Protecting the Deal: Using Criminal Competency Standards to Defeat ‘Lack of Capacity’ Challenges to MSAs and Agreed Orders

Ex Parte Robert Brimmer, 02-25-00369-CR, February 19, 2026.

On appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3, Tarrant County, Texas.

Synopsis

The Second Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief, holding that the applicant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent or that his guilty plea was involuntary. The court emphasized that trial courts may rely on contemporaneous forensic evaluations and the affirmations of trial counsel to override retrospective claims of mental incapacity, even when the defendant exhibits “distorted thinking” or “unreasonable” legal beliefs.

Relevance to Family Law

For the Texas family law practitioner, Brimmer provides a powerful appellate roadmap for defending Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs) and Agreed Orders against “buyer’s remorse” rebranded as a lack of capacity. It is common for a disappointed spouse to seek to set aside a settlement by alleging they were too depressed, medicated, or “not in their right mind” during mediation. Brimmer clarifies that the legal threshold for incapacity is not the mere existence of mental illness or “waxing and waning” symptoms, but rather a functional inability to understand the proceedings. By adopting the criminal competency framework, civil litigators can argue that if a party understood “the players” and “the deal” at the time of execution, the contract must stand.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Robert Brimmer, a medical doctor, was indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Early in the proceedings, his counsel filed a notice of intent to raise an insanity defense and requested a competency evaluation, noting that Brimmer had “distorted thinking” and failed to understand the legal process. Specifically, Brimmer held the “unreasonable view” that he could not be prosecuted because the incident occurred on his own property.

A forensic psychologist, Dr. Kristi Compton, evaluated Brimmer and found him competent, despite a diagnosis of mild major depressive disorder and observations of paranoid ideation regarding his family. Shortly thereafter, Brimmer entered a negotiated guilty plea for a lesser offense. In the plea paperwork, Brimmer and his attorney signed written waivers affirming his mental competence and the voluntary nature of the plea. Over a year later, after the State moved to adjudicate his deferred adjudication, Brimmer filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking to vacate the plea. He presented testimony from his son regarding his “paranoid delusions” and pointed to his former attorney’s initial concerns about his mental state. The trial court denied the writ, leading to this appeal.

Issues Decided

The court decided whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Article 11.072 habeas corpus relief based on the applicant’s claim that he was incompetent to enter a plea and that his plea was entered involuntarily.

Rules Applied

The court applied Article 11.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which serves as the vehicle for challenging a conviction or order of deferred adjudication community supervision. Under this article, the applicant bears the burden of proving his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

Regarding competency, the court looked to the standard established in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 46B.003(a): whether the defendant has a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings. The court also applied the presumption of regularity to written plea admonishments, shifting a heavy burden to the applicant to prove that his signatures on those documents were not knowing or voluntary.

Application

In a detailed narrative analysis, the court weighed the expert forensic testimony against the lay observations of the applicant’s family. The applicant argued that his “unreasonable” legal beliefs and documented paranoid ideations proved he lacked a rational understanding of his case. However, the court found that Dr. Compton’s contemporaneous mental status examination—specifically the St. Louis University Mental Status Examination (SLUMS)—provided a reliable “snapshot” of competence that outweighed retrospective accounts.

The court noted that while mental illness may “wax and wane,” the legal inquiry is fixed upon the moment the plea is entered. Crucially, the court credited the testimony of Brimmer’s trial counsel, who stated that despite Brimmer’s eccentric views on the law, he understood the benefits of the plea bargain. The court determined that “unreasonable views” do not equate to legal incompetence. Because the trial court is the sole judge of witness credibility in a habeas proceeding, its decision to believe the forensic expert and the trial attorney over the applicant’s son was not an abuse of discretion.

Holding

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the applicant failed to prove incompetence. The court emphasized that the presence of mental health issues—including depression and paranoid ideation—does not automatically render a person incompetent if they maintain a factual and rational understanding of the legal process.

The court further held that the plea was voluntary and knowing. The court ruled that the written plea admonishments and the attorney’s certification of the defendant’s competence constitute formidable evidence of voluntariness that cannot be overcome by a defendant’s subsequent “change of heart” or a family member’s lay opinion on his mental state.

Practical Application

Family law litigators should use this case to “competency-proof” their settlements. If you are dealing with a party who has a history of mental health issues, the Brimmer opinion suggests that a contemporaneous record—even an informal one—affirming the party’s understanding of the “players” (the judge, the lawyers) and the “deal” (the MSA terms) is nearly impossible to overturn. When defending an MSA against a motion to set aside, emphasize that “distorted thinking” on collateral issues (like the applicant’s family paranoia in Brimmer) does not invalidate a signature if the party understood the specific legal transaction at hand.

Checklists

Insulating MSAs Against Lack of Capacity Challenges

• Include a “Capacity Affirmation” clause in the MSA where both parties represent they are not under the influence of any substance or mental condition that impairs their ability to understand the agreement.
• Request that opposing counsel initial a provision stating they have no reason to believe their client lacks the legal capacity to execute the agreement.
• If a party appears “fragile,” conduct a brief “prove-up” on the record with the mediator present, asking the party to explain the primary terms of the deal in their own words.
• Document the “goal-directed” behavior of the opposing party during mediation (e.g., their specific counter-offers) to prove they were actively and rationally participating.

Defeating a Motion to Set Aside an Agreed Order

• Subpoena the prior trial counsel to testify regarding the “lucid interval” during the settlement.
• Distinguish between “medical diagnosis” and “legal incompetence”; argue that a diagnosis of depression or anxiety (as seen in Brimmer) is insufficient to vacate an order.
• Invoke the “Presumption of Regularity” for any signed admonishments or signatures on the order.
• Highlight any “unreasonable views” held by the party as evidence of their specific legal strategy or personality rather than a lack of cognitive capacity.

Citation

Ex Parte Robert Brimmer, No. 02-25-00369-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 19, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

The full opinion can be found here: View Opinion

Family Law Crossover

In Texas divorce litigation, the “insanity defense” of the civil world is the “Motion to Set Aside MSA.” Brimmer is a strategic weapon for the party seeking to enforce a settlement. It establishes that even if a party has “paranoid ideations” or “distorted thinking,” their agreement is binding so long as they understand the “process and the potential penalties” (or in family law, the property division and custody rights). Litigators should cite Brimmer to argue that the trial court must defer to the “contemporaneous snapshot” of the mediation day rather than a party’s retrospective regret or a therapist’s later diagnosis. If a party was competent enough to negotiate a lower “charge” (or a better asset split), they are competent enough to be bound by their signature.

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