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First District Affirms Child Support Modification and Arrearage Despite Disputes Over Military Income Calculation

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Caughey, 01-24-00137-CV, January 29, 2026.

On appeal from the 311th District Court, Harris County, Texas.

Synopsis

The First District Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s order modifying child support and confirming arrearages, holding that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when resolving conflicting testimony regarding military income and allowances. The court emphasized that as the sole judge of witness credibility, the trial court is free to disregard a party’s self-serving testimony concerning income reductions when that testimony lacks objective corroboration.

Relevance to Family Law

This case reinforces the high evidentiary burden placed on obligors seeking a downward modification of child support, particularly when dealing with the complexities of military compensation. It serves as a stark warning to practitioners: in the absence of definitive, admissible financial documentation (such as current Leave and Earnings Statements or MyPay records), a trial court possesses broad discretion to credit an obligee’s testimony or draw adverse inferences regarding the obligor’s net monthly income. For appellate purposes, this case underscores the near-insurmountable “abuse of discretion” hurdle when the complaint is essentially a request for the appellate court to re-weigh the trial court’s credibility determinations.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Eric Owens, a Staff Sergeant in the U.S. Army, sought to modify his child support obligation, contending that his income had decreased following a change in his service status. Owens testified that while he remained on active duty, he had moved to a guard or reserve status, which allegedly eliminated his eligibility for housing (BAH) and food (BAS) allowances. He further argued that his remarriage to another service member resulted in his wife receiving the housing allowance instead of him. Additionally, Owens claimed his medical and dental insurance premiums for the children had surged from $30 to over $450 per month.

Nicole Johnson, the obligee, contested these assertions. While she lacked documentary proof of Owens’s current income, she disputed the plausibility of his claims regarding the loss of allowances and the “thousandfold” increase in dental insurance costs. During the bench trial, Johnson attempted to introduce an online military pay calculator to estimate Owens’s income, but the trial court sustained Owens’s hearsay objection and excluded it. Despite the exclusion of the calculator and Owens’s own testimony regarding his lower net income, the trial court set the support amount higher than Owens requested and confirmed an arrearage. Owens appealed, arguing the trial court must have relied on the excluded calculator or otherwise ignored his uncontradicted testimony.

Issues Decided

  1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in calculating the obligor’s net monthly income by allegedly relying on excluded hearsay and failing to credit the obligor’s testimony regarding lost military allowances.
  2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in confirming child support arrearages based on its assessment of conflicting evidence and witness credibility.

Rules Applied

The court applied the Texas Family Code’s child support guidelines under Chapter 154, which require the court to calculate “net resources” available for support. The standard of review was “abuse of discretion,” a high bar requiring the appellant to show the trial court acted without reference to guiding rules or principles. Central to the court’s analysis was the principle from City of Keller v. Wilson that in a bench trial, the trial judge is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. The court also relied on the rule that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it bases its decision on conflicting evidence, so long as some evidence of substantive and probative character exists to support the decision.

Application

The legal narrative in this appeal centers on the finality of a trial court’s role as factfinder. Owens’s primary strategy on appeal was to argue that because his testimony regarding his income reduction was “uncontradicted” by documentary evidence, the trial court was legally bound to accept it. The Court of Appeals rejected this, noting that the trial court was entitled to find Owens’s testimony not credible, especially given his admission that he failed to produce readily available MyPay records that would have provided a definitive account of his earnings and garnishments.

Owens also argued that the trial court must have used the excluded online calculator to reach its figures. However, the appellate court found no evidence in the record that the trial court relied on the hearsay; rather, the record showed the objection was sustained. The court determined that the trial court sat as the arbiter of a classic “he-said, she-said” dispute. Because Owens bore the burden of proving his income for the modification, his failure to provide credible, corroborated evidence allowed the trial court to resolve the evidentiary conflicts in favor of the obligee.

Holding

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its modification of the monthly child-support obligation. The court reasoned that the trial court, acting as the factfinder, was tasked with resolving the disputes concerning Owens’s income and the credibility of his testimony. Because the trial court was free to disbelieve Owens’s claims regarding his lost allowances and increased insurance costs, the resulting calculation would not be disturbed on appeal.

The Court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in confirming the child-support arrearage. As with the income calculation, the determination of the arrearage amount turned on the trial court’s assessment of the evidence and the credibility of the parties’ respective testimonies. Under the abuse of discretion standard, the appellate court will not revisit those credibility assessments.

Practical Application

For the practitioner, this case emphasizes that “testimony is not evidence” in the eyes of a skeptical factfinder unless backed by a paper trail. When representing an obligor, especially one with complex military or corporate benefits, you must move beyond the client’s testimony. If a client claims a loss of BAH/BAS, the practitioner should secure a formal letter from the unit’s finance officer or the “Command Policy” documentation. Conversely, when representing an obligee, this case provides a roadmap for defending a favorable support order on appeal by focusing on the “standard of review” and the trial court’s exclusive right to find the obligor’s testimony non-credible.

Checklists

Determining Military Net Resources

  • Obtain the last 12 months of Leave and Earnings Statements (LES) to identify trends in BAH (Basic Allowance for Housing) and BAS (Basic Allowance for Subsistence).
  • Verify “Service Member Married to Service Member” status; specifically, identify which spouse is designated to receive the “With Dependents” rate.
  • Use discovery to obtain MyPay login-protected reports if the client claims they cannot access them.
  • Corroborate any claimed increase in health/dental insurance premiums with the actual insurance summary of benefits or payroll deduction authorizations.

Defending the Factfinder’s Discretion on Appeal

  • Ensure the record reflects a sustained objection to any hearsay evidence (like online calculators) to prevent “implied reliance” arguments.
  • Highlight in the briefing any instances where the opposing party admitted that corroborating documentation existed but was not produced (the “missing evidence” inference).
  • Emphasize the City of Keller standards, reminding the appellate court that it cannot substitute its judgment for the trial court’s credibility calls.

Citation

Owens v. Johnson, No. 01-24-00137-CV, 2026 WL [TBD] (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Link to Full Opinion

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Tom Daley is a board-certified family law attorney with extensive experience practicing across the United States, primarily in Texas. He represents clients in all aspects of family law, including negotiation, settlement, litigation, trial, and appeals.