CROSSOVER: Houston COA Upholds Chapter 10/Rule 13–Style Sanctions and $69,861 Fee Award After Voluntary Nonsuit—A Cautionary Playbook for Family-Law TRO/Temp-Orders Practice

Dr. Robert Corwin, Richard B. Brualdi, and The Brualdi Law Firm, P.C. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 01-24-00207-CV, March 31, 2026.

On appeal from 190th District Court, Harris County, Texas

Synopsis

The First Court of Appeals affirmed sanctions and a $69,861.19 fee award against counsel and the law firm arising from an emergency temporary-injunction push—even though the sanctioned lawyers argued they did not sign the offending filings and even though the case was voluntarily nonsuited shortly after the hearing. The court held the trial court acted within its discretion under Chapter 10 and Rule 13 and did not “improperly” circumvent those frameworks by referencing inherent authority, because the record supported findings that the temporary-injunction request was groundless and pursued in bad faith/improper purpose.

Relevance to Family Law

Family-law litigation is saturated with expedited injunction practice—TROs, temporary orders, enforcement-related restraints, and “emergency” requests that effectively decide possession, use of property, or access to children long before final trial. This opinion is a reminder that (1) a nonsuit will not necessarily wash away sanctions exposure tied to temp-relief filings, (2) “who signed what” is not a safe harbor when the court finds the lawyer and firm responsible for the filing strategy, and (3) pattern-and-purpose evidence can matter when a court is evaluating whether a temporary-injunction request is a bona fide attempt to preserve rights or a pressure tactic.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

A Pioneer shareholder, Dr. Corwin, sued to enjoin the closing of a scheduled shareholder vote on a proposed Exxon/Pioneer merger. His counsel (Mr. Brualdi and his firm) sought emergency temporary-injunction relief set for hearing five days before the vote. The trial court denied injunctive relief; ten days later, the plaintiff nonsuited the case.

Exxon then pursued sanctions against counsel and the firm, arguing that the temporary-injunction push was groundless and filed in bad faith and for an improper purpose—what Exxon characterized as “merger tax” litigation designed to extract settlement value from the threat of timing disruption. At an evidentiary sanctions hearing, Exxon offered testimony about counsel’s experience with numerous similar suits brought by the same firm, introduced a list of more than seventy comparable lawsuits (many voluntarily dismissed), and pointed the court to out-of-state opinions criticizing similar conduct. The trial court found fundamental defects in the pleaded claims and the temporary-injunction request, found the request was pursued for settlement leverage rather than legitimate relief, and imposed sanctions consisting primarily of attorney’s fees ($59,861.19) plus a $10,000 payment to the county, along with conditional appellate fees.

On appeal, counsel and the firm argued sanctions were improper because they did not sign the offending petition and temporary-injunction motion, that the trial court could not “circumvent” Chapter 10/Rule 13 by invoking inherent power, and that the injunction request was not groundless or in bad faith.

Issues Decided

• Whether sanctions under Chapter 10 and/or Rule 13 were unavailable because neither the individual lawyer nor the firm signed the petition and temporary-injunction motion.
• Whether the trial court improperly relied on inherent power to sanction in a way that circumvented Chapter 10 and Rule 13.
• Whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding the temporary-injunction request groundless and filed in bad faith/for an improper purpose and by awarding $69,861.19 in fees and related sanctions after the plaintiff nonsuited.

Rules Applied

• Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 10 (sanctions for filings that are groundless/brought in bad faith or for improper purpose; responsibility for representations to the court).
• Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 (sanctions for groundless pleadings and motions brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment).
• Abuse-of-discretion review for sanctions orders (deference to trial court’s factfinding and credibility assessments where supported by the record).
• Sanctions post-nonsuit principles (a nonsuit does not necessarily deprive the court of authority to decide collateral matters such as sanctions and fees based on sanctionable conduct occurring before dismissal).
• Inherent authority concepts (courts possess inherent power to sanction bad-faith conduct, but that power operates within constitutional and due-process limits and typically alongside—rather than as a substitute for—rule/statutory regimes when applicable).

Application

The First Court treated the appeal as a classic sanctions review: did the trial court have a legally available vehicle to sanction, and did the record support the trial court’s findings and chosen remedy?

On the signature argument, the court rejected the attempt to use a “non-signer” posture as a categorical bar to Chapter 10/Rule 13 sanctions. The opinion’s thrust is practical: Texas sanctions regimes target responsibility for filings and litigation conduct—not merely the ink on a signature line—particularly where the trial court found that counsel and firm were the actors behind the pleadings and the emergency injunction request. In other words, if the evidence supports that the lawyer/firm caused and pursued the sanctionable request, the absence of a signature did not deprive the trial court of discretion to sanction.

On inherent power, the court rejected the contention that the trial court “could not circumvent” Chapter 10/Rule 13. The appellate court understood the sanctions order as grounded in Chapter 10 and Rule 13 (with inherent authority discussed alternatively), and it found no reversible error in the trial court’s approach given that the conduct fit within the statutory/rule frameworks and the trial court made express findings tied to those standards.

Most importantly, the court upheld the trial court’s core factual determinations: the temporary-injunction request was groundless and pursued in bad faith/for improper purpose. The trial court’s findings emphasized fundamental defects—no viable cause of action against the defendant targeted by the injunction and inability to show imminent irreparable harm—paired with the timing and strategy of emergency injunctive relief shortly before the vote, followed by a quick nonsuit. The evidentiary record (including credibility calls, counsel testimony about the business model, and pattern evidence) supported the inference that the injunction request functioned as leverage rather than a legitimate attempt to preserve a right pending adjudication.

Holding

The First Court of Appeals held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions and awarding $69,861.19 in attorney’s fees against counsel and the law firm. The court rejected the argument that sanctions were barred solely because counsel/firm did not sign the petition and temporary-injunction motion, concluding the trial court could still sanction based on responsibility for the filings and related conduct.

The court also held the trial court did not reversibly err by referencing inherent authority in conjunction with Chapter 10 and Rule 13. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the temporary-injunction request was groundless and filed in bad faith/for an improper purpose, and it left the sanctions findings and fee award intact notwithstanding the plaintiff’s voluntary nonsuit.

Practical Application

For Texas family-law litigators, the lesson is not “don’t seek emergency relief.” It is that temporary relief practice is sanctions-sensitive because it is often fast, asymmetric, and outcome-determinative in the short term—making it fertile ground for arguments that a request was filed to gain leverage rather than to prevent imminent harm.

Concrete family-law pressure points where this opinion will resonate:

1. TROs aimed at possession/access: If a TRO is sought to change the status quo rather than preserve it—especially without admissible, specific evidence of imminent harm—expect a Chapter 10/Rule 13 response framing the request as tactical.
2. Injunctions freezing accounts/property: Requests to freeze broad categories of property based on suspicion, without a traceable evidentiary record, can be recast as harassment or settlement leverage—particularly when paired with aggressive discovery or public-facing accusations.
3. Emergency “exclusive use” or ouster requests: Courts will tolerate speed, not sloppiness. If the factual showing does not match the severity of the requested restraint, you are building a sanctions record for the other side.
4. Nonsuit/withdrawal after temp hearing: If you lose the temp hearing and then nonsuit, do not assume the sanctions threat is gone. Treat sanctions as a collateral proceeding that can survive dismissal.

Checklists

Pre-Filing Injunction/TRO Triage (Family Cases)

• Confirm the requested relief preserves the status quo rather than effectively awarding final relief.
• Identify the precise legal vehicle: TRO, temporary injunction, temporary orders, protective order, or enforcement-related relief—do not mix standards.
• Draft a harm theory that is probable, imminent, and irreparable (not speculative, not reputational, not “hard to deal with”).
• Verify that each asserted claim/ground for relief is viable against the specific respondent you are trying to enjoin.
• Pressure-test standing, jurisdiction, and any statutory preconditions (e.g., UCCJEA posture, SAPCR prerequisites, venue posture).

Evidentiary Record Checklist for Emergency Hearings

• Prepare admissible, specific testimony (who/what/when/where) supporting imminent harm.
• Attach only exhibits you can authenticate quickly (texts, emails, bank records, school/medical records) and be ready to lay foundation.
• Quantify monetary harm where possible and explain why money damages are inadequate if you are seeking equitable restraints.
• Draft proposed orders with narrow, enforceable terms (avoid vague “don’t harass” language).
• Ensure your verification/affidavits are internally consistent; contradictions are sanctions accelerants.

Signature, Responsibility, and “Who Filed It” Risk Management

• Assume the court will look past formalities to who directed, drafted, and pursued the motion.
• Maintain clean internal documentation of attorney supervision and client instructions.
• Do not use “non-signing counsel” as a perceived firewall; align responsibility with actual conduct.
• Review every emergency filing for Chapter 10/Rule 13 exposure: factual contentions, legal contentions, and purpose.

Settlement-Leverage Optics (How to Avoid the “Improper Purpose” Narrative)

• Make sure your correspondence and hearing presentation reads like litigation to prevent harm, not a threat campaign.
• Avoid ultimatum settlement demands tethered to the hearing date (“pay by Friday or we’ll seek an injunction”).
• If you must make a demand, tie it to objective relief and case merits, not to calendar brinkmanship.
• After an adverse ruling, do not reflexively nonsuit without first assessing whether your record could be portrayed as a leverage play.

Responding to a Sanctions Threat After a Temp-Relief Loss

• Treat the sanctions hearing as a merits hearing: prepare witnesses, exhibits, and a coherent narrative of good-faith purpose.
• Demand specificity: isolate the exact statements/positions alleged to be sanctionable.
• Separate weak merits from bad faith—sanctions require more than “the judge disagreed.”
• If pattern evidence is offered, be prepared with limiting arguments and counter-context (but do not ignore it).

Citation

Dr. Robert Corwin, Richard B. Brualdi, and The Brualdi Law Firm, P.C. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-24-00207-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2026) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

Family Law Crossover

Expect this opinion to be cited in Texas divorce and custody cases to support an aggressive sanctions posture when a party files an emergency TRO/temporary-injunction/temporary-orders request that appears timed for maximum leverage and minimum proof—then retreats via nonsuit, agreed order, or “reset” once the court pushes back. The play is straightforward: (1) characterize the emergency filing as groundless (no viable claim/defense theory supporting the restraint; no evidence of imminent irreparable harm), (2) build an “improper purpose” narrative around timing, communications, and litigation pattern (serial emergencies, repeated last-minute filings, repeat allegations that evaporate at hearing), and (3) pursue fees as a collateral sanction even if the underlying dispute becomes moot—turning the temp-relief attempt into a cost-shifting event. For the movant, the strategic countermeasure is equally clear: litigate temporary relief like it will be audited later—because, after this case, the opposing side will be more willing to try.

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