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CROSSOVER: TCPA-Proofing Your Sanctions: Texas Court Confirms Anti-SLAPP Motions Cannot Be Used to Block Sanctions for Groundless Filings

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ellis, 03-24-00071-CV, January 28, 2026.

On appeal from the 250th District Court, Travis County, Texas.

Synopsis

The Third Court of Appeals held that a motion for sanctions—even when styled as a “counterclaim”—does not constitute a “legal action” under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). Following recent Texas Supreme Court precedent, the court affirmed that sanctions requests are ancillary to substantive claims and therefore are not subject to dismissal under the Anti-SLAPP statute.

Relevance to Family Law

In the volatile arena of Texas Family Law, litigants frequently utilize Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code or Rule 13 to curb groundless filings in high-conflict custody and property disputes. This ruling provides essential clarity for family law practitioners: a request for sanctions aimed at penalizing a frivolous motion or pleading cannot be “SLAPPed” down. Opposing counsel can no longer weaponize the TCPA to stay discovery or seek a dismissal of your client’s request for attorney’s fees and sanctions when those requests are based on groundless or harassing litigation conduct.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The underlying litigation began when Armando Lorenzo sued the law firm Sandoval & James, PLLC, and an alleged case runner, Antonio Velasco, for barratry. Velasco answered the suit and included a section titled “Original Answer and Counterclaims,” which contained a “Motion and Claims for Sanctions and Fees.” In this filing, Velasco alleged that Lorenzo’s suit was groundless and brought in bad faith, specifically seeking sanctions under Chapters 9 and 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code to recover his attorney’s fees and costs.

In response, Lorenzo filed a TCPA motion to dismiss Velasco’s request for sanctions. Lorenzo argued that the request for sanctions was a “legal action” based on his exercise of the right to petition—namely, his filing of the barratry lawsuit. The trial court denied the TCPA motion, and Lorenzo pursued an interlocutory appeal, arguing that because Velasco labeled his request as a “counterclaim,” it fell squarely within the statutory definition of a “legal action.”

Issues Decided

  1. Whether a motion for sanctions, seeking fees and costs for a groundless filing, constitutes a “legal action” under the TCPA.
  2. Whether the labeling of a sanctions request as a “counterclaim” transforms an ancillary motion into a “legal action” subject to the TCPA’s dismissal mechanisms.

Rules Applied

The court relied primarily on the statutory definition of “legal action” found in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(6), which includes lawsuits, causes of action, petitions, complaints, cross-claims, or counterclaims, as well as a catch-all for filings requesting legal or equitable relief. The court also looked to the 2019 TCPA Amendments, which excluded procedural actions that do not amend or add a substantive claim for relief.

Central to the decision was the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Ferchichi v. Whataburger Rests. LLC, 713 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. 2025). This precedent applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis to narrow the TCPA’s catch-all provision to filings that function like a lawsuit by commencing or materially amending a proceeding on a substantive legal claim.

Application

The court’s analysis centered on the functional nature of the filing rather than its title. Justice Ellis explained that for the TCPA to apply, the challenged filing must be “like” the enumerated filings in the statute, such as a lawsuit or cause of action. The court noted that the 2019 amendments specifically clarified that procedural motions that do not add a substantive claim—such as negligence or fraud—are exempt from the Act.

The court then applied this framework to Velasco’s “counterclaim” for sanctions. The court determined that the filing was based entirely on conduct ancillary to the substantive barratry claims and could not stand on its own as an independent lawsuit. If Lorenzo had never filed the barratry suit, Velasco would have had no basis for his sanctions request. Consequently, the request for sanctions did not “commence or amend a proceeding on a substantive legal claim.”

The court further rejected Lorenzo’s argument that the use of the word “counterclaim” in the pleading’s title was dispositive. Citing long-standing Texas procedure, the court emphasized that the substance of a pleading controls over its form. Because the “counterclaim” was substantively a motion for sanctions under Chapters 9 and 10, it did not meet the definition of a “legal action.”

Holding

The court held that a motion for sanctions is not a “legal action” subject to dismissal under the TCPA because it does not present a substantive underlying claim for relief but is instead based on ancillary conduct within the litigation.

The court further held that the nature of a filing is determined by its substance rather than its title; therefore, labeling a motion for sanctions as a “counterclaim” does not bring it within the scope of the TCPA if the filing does not actually assert a substantive cause of action.

Practical Application

This decision is a strategic win for litigators who need to police the “scorched earth” tactics often seen in family law. When a party files a meritless motion for enforcement or a groundless modification to gain leverage in a divorce, the respondent can seek sanctions without the fear of being derailed by a TCPA motion. Practitioners should be careful to ensure their sanctions requests remain “ancillary”—meaning they are tied to the conduct within the suit—rather than inadvertently pleading a separate tort (like malicious prosecution or abuse of process) that could trigger TCPA protections.

Checklists

Determining if a Filing is TCPA-Proof

Check the Substantive Claim: Does the filing add a new cause of action (e.g., fraud, breach of contract, or a statutory family law claim), or does it merely seek fees for bad-faith conduct in the current suit?

Evaluate Independence: Could this filing exist if the underlying lawsuit were never filed? If the answer is “no,” it is likely ancillary and TCPA-exempt.

Identify the Source of Relief: Is the relief sought under a sanctions statute (Chapter 10, Rule 13) or via a substantive “cause of action”?

Drafting Sanctions to Avoid Anti-SLAPP Delay

Focus on Conduct: Explicitly tie the request for fees to the “groundless” or “bad faith” nature of the specific pleadings filed by the opposing party.

Substance Over Label: While Lorenzo protects mislabeled filings, the best practice remains clearly labeling these requests as “Motions for Sanctions” rather than “Counterclaims” to avoid inviting a frivolous TCPA challenge.

Cite the Exception: In response to any TCPA threat, cite Ferchichi and Lorenzo to demonstrate that the motion does not “amend or add a claim for legal, equitable, or declaratory relief” under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001(6)(A).

Citation

Lorenzo v. Sandoval & James, PLLC, No. 03-24-00071-CV, 2026 WL 287232 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 28, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Full Opinion: Lorenzo v. Sandoval & James, PLLC

Family Law Crossover

The “Crossover” utility of this case in family law cannot be overstated. In high-stakes property divisions, one spouse may file a groundless suit against a family business or a third party to create financial pressure. When that third party or the other spouse moves for sanctions, the offending spouse often attempts to use the TCPA as a “shield,” filing a motion to dismiss the sanctions request to trigger a stay of all discovery and an immediate right to interlocutory appeal.

Lorenzo effectively shuts this door. It ensures that sanctions for groundless filings in divorce and custody cases remain a trial court matter, preventing the “appellate hijack” where a simple fee request is transformed into a multi-year TCPA battle. If you are representing a client facing a barrage of frivolous motions, Lorenzo provides the green light to seek sanctions aggressively without fear of the Anti-SLAPP “boomerang.”

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Tom Daley is a board-certified family law attorney with extensive experience practicing across the United States, primarily in Texas. He represents clients in all aspects of family law, including negotiation, settlement, litigation, trial, and appeals.