CROSSOVER: Injury-to-a-Child Appeal Highlights ‘Assumed Duty’ by Live-In Partner—A Template for Texas SAPCR/Protective-Order Proof

Skorich v. The State of Texas; Woody v. The State of Texas, 07-25-00002-CR, March 30, 2026.

On appeal from 222nd District Court, Deaf Smith County, Texas

Synopsis

The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed injury-to-a-child convictions arising from omissions during an interstate trucking trip, holding the 222nd District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction and that venue was proper in Deaf Smith County. Critically for crossover purposes, the court also held the evidence was sufficient to prove a live-in boyfriend “assumed” care, custody, and control—creating a legal duty that supported criminal liability by omission.

Relevance to Family Law

For Texas family-law litigators, this opinion is a proof template for (1) establishing non-parent third-party responsibility and restrictions in SAPCRs, and (2) supporting protective-order findings where a respondent’s liability is framed as omissions and coercive “care” practices rather than a single discrete assault. The court’s assumed-duty analysis translates directly to arguments that a live-in partner has become a de facto caregiver whose access should be limited (or barred) and whose conduct can satisfy “family violence” dynamics relevant to conservatorship, possession, and supervised visitation—even absent biological or adoptive status.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

A seven-year-old child arrived at a Hereford emergency room unresponsive, profoundly dehydrated, and covered with extensive bruising in multiple stages of healing. He had been traveling for days in an 18-wheeler with his mother (Skorich) and her boyfriend (Woody), who lived with them in Arkansas and functioned as the household’s primary disciplinarian. The evidence included: deliberate and severe restrictions on the child’s access to fluids during the trip; a cab environment without a proper seat/seatbelt for the child; accounts of falls from a high bunk; and a reported “outburst” followed by belt punishment. Medical testimony characterized the dehydration as chronic and not self-achievable—i.e., consistent with water being withheld over time—producing extreme hypernatremia and life-threatening encephalopathy. Forensic documentation described patterned injuries consistent with inflicted trauma.

The prosecution theory was not limited to “who struck the child,” but centered on knowing or reckless omissions: failing to provide water, failing to seek timely medical care as the child’s condition deteriorated, and maintaining conditions that predictably produced serious bodily injury. A central fight on appeal was whether Woody—“just” the boyfriend—could be criminally liable by omission at all, which required proof he had a legal duty to act based on assumed care, custody, or control.

Issues Decided

• Whether the 222nd District Court of Deaf Smith County had subject-matter jurisdiction over injury-to-a-child offenses tied to omissions occurring during interstate travel.
• Whether venue was proper in Deaf Smith County for offenses involving a course of conduct/omissions occurring across multiple locations.
• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to show Woody assumed care, custody, and control over the child, creating a legal duty supporting omission-based liability.
• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove Skorich knowingly or recklessly caused serious bodily injury and bodily injury to the child by omission.

Rules Applied

• Texas Penal Code § 22.04 (Injury to a Child) (including liability for causing injury by act or omission and culpable mental states of intent, knowledge, recklessness, and criminal negligence, depending on charge).
• Jurisdiction and venue principles applicable to offenses committed in part in a county, and to continuing offenses/course-of-conduct scenarios where the harmful result and/or component conduct occurs in the charging county.
• Legal duty for omission liability: A defendant may be liable for an omission when the State proves a legal duty to act, which can arise from a defendant’s assumption of care, custody, or control over a child—even absent formal parent status.
• Sufficiency review standards (viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferring to credibility determinations) applied to duty, mental state, and causation.

Application

On jurisdiction and venue, the court treated the alleged wrongdoing as more than a single, fixed-location event. The State’s proof described an interstate trip during which the child’s condition progressively worsened, culminating in an emergency presentation and medical intervention in Hereford (Deaf Smith County). The court concluded Texas courts had jurisdiction over the charged offenses and that Deaf Smith County was a proper venue because the harmful result and key components of the omission-based conduct were tied to the county where the child was ultimately brought in extremis.

On Woody’s “assumed duty,” the court focused on functional caregiving realities rather than labels. Evidence showed a cohabiting family unit; the child lived either in Woody’s home or in the truck with him; household finances were intertwined; Woody exercised authority and discipline; and he actively participated in decision-making about when to seek medical care (including telling an officer he instructed Skorich on timing and acknowledging the child’s progressive decline). Those facts permitted a rational juror to find that Woody had assumed care, custody, and control—enough to create a legal duty to act, and thus to support omission liability under § 22.04.

As to Skorich, the court credited medical evidence that the dehydration was chronic and not attributable to a benign viral illness, paired with evidence of deliberate restriction of fluids and delay in obtaining care despite obvious deterioration. The jury was entitled to infer knowledge or recklessness from the duration and extremity of deprivation, the child’s visible decline, and the caregivers’ continuing choices. The court therefore upheld sufficiency as to causation and culpable mental state for serious bodily injury and bodily injury by omission.

Holding

The Seventh Court of Appeals held the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the injury-to-a-child prosecutions and that venue was proper in Deaf Smith County, notwithstanding that parts of the travel and alleged conduct occurred outside the county and outside Texas. The court treated the offenses as encompassing omissions and results that were sufficiently connected to Deaf Smith County.

The court further held the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Woody assumed care, custody, and control over the child, thereby creating a legal duty to act. Because § 22.04 permits criminal responsibility for injury by omission when a duty exists, the assumed-duty finding supported Woody’s convictions.

Finally, the court held the evidence was legally sufficient to support Skorich’s convictions for knowingly or recklessly causing serious bodily injury and bodily injury by omission, and it affirmed both defendants’ judgments and sentences.

Practical Application

Texas family-law litigators should treat Skorich/Woody as a roadmap for proving (or attacking) “third-party caregiver” status and the consequences that flow from it.

• SAPCRs involving a parent’s live-in partner: The opinion supplies a fact pattern and evidentiary categories that support findings that a boyfriend/girlfriend is not a mere bystander, but an assumed caregiver with daily operational control. That matters when you are litigating geographic restrictions, right of first refusal provisions, supervised possession, and injunctions about who may be present during possession.

• Protective orders and temporary orders: Omission-based harm (withholding necessities, delaying medical care, controlling bodily functions) often presents as “parenting decisions” rather than headline-grabbing violence. This case helps reframe those choices as duty-driven conduct with foreseeable severe consequences, useful for establishing the necessity of immediate restraints and supervised access.

• Discovery and case theme: The State’s success here was built on a structured narrative: (1) a defined family unit; (2) daily caretaking and discipline; (3) progressive decline; (4) conscious choices not to correct course; (5) catastrophic medical endpoint in the forum county. That architecture is equally effective in family court when the relief sought is restrictions on access and decision-making authority.

• Venue and forum considerations in parallel proceedings: Although your case is civil, the venue analysis is a reminder to anchor your pleadings and proof to where the harmful result manifested and where critical interventions occurred (ER visit, DFPS involvement, forensic exam). Those anchors influence emergency jurisdiction, transfer fights, and strategic coordination with investigators.

Checklists

Proving “Assumed Care, Custody, and Control” (Non-Parent Partner)

• Cohabitation facts: lease/mortgage, mail, utilities, shared residence timeline
• Child’s living arrangement: where the child sleeps, who transports, who supervises daily routines
• Financial integration: pooled accounts, shared bills, use of child-related benefits, purchase history
• Decision-making authority: medical decisions, school decisions, discipline rules, travel decisions
• Statements against interest: texts, recorded calls, police-bodycam admissions about “my role,” “my rules,” “I told her when to go to the hospital”
• Witnesses: teachers, relatives, neighbors, daycare, co-workers who observed caretaking conduct
• Pattern evidence: prior similar incidents, escalating discipline, restrictions on food/water/sleep (where admissible)

Building an Omission Case (Family Court Lens: Necessities + Medical Delay)

• Timeline of deterioration: symptoms, dates, and observable changes corroborated by third parties
• Necessities deprivation: water/food/sleep/bathroom access rules, logs, receipts, travel-stop records
• Medical proof: ER records, labs, treating physician opinions on chronicity and non-accidental causation
• Knowledge/recklessness proof: prior warnings, prior similar episodes, admissions, “we waited” explanations
• Safer alternatives ignored: accessible clinics, urgent care options, stopping the trip, contacting family
• Child vulnerability factors: developmental delays, disability-related needs, dependence on adults

Defensive Checklist (When Your Client Is the Non-Parent Partner)

• Define role boundaries early: who had legal authority, who made medical decisions, who controlled resources
• Separate “presence” from “assumption”: document lack of authority to override the parent
• Attack duty evidence: show absence of custody/control indicators (finances, residence, caretaking tasks)
• Causation counterproof: medical expert review of alternative etiologies and time-to-injury opinions
• Preserve electronic evidence: location data, receipts, logs showing stops, efforts to obtain care
• Avoid damaging admissions: prep for interviews/hearings; keep testimony consistent and precise

Citation

Skorich v. The State of Texas; Woody v. The State of Texas, Nos. 07-25-00001-CR & 07-25-00002-CR (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

Family Law Crossover

This case is unusually “weaponizable” in SAPCRs and protective-order practice because it collapses the common defense—“he’s not the parent”—by treating assumed caregiving as a duty-creating status with real consequences. In a custody dispute, you can use Skorich/Woody to argue that the live-in partner’s hands-on discipline, joint travel decisions, control over the child’s daily needs, and participation in medical decision-making establish de facto custody/control; once that frame is accepted, the partner becomes a legitimate target for (1) injunctive relief restricting contact, (2) supervised-possession conditions when the parent exercises visitation, and (3) findings supporting exclusive rights (e.g., to designate the child’s residence, to consent to medical care, to make educational decisions) in the safer parent. In protective-order litigation, the opinion supports a theme that “withholding care” and “delaying medical intervention” are not mere parenting disagreements but actionable endangerment—especially when paired with expert testimony on chronic deprivation and when the child’s condition predictably worsens while adults continue the conduct.

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