, applying to bathrooms and changing rooms—settings in which privacy interests are particularly acute.

Those limitations created a close relationship between the prohibited conduct and the privacy harm the Legislature sought to prevent. The statute targeted the nonconsensual creation of sexually invasive images rather than the discussion, criticism, or lawful documentation of matters occurring in public view.

The same limitations defeated the facial overbreadth claim. Although hypothetical applications might implicate protected expression, the relevant question was whether the statute prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its legitimate applications. Given the requirements of nonconsent, intent to invade privacy, intimate-area imagery or a protected location, and—in subsection (b)(1)—a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court concluded that the statute’s potentially unconstitutional reach was not substantial.

The property-based argument did not alter the facial analysis. Wasek asserted that application of the statute inside property owned or controlled by the person making the recording improperly subordinated the owner’s property rights to the privacy interests of others. The court did not adjudicate that theory on its merits. Instead, it held that the as-applied takings claim was not cognizable in pretrial habeas proceedings.

Holding

The court held that the 2015 version of Texas Penal Code § 21.15(b) survives First Amendment strict scrutiny. Protecting individuals against nonconsensual, sexually invasive recording is a compelling governmental interest, and the statute’s consent, intent, subject-matter, location, and reasonable-expectation-of-privacy requirements narrowly tailor the prohibition to that interest.

The court separately held that Section 21.15(b) is not facially overbroad. Any applications affecting protected expression were not substantial when measured against the statute’s legitimate prohibition of intentional, nonconsensual recording of intimate areas or persons in bathrooms and changing rooms.

The court further held that the as-applied takings challenge could not be resolved through pretrial habeas corpus. The court therefore affirmed the denial of relief without deciding whether the takings theory could prevail in another procedural posture.

Practical Application

Family-law counsel should distinguish between evidence that is relevant and evidence that may lawfully be created. A spouse’s ownership of the residence, payment of the mortgage, access to a room, or right to possess community property does not necessarily eliminate another occupant’s reasonable expectation of privacy or supply consent to intimate recording.

Before advising a client concerning cameras or recording devices, counsel should identify the proposed location, field of view, recording method, persons likely to be captured, and whether the device records audio. A camera used for ordinary exterior security is materially different from a concealed device directed toward a bathroom, dressing area, bed, or other place where intimate exposure is foreseeable.

In divorce litigation, covert visual recording may arise when a client seeks evidence of adultery or dissipation of community assets. The evidentiary objective does not displace Section 21.15’s elements. Discovery, subpoenas, financial tracing, admissions, third-party records, and properly obtained surveillance in locations open to public view generally present safer investigative alternatives.

In conservatorship litigation, a parent may propose in-home cameras to document the other parent’s conduct, a child’s condition, or compliance with temporary orders. Counsel should not assume that the best-interest standard authorizes surveillance that would otherwise violate criminal law. Cameras in children’s bedrooms, bathrooms, or changing areas require especially careful review because additional statutes may apply when minors are recorded.

In exclusive-use or occupancy disputes, possession of the marital residence should not be conflated with unrestricted authority to monitor everyone who enters it. Temporary orders may allocate possession between spouses, but they do not necessarily extinguish the privacy rights of children, guests, caregivers, tenants, or the nonpossessing spouse during authorized access.

The opinion concerns visual recording, but many hidden cameras also capture sound. Audio interception raises separate issues under Texas Penal Code § 16.02, federal wiretap law, and potential civil causes of action. A device should therefore be evaluated for both its visual and audio functions.

Finally, admissibility is a separate question from legality. Counsel receiving a recording should assess preservation, authentication, completeness, relevance, Rule 403 concerns, privileges, privacy protections, and the circumstances under which the recording was made. The file should be preserved without unnecessary dissemination, and counsel should avoid directing a client to continue potentially unlawful recording activity.

Checklists

Evaluate a Proposed Recording

Respond to a Client Who Already Has a Recording

Develop Evidence Without Covert Intimate Recording

Prepare to Use or Challenge a Recording

Frame a Pretrial Constitutional Challenge

Citation

Ex parte Mitchell Wasek, Nos. 03-26-00034-CR through 03-26-00039-CR, slip op. (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 20, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion

Family Law Crossover

The principal procedural crossover is the use—and limitation—of a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus to challenge the constitutionality of the statute defining a charged offense. A facial challenge may be resolved before trial because it presents a legal question concerning whether the statute is valid across its applications. By contrast, a fact-dependent as-applied challenge generally cannot be used to obtain pretrial adjudication of the prosecution’s evidence or a defense that depends on the particular circumstances of the alleged conduct.

That distinction can matter when criminal allegations concerning recordings overlap with a divorce or conservatorship case. A party charged under Section 21.15 may pursue an available facial constitutional challenge through pretrial habeas, but property ownership, consent, camera placement, privacy expectations, and the recording’s contents may present fact-specific questions reserved for the criminal proceeding. The family court likewise should not be asked to treat a pending constitutional challenge as establishing that the recording was lawful.

Substantively, the crossover rule is that property rights and privacy rights are separate inquiries. Ownership or possession of the marital residence may be relevant to access, control, and property division, but it does not categorically defeat the statutory protection afforded to a person who does not consent to an intentionally privacy-invasive recording. Family-law counsel should therefore evaluate surveillance evidence under the governing privacy and recording statutes before attempting to use it in divorce, conservatorship, enforcement, or property litigation.

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