No Shelter from the Storm: Why the SCOTX ‘Windstorm’ Ruling Limits Semantic Dodging in Property Division and MSAs

Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Mankoff, 24-0132, February 13, 2026.

On appeal from Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas

Synopsis

The Supreme Court of Texas held that the term “windstorm,” when undefined in an insurance policy, is unambiguous and encompasses a tornado under its plain, ordinary meaning. Consequently, a policy’s “Windstorm or Hail Deductible” applies to losses caused by a tornado as a matter of law, precluding attempts to create “false ambiguity” through extrinsic sources or narrow dictionary definitions.

Relevance to Family Law

For the Family Law practitioner, Mankoff is a cautionary tale regarding the drafting and interpretation of Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs) and Final Decrees. In our practice, we frequently use broad, undefined terms—such as “extraordinary expenses,” “maintenance,” or “household furniture”—assuming their meaning is intuitive. Mankoff reaffirms that Texas courts will not find ambiguity simply because a term is broad or because a creative advocate can find a narrow dictionary definition that excludes a specific item. If your MSA uses a general category, expect the court to apply its “plain meaning” to all sub-categories as a matter of law, effectively stripping the trial court of the discretion to “interpret” the intent of the parties through extrinsic evidence.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

In 2019, a tornado struck the Dallas-area home of Jeff and Staci Mankoff, causing significant structural damage. Their homeowners policy, issued by Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange (PURE), contained a specific “Windstorm or Hail Deductible” amounting to $87,156. PURE applied this deductible to the Mankoffs’ claim. The Mankoffs sued for breach of contract, arguing that the deductible was inapplicable because their damage was caused by a “tornado,” which they contended was a peril distinct from a “windstorm.”

The policy did not define “windstorm.” The Mankoffs argued that because some statutes and media outlets distinguish between general windstorms and tornadoes, the term was at least ambiguous. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer, but a divided Dallas Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “windstorm” was subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and must therefore be construed in favor of the insured to exclude tornadoes.

Issues Decided

The Court addressed whether the undefined term “windstorm” in a property insurance policy is ambiguous or whether it encompasses a tornado under its plain, ordinary meaning for the purposes of applying a policy deductible. Additionally, the Court addressed whether extrinsic sources—such as media reports and unrelated statutory provisions—can be used to create ambiguity in an otherwise clear contract term.

Rules Applied

The Court relied on the fundamental “plain meaning” rule of contract construction. Under National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. CBI Indus., Inc., a contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite or certain legal meaning. If it is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, it is ambiguous.

However, under URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, the primary objective is to ascertain the parties’ intent as expressed in the instrument itself. Furthermore, Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. dictates that when a policy does not define a term, courts must give the language its plain, ordinary meaning unless the policy clearly shows the parties intended a technical or different meaning.

Application

Justice Lehrmann’s analysis centered on the rejection of “semantic dodging.” The Court noted that for a term to be ambiguous, the competing interpretation must be reasonable. The Mankoffs’ argument—that a tornado is not a windstorm—was deemed unreasonable because the “consistent thread” of all definitions of “windstorm” involves a storm with high-velocity or violent winds. Since a tornado is essentially a storm of violent winds, it is a “subtype” of the broader category.

The Court criticized the court of appeals for relying on “inappropriate sources” like media coverage and specific statutory definitions to create a “false ambiguity.” The Court clarified that while a term might be defined narrowly in a specific regulatory context (like the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association statutes), those specialized definitions do not override the common, ordinary meaning of the word in a private contract unless the contract specifically incorporates them.

Holding

The Supreme Court held that “windstorm” is not an ambiguous term and, as a matter of law, includes tornadoes. The Court reasoned that a tornado is a species of windstorm, and no reasonable person would interpret a storm characterized by violent winds as being anything other than a “windstorm.”

The Court further held that the court of appeals erred by looking beyond the four corners of the policy to find ambiguity. Because the term has a settled ordinary meaning, the insurer was entitled to apply the “Windstorm or Hail Deductible” to the tornado-related loss. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the trial court’s take-nothing judgment against the Insureds was reinstated.

Practical Application

In the context of Texas Family Law litigation, Mankoff serves as a strategic roadmap for enforcement and clarification actions:

1. Drafting Precision: When drafting an MSA, if a client intends for a “special” asset or expense to be treated differently from its general category (e.g., a “classic car” versus “motor vehicles”), the document must explicitly define the distinction. You can no longer rely on a “latent ambiguity” argument to save a client from a broad category.
2. Summary Judgment Strategy: In enforcement actions where a party is playing “word games” with Decree language (e.g., arguing that “college tuition” doesn’t include “mandatory student fees”), Mankoff provides the authority to move for summary judgment on the “plain meaning” of the term, bypassing the need for a full evidentiary hearing on “intent.”
3. Extrinsic Evidence Bar: Use this case to exclude testimony regarding what the parties meant during mediation. If the term used in the MSA has a common dictionary meaning, Mankoff suggests that the court should not even consider the “backstory” of the negotiation.

Checklists

Drafting the MSA to Survive “Plain Meaning” Review

• Identify Broad Categories
  • Does the term (e.g., “residence,” “personal property”) have a commonly understood meaning that might be broader than your client intends?
• Define “Sub-types”
  • If “medical expenses” should exclude elective procedures, state so explicitly.
  • If “windfall” or “bonus” income is being divided, define whether that includes stock options or RSUs.
• The “Including but not limited to” Clause
  • Use this to bridge the gap between a general category and specific high-value items to prevent a Mankoff-style “species” argument.

Defeating a Claim of Ambiguity in Enforcement

• Consult the Dictionary
  • Gather 2–3 standard dictionary definitions to establish the “plain, ordinary meaning.”
• Identify the “Consistent Thread”
  • Determine the core characteristic of the term (like “violent winds” for “windstorm”) and show how the disputed item fits that characteristic.
• Exclude Extrinsic Evidence
  • Move in limine to exclude media reports, statutory definitions from other codes, or “custom and usage” evidence that contradicts the plain meaning.
• Argue “False Ambiguity”
  • Cite Mankoff for the proposition that a lack of a definition in the document does not equal ambiguity.

Citation

Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Mankoff, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. 2026).

Full Opinion

The full opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas can be found here: https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1462113/240132.pdf

Family Law Crossover

Mankoff can be weaponized in Texas divorce litigation to narrow the scope of “interpretation” available to a creative opposing counsel. For example, if a Decree awards a spouse “all accounts at Chase Bank,” and the other spouse later discovers a “Chase Investment Services” brokerage account, the Mankoff logic dictates that an “investment account” is a subtype of a “bank account” under a broad, plain-meaning construction.

More importantly, it shuts down the common tactic of using the Texas Family Code’s specialized definitions to interpret a contract (the MSA). Just as the Mankoffs failed to use the Insurance Code to redefine “windstorm,” a party to a divorce cannot necessarily use the Family Code’s definition of “net resources” to interpret the word “income” in an MSA if the plain, ordinary meaning of “income” is broader. Mankoff shifts the power back to the four corners of the document and away from the “equity” often sought in family courts.

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