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Rule 11 Duress Challenge Requires Preservation | In re Snoe (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In re Scott Aaron Snoe, 12-26-00366-CV, November 16, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law, Cherokee County, Texas

Synopsis

A habeas relator cannot obtain appellate review of a claim that an agreement conforming to Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure supporting a child-support contempt order was procured through duress or coercion when the complaint was never presented to the trial court. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a), the relator was required to move to revoke the agreement or otherwise raise the involuntary-consent challenge in the trial court.

Relevance to Family Law

Rule 11 agreements routinely resolve disputed issues in divorce, conservatorship, possession, child-support, and property-enforcement proceedings. In re Snoe underscores that an attorney cannot wait until an original proceeding to challenge an agreement as involuntary. If a client contends that consent was withdrawn, the agreement differs from the settlement announced, or coercion deprived the client of meaningful choice, counsel must create a trial-court record through a motion to revoke consent, objection to entry, motion to set aside, or other procedurally appropriate request—and obtain a ruling.

The preservation requirement is especially consequential in enforcement proceedings because an agreed order may support contempt findings, suspended commitment, community supervision, and eventual confinement. Although habeas corpus protects against unlawful restraint, it is not a substitute for preserving fact-dependent complaints about the formation of the underlying agreement.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Scott Aaron Snoe and Kasey D. Parker divorced in October 2024 and shared two children. Parker later filed a petition for enforcement concerning Snoe’s child-support obligations. At the January 7, 2025 enforcement hearing, the parties reached a Rule 11 agreement under which Snoe would be found in contempt and sentenced to six months in jail. The commitment would be suspended, however, while Snoe served 24 months of community supervision and complied with an agreed payment schedule.

Snoe was present and represented by appointed counsel when the agreement was placed before the court. He participated in the hearing, responded to questions, and testified that he understood and agreed to the terms. Those terms included staying current on child support and paying child-support arrearages, medical support, attorney’s fees, and costs. When the payment terms were discussed, Snoe represented that he could make the initial $5,000 payment by the following day, and the habeas record showed that he did so.

The trial court explained that failure to comply with the agreement could lead to revocation of the suspended commitment and confinement. Snoe acknowledged that explanation. The court then approved the Rule 11 agreement, rendered judgment on it, found Snoe in contempt, imposed a 180-day sentence, and suspended the commitment subject to the agreed conditions.

On January 22, 2025, the court signed an amended agreed enforcement order. The order found eight violations of Snoe’s child-support obligation, held him in contempt for each violation, imposed concurrent or cumulative 180-day commitments as stated in the order, suspended commitment, and placed him on community supervision. Snoe’s counsel approved the original and amended orders as to form.

Parker subsequently moved to revoke the suspended commitment. Snoe did not appear for the scheduled March 2025 hearing, and the trial court issued an arrest warrant after finding that Parker had alleged a prima facie violation of the community-supervision conditions. Snoe was arrested in October 2026.

At an October 26 hearing, Snoe asserted that he had not been served regarding the March hearing and that the written order did not reflect what he had agreed to in January 2025. After Snoe consulted privately with counsel, the parties agreed to continue the revocation hearing. The court did not revoke his community supervision, but it ordered that he remain in custody pending the rescheduled hearing.

Snoe then sought habeas relief. Among other allegations, he asserted that the agreed enforcement order was void because his consent resulted from duress, coercion, intimidation, and improper pressure. The appellate record did not show, however, that he had moved to revoke the Rule 11 agreement or presented those allegations to the trial court before filing his habeas petition.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a). As a prerequisite to appellate review, the record generally must show that the complaint was presented to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion stating the grounds with sufficient specificity. The record also must show that the trial court ruled or refused to rule after an objection to that refusal.

Texas Government Code § 22.221(d). A Texas court of appeals may issue a writ of habeas corpus in a civil matter when a person’s restraint arises from a trial court’s order, process, or commitment based on the violation of a prior order, judgment, or decree.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11. An agreement between attorneys or parties concerning a pending suit is enforceable when it is in writing, signed, and filed with the papers as part of the record, or when it is made in open court and entered of record.

Habeas review of contempt orders. A civil habeas proceeding determines whether the relator is unlawfully restrained, not whether the relator is guilty or innocent. The relator bears the burden to show that the contempt order or the underlying order is void. In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715, 721–22 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding).

Limits on the contempt power. Contempt is an inherent judicial power, but a contempt order is void when the court exceeds its authority or deprives the relator of liberty without due process. In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 364, 366 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1980) (orig. proceeding).

Preservation in habeas proceedings. The court relied on In re B.G.B., 580 S.W.3d 310, 317 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, orig. proceeding), which held that a habeas relator failed to preserve complaints concerning the absence of a show-cause order and inadequate notice when those complaints were not raised in the response to the enforcement motion or during the trial-court hearings.

Application

The court began with the record’s central procedural deficiency: Snoe did not ask the trial court to revoke the Rule 11 agreement and did not present his allegations of duress or coercion before seeking habeas relief. His appellate petition was the first place in which he claimed that the agreement was not the product of free and voluntary consent.

That omission prevented the trial court from considering the factual allegations, taking evidence, evaluating credibility, and deciding whether Snoe had withdrawn consent or established a basis to set aside the agreement. Because the complaint was not presented through a timely motion, objection, or request, Rule 33.1(a) barred appellate review.

The court also observed that the existing record did not demonstrate duress or coercion. Snoe had appointed counsel at the January hearing, participated in the negotiations and on-the-record discussion, interacted directly with the judge, and affirmed his understanding of the agreement. The trial court explained both the payment obligations and the consequences of violating the community-supervision conditions.

Snoe’s statement that he did not “have a choice” about paying child support did not establish legally cognizable duress in the context of the complete record. The proceeding necessarily involved the possibility of contempt and confinement, but the court treated the agreement as an alternative that suspended the jail commitment while Snoe complied with the negotiated conditions. The record further showed that the court adjusted the initial payment deadline based on Snoe’s representation that he could pay the following day, and Snoe made that payment.

Thus, even apart from preservation, the hearing record contradicted the later characterization of the agreement as the product of coercion or involuntary consent.

Holding

The Twelfth Court of Appeals held that Snoe did not preserve his challenge to the Rule 11 agreement. Because he neither moved to revoke the agreement nor presented his duress, coercion, intimidation, or involuntary-consent allegations to the trial court, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) precluded habeas review of that complaint.

The court further noted that the record did not substantiate the claimed duress or coercion. Snoe was represented by appointed counsel, participated in the hearing, affirmed the material terms, and acknowledged the consequences of noncompliance. The court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Practical Application

Do not treat habeas as the first forum for a Rule 11 formation challenge. If a client claims that consent was coerced, withdrawn, or never given, raise the issue immediately in the trial court. A habeas petition directed at a later contempt or commitment order will not ordinarily preserve a complaint that could have been presented below.

Distinguish withdrawal of consent from an attack on enforceability. Consent must exist when an agreed judgment is rendered. If the client withdraws consent before rendition, counsel should clearly announce the withdrawal on the record and object to entry of an agreed judgment. If judgment has already been rendered, counsel must identify and pursue the appropriate procedural mechanism for challenging the agreement or judgment.

Create a record before the written order is signed. When the proposed order does not match the agreement announced in open court, file specific written objections and request a hearing. Identify each variance between the transcript and the proposed order. Approval “as to form” may complicate a later effort to argue that the written order materially departed from the agreement.

Develop duress allegations with evidence. A generalized assertion that a party agreed because the alternative was confinement will rarely be sufficient in a contempt proceeding. Counsel should identify the allegedly wrongful threat or pressure, who made it, when it occurred, how it overcame the client’s free will, and why the client could not pursue a reasonable alternative.

Use a careful Rule 11 colloquy. Counsel seeking to protect an agreement should establish on the record that the client understands the material terms, has had sufficient time to confer with counsel, is acting voluntarily, and understands the consequences of default. Payment amounts, deadlines, arrearage calculations, attorney’s fees, and the terms governing suspended commitment should be stated precisely.

Preserve complaints arising during revocation proceedings separately. Objections regarding service, notice, accelerated hearing requirements, continued confinement, or the conditions of community supervision should be raised when those issues arise. Preserving one procedural complaint does not necessarily preserve a distinct attack on the original Rule 11 agreement.

Checklists

Challenging an Allegedly Involuntary Rule 11 Agreement

Defending a Rule 11 Agreement

Preserving Error in an Enforcement or Contempt Proceeding

Reviewing an Agreed Child-Support Enforcement Order

Citation

In re Scott Aaron Snoe, No. 12-26-00366-CV (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 16, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion.

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