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Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) Endangering Conditions | In re I.V. (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of I.V., a Child, 02-26-00361-CV, November 19, 2026.

On appeal from 367th District Court, Denton County, Texas

Synopsis

Repeated physical abuse can establish endangering “conditions or surroundings” under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) when the parent’s conduct creates the child’s dangerous home environment. Evidence that Mother repeatedly struck the child with a belt-like object, pulled her hair, caused visible bruising, admitted causing the injury, and pleaded guilty to reckless injury to a child was legally and factually sufficient to support termination; because the best-interest finding was also supported, the Second Court of Appeals affirmed.

Relevance to Family Law

Although In re I.V. is a parental-termination case, its treatment of family violence has broader significance in divorce and custody litigation. In conservatorship disputes, counsel should develop evidence showing not merely that an assault occurred, but that repeated physical discipline or abuse created an ongoing environment jeopardizing the child’s physical or emotional welfare. Forensic interviews, photographs, contemporaneous observations, admissions, criminal records, and the child’s account of repeated incidents can collectively establish a pattern relevant to possession restrictions, supervised visitation, conservatorship presumptions, protective orders, and findings under Chapters 153 and 262 of the Texas Family Code.

The opinion does not alter Texas property-division law. But in a divorce involving both property and child-related claims, counsel should recognize that criminal proceedings, immigration detention, and Department involvement may materially affect trial scheduling, witness access, discovery, and the presentation of conservatorship issues. The case also reinforces two appellate principles with application across family-law litigation: a party cannot request a trial procedure and later attack that procedure on appeal, and complaints about the form or specificity of an order generally must be preserved in the trial court.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The Department removed five-year-old Irene after discovering linear bruises on both of her arms. During a forensic interview, Irene reported that Mother had struck her with a belt-like object, hit her throughout her body on multiple occasions at home and at Walmart, and pulled her hair. Irene showed the interviewer bruising that remained on both shoulders. She also described a statement by Mother that arguably suggested Mother would beat her until she bled, although Irene did not elaborate.

Police interviewed Mother, who admitted injuring Irene. Mother was arrested and charged with injury to a child. In March 2025, she pleaded guilty to the state-jail felony offense of reckless injury to a child and received a time-served sentence of 168 days.

After Mother’s release from jail, federal immigration authorities detained her. She was released in May 2025 but detained again on March 5, 2026, one day before the termination trial was scheduled to begin. Mother moved to commence the trial and then recess it so that arrangements could be made for her participation. Consistent with the parties’ agreement, the trial court heard brief testimony on March 6 and recessed the trial. The proceeding resumed on May 27, with Mother participating by Zoom from immigration detention.

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding predicate grounds under Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (L), finding that termination was in Irene’s best interest, and making findings concerning the Department’s reasonable reunification efforts and the continuing danger preventing Irene’s return. Mother appealed those findings and also challenged the absence of contemporaneous translation of other witnesses’ testimony during trial.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b), termination requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one statutory predicate ground and that termination is in the child’s best interest. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence sufficient to produce in the factfinder’s mind a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the allegations.

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination when a parent knowingly places or knowingly allows a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being. “Endanger” means exposing the child to loss or injury or jeopardizing the child’s physical or emotional health. Although Subsection (D) focuses on the child’s environment, a parent’s conduct may be relevant when that conduct creates the endangering environment.

The court relied on the following sufficiency principles:

The court also applied Section 161.001(f), which generally requires findings that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child before trial and that, despite those efforts, a continuing danger prevented the child’s return. Section 161.001(g) requires the termination order to include a separate section containing written findings that specifically describe the Department’s reasonable efforts.

Finally, the court applied invited-error and preservation principles. A litigant generally cannot request or agree to a trial procedure and then obtain reversal based on that same procedure. Likewise, an objection to the form or specificity of a trial court’s order must be timely presented to the trial court to preserve the complaint for appellate review.

Application

The court treated Mother’s physical abuse not merely as isolated misconduct but as conduct that created Irene’s endangering environment. Irene reported that Mother repeatedly struck her with a belt-like object, hit her throughout her body, and pulled her hair. Her account identified multiple incidents and multiple locations, supporting an inference that the danger was recurring rather than confined to a single episode. The remaining bruises on Irene’s arms and shoulders objectively corroborated her description.

Mother’s own statements and criminal proceedings provided additional corroboration. She admitted that she injured Irene and later pleaded guilty to reckless injury to a child. Considered together, Irene’s outcry, the visible injuries, Mother’s admission, and the guilty plea permitted the factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly placed or allowed Irene to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.

Because the evidence was sufficient under Subsection (D), the appellate court did not need to decide whether the evidence independently supported the trial court’s findings under Subsections (E) and (L). The court separately concluded that the record supported the best-interest finding, thereby satisfying both components necessary to affirm the termination judgment.

Mother’s translation complaint failed under the invited-error doctrine. The record showed that the trial proceeded in the challenged manner at Mother’s specific request. Having asked the trial court to follow that procedure, Mother could not obtain reversal by characterizing the same procedure as a due-process violation.

The court also concluded that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the Section 161.001(f) findings concerning the Department’s reasonable efforts and the continuing danger that prevented Irene’s return. Mother did not preserve her complaint regarding the specificity of the Section 161.001(g) findings. The court further observed that prior cases had rejected the additional requirements Mother sought to impose because they were not supported by the statute’s text.

Holding

The Second Court of Appeals held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D). Mother’s repeated use of a belt-like object to strike Irene, hair pulling, the resulting visible bruising, Mother’s admission, and her guilty plea to reckless injury to a child supported a firm belief or conviction that Mother knowingly exposed Irene to an endangering environment.

Because Subsection (D) supplied one sufficient predicate ground, the court did not reach Mother’s challenges to the Subsection (E) and (L) findings. The court also held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the finding that termination was in Irene’s best interest.

The court rejected Mother’s due-process complaint concerning translation because any error was invited. Mother specifically requested the procedure used by the trial court and therefore could not complain about that procedure for the first time on appeal.

The court further held that the evidence supported the Section 161.001(f) findings regarding reasonable reunification efforts and continuing danger. Mother’s challenge to the specificity of the Section 161.001(g) findings was not preserved and, in any event, sought requirements not found in the statutory language. The termination judgment was affirmed.

Practical Application

For Department counsel and an attorney ad litem, In re I.V. demonstrates how to connect a parent’s abusive conduct to the child’s “conditions or surroundings” under Subsection (D). The evidentiary presentation should identify where the abuse occurred, how often it occurred, whether the child continued to reside with the offending parent, and how the conduct made the child’s ordinary environment dangerous. Counsel should avoid presenting Subsection (D) as a generic misconduct ground; the proof should expressly connect the conduct to the environment in which the child was placed or allowed to remain.

For parent’s counsel, the case highlights the difficulty of overcoming a record containing mutually reinforcing evidence: a child’s detailed outcry, objectively visible injuries, a parental admission, and a criminal guilty plea. The defense must address each evidentiary component rather than relying solely on evidence of later compliance or generalized promises that the abuse will not recur. Counsel should investigate the circumstances of the forensic interview, the timing and source of each injury, the precise content and admissibility of any admission, and the offense and factual basis underlying any plea.

In private custody litigation, the same evidence may support requests for sole managing conservatorship, supervised possession, geographic or safety restrictions, injunctions, or protective relief. Although the burden and statutory framework differ from termination proceedings, evidence demonstrating repeated corporal punishment, bruising, threats, or hair pulling can be highly material to the child’s best interest and to family-violence findings.

The invited-error holding warrants particular attention when language access, remote participation, continuances, or unusual trial scheduling are involved. If a party accepts a procedure only because of incarceration, detention, interpreter availability, or an approaching dismissal deadline, counsel should clearly state any objection, identify the constitutional or procedural concern, and explain that participation is not intended as a waiver. A proposed alternative should also be placed on the record.

Counsel should separately preserve objections to the termination order. If the order does not contain the findings required by Section 161.001(g), or if those findings lack the required specificity, the complaint should be raised before the trial court through an objection, motion to modify, motion for new trial, or other appropriate request for correction.

Checklists

Building a Subsection (D) Record

Handling Admissions and Criminal Proceedings

Defending Against an Endangerment Allegation

Preserving Translation and Participation Complaints

Protecting the Appellate Record

Citation

In re I.V., No. 02-26-00361-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 19, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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