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CROSSOVER: Texas Supreme Court: Family Courts Cannot Rewrite Final Judgments After Plenary Power Expires

New SCOTX Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In re Marquez AD, LLC, 25-0175, November 20, 2026.

On appeal from District court; mandamus denied by Court of Appeals for the Third District (Austin)

Synopsis

A trial court cannot use a judgment nunc pro tunc to make a substantive change to a final judgment after its plenary power expires. Because the signed final judgment was the court’s first rendition fixing the attorney’s-fee award, reducing that award months later corrected a judicial error—not a clerical error—and the later order was void.

Relevance to Family Law

The finality principles in In re Marquez AD, LLC apply directly to divorce decrees, SAPCR orders, property divisions, enforcement judgments, and attorney’s-fee awards. Once plenary power expires, a family court cannot revise the substance of a final order merely because the signed document differs from what the court was considering, expected to sign, or later concludes it should have ordered. A nunc pro tunc order is available only when the written judgment fails to memorialize a judgment previously rendered; it cannot supply a new ruling, change conservatorship terms, revise possession provisions, reallocate marital property, or reduce attorney’s fees first fixed in the signed judgment.

The decision is particularly important in cases involving proposed decrees submitted after trial. Even when the court expressed a preliminary view from the bench, the signed decree may constitute the first rendition if the earlier statements were tentative or incomplete. Counsel must therefore treat the date of signature as the beginning of a short and jurisdictionally consequential period for identifying substantive drafting errors and filing an appropriate postjudgment motion.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Marquez AD, LLC prevailed in a contract dispute after a jury trial. The parties had agreed that the district court would decide attorney’s fees. Marquez moved for fees and entry of judgment, requested nearly $82,000, and attached a proposed final judgment.

At the attorney’s-fee hearing, the district court indicated that it was inclined to award each party only nominal fees. The court described that position as what it was “feeling” and what it considered appropriate “at this point.” It did not announce a final decision or state a definite fee amount.

Approximately one month later, on November 20, 2023, the district court signed Marquez’s proposed judgment. The judgment awarded Marquez nearly $82,000 in attorney’s fees and expressly stated that it finally disposed of all claims and parties and was appealable.

No qualifying postjudgment motion extended the district court’s plenary power. Approximately eight months later, the opposing party moved to reform the judgment. On September 3, 2024, the district court signed an order vacating the November 2023 judgment, reducing the attorney’s-fee award to approximately $2,000, and requiring the return of funds collected under the original judgment.

Marquez sought mandamus relief, arguing that the September 2024 order was void because the district court’s plenary power had expired. The Third Court of Appeals denied relief, but the Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted mandamus.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Application

The Supreme Court first determined that the November 20, 2023 judgment was unambiguously final. It awarded relief and stated that it finally disposed of all claims and parties and was appealable. Because no qualifying postjudgment proceeding extended the applicable deadline, the district court’s plenary power expired in December 2023.

The Court then examined whether the September 2024 order could be sustained as a judgment nunc pro tunc. That question turned on whether the nearly $82,000 fee award resulted from a clerical error in recording an earlier rendition or from a judicial error in the judgment itself.

The district court’s statements at the October fee hearing did not amount to a prior rendition. The court had expressed only an inclination to award nominal fees, using tentative language and identifying no final amount. Those statements did not demonstrate a present, definitive intent to render judgment.

Accordingly, the signed November judgment was the first and only rendition fixing the amount of attorney’s fees. Because the written judgment did not inaccurately memorialize an earlier ruling, there was no clerical discrepancy for a nunc pro tunc order to correct. If the fee award was incorrect, the mistake was in the substance of the court’s rendered decision and was therefore judicial.

Correcting that judicial error required plenary power. By September 2024, the district court lacked jurisdiction to reduce the award, vacate the original judgment, require the return of collected funds, or add other substantive relief. The later order was therefore void.

The Supreme Court cautioned that its decision was based on the record before it and did not alter existing law governing judgments nunc pro tunc. It also expressed no view on the original judgment’s validity or enforceability in the face of any fraud allegations.

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the November 20, 2023 judgment was a final judgment and that the district court’s plenary power expired before it entered the September 3, 2024 order.

The Court further held that the attorney’s-fee reduction was a substantive correction of judicial error. Because no prior rendition fixed a different fee amount, the signed judgment was the first rendition of that issue and could not later be changed through a judgment nunc pro tunc.

Finally, the Court held that the September 2024 order was void and subject to mandamus relief. It conditionally directed the district court to vacate that order and reinstate the November 2023 judgment.

Practical Application

Family-law practitioners should distinguish carefully between an error in rendering judgment and an error in recording a judgment previously rendered. That distinction controls whether the court may act after plenary power expires.

In a divorce case, a court cannot use a nunc pro tunc decree to change which spouse receives an asset, alter the percentage division of sale proceeds, impose a previously unrendered debt allocation, or revise an attorney’s-fee award. Those are substantive decisions. Separate restrictions on post-decree property orders—including Texas Family Code section 9.007’s prohibition against altering or changing the substantive division of property—may provide an additional barrier.

In a SAPCR, continuing jurisdiction does not authorize the court to rewrite the historical terms of a final order after plenary power expires. Conservatorship, possession, child-support, and geographic-restriction provisions generally must be changed through a properly pleaded statutory modification proceeding. A modification order changes rights under the governing statutory framework; it is not a vehicle for retroactively revising the original judgment.

The same distinction matters when preparing orders following a memorandum ruling or bench announcement. Statements that the court is “inclined” to rule a particular way, is considering a remedy, or expects counsel to draft an order ordinarily do not establish rendition unless they show a present and definitive intent to decide the matter. Counsel relying on an oral rendition should ensure that the record identifies the precise relief granted and reflects that the court is rendering judgment at that time.

Attorney’s-fee awards demand immediate review. If the signed decree contains the wrong amount, payor, conditions, appellate-fee schedule, or enforcement language, counsel should not assume that the mistake can be corrected later as clerical. A timely motion for new trial or motion to modify, correct, or reform the judgment should be filed when the requested change affects substantive rights.

Proposed orders also require exacting review before submission. Under Daredia and Marquez, a provision does not remain merely an attorney drafting mistake after the court signs and renders judgment incorporating it. Once adopted as the court’s judgment, changing that provision may require plenary power, a direct appeal, or another independently authorized proceeding.

Checklists

Review the Final Decree Immediately

Determine Whether the Error Is Clerical or Judicial

Preserve a Substantive Correction

Establish Rendition in the Record

Address Post-Decree Family-Law Relief Correctly

Family Law Crossover

The crossover rule is procedural but consequential: after a family court’s plenary power expires, it may not revise the substance of a final decree or order under the label of correction, clarification, or nunc pro tunc relief. Rule 316 permits the court to correct the written record only when competent evidence establishes that the court previously rendered a different judgment. Rule 329b bars a later substantive revision unless another authorized procedure—such as a bill of review or a statutory modification proceeding—independently supplies jurisdiction.

This issue can arise when a divorce decree includes an unintended property allocation, when a SAPCR order contains possession or support terms not previously rendered, when an enforcement judgment awards a different amount than anticipated, or when a final order fixes attorney’s fees for the first time. If the signed order is the first definitive rendition of the disputed term, a later change addresses judicial error and must occur while the court retains plenary power. Continuing jurisdiction over a family-law case does not eliminate that limitation or convert a substantive correction into a clerical one.

Citation

In re Marquez AD, LLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 25-0175 (Tex. Nov. 20, 2026) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion in In re Marquez AD, LLC

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