CROSSOVER: Texas civil stalking claim survives TCPA where threatening emails and calls are not protected speech or petitioning

Lartigue v. Farias, 01-24-00755-CV, April 30, 2026.

On appeal from 234th District Court of Harris County, Texas

Synopsis

The First Court of Appeals held that a Chapter 85 civil stalking claim did not trigger the TCPA where the complained-of conduct consisted of threatening emails, repeated calls, and statements implying an in-person confrontation. Because the claim was not based on, related to, or in response to protected speech, petitioning, or other protected TCPA activity, the trial court properly denied the interlocutory motion to dismiss without ever reaching prima facie proof or affirmative defenses.

Relevance to Family Law

This is a significant crossover case for Texas family litigators because high-conflict divorce, SAPCR, and post-judgment enforcement matters frequently involve allegations of harassment cloaked as “litigation communications.” Lartigue gives practitioners a clean appellate answer: not every communication touching pending litigation is TCPA-protected, and when the gravamen of the claim is threatening or stalking-type conduct rather than legitimate advocacy, the TCPA may never get off the ground. That matters in protective-order proceedings, injunctive requests, temporary orders practice, turnover disputes, child-exchange conflict, and cases involving obsessive texts, repeated calls to counsel, threats to appear at homes or offices, or intimidation directed at a party, counsel, or third parties.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The stalking suit arose against the backdrop of separate unauthorized-practice litigation filed by the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee. Farias, an attorney, had investigated complaints against Lartigue in that matter. While that separate case was pending, Lartigue sent multiple emails to Farias and repeatedly called Farias’s law firm. The communications demanded information about a person identified as Dale Keating and access to complaint materials, but they also escalated into overtly threatening and abusive language.

The opinion highlights several statements that drove the analysis. In one email, Lartigue told Farias to identify Dale Keating “or else I will have the police knocking on your door.” When Farias asked that communications go through counsel and requested that Lartigue stop contacting her directly, Lartigue replied, “nah.” In later communications, Lartigue accused Farias of criminal conduct, referenced Farias’s office in insulting terms, and after learning that Farias had contacted police, sent messages stating, among other things, “You are going to suffer now as much as I have….go to sleep bitch,” with subject lines including “Dale – See you today” and “Ill be by your pig pen ….. around….whatever time works best for my busy schedule.”

Farias then sued under Chapter 85 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code for stalking and sought temporary and permanent injunctive relief. Her petition and affidavit characterized the conduct as repeated, harassing, profane, and threatening, and she alleged that Lartigue’s conduct interfered with her law practice and caused fear for her safety and her family’s safety. Lartigue responded with a TCPA motion to dismiss, arguing that all communications related to the underlying UPLC case and therefore implicated the rights of free speech, petition, and the statute’s additional protected-act provisions. The trial court denied the motion, and Lartigue pursued an interlocutory appeal.

Issues Decided

• Whether the stalking claim was “based on or is in response to” Lartigue’s exercise of the right of free speech under the TCPA.
• Whether the stalking claim was “based on or is in response to” Lartigue’s exercise of the right to petition under the TCPA.
• Whether the stalking claim arose from any other act protected by the TCPA, including the provision cited by the movant under section 27.010(b).
• Whether, if the TCPA did not apply at step one, the appellate court needed to reach prima facie proof or affirmative defenses.

Rules Applied

The court worked from the ordinary three-step TCPA framework:

1. The movant must first show that the legal action is based on or in response to the movant’s exercise of a protected TCPA right or act. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(b).
2. If that burden is met, the nonmovant must establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(c).
3. Even then, dismissal may still follow if the movant establishes an affirmative defense or another basis for judgment as a matter of law. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(d).

The court also relied on the TCPA’s stated purpose in section 27.002 and on the Supreme Court’s discussion of the statute in McLane Champions, LLC v. Houston Baseball Partners LLC, 671 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. 2023), particularly the insistence that the movant must first establish actual TCPA applicability before burden-shifting begins. The opinion noted the de novo standard of review, citing Gaskamp v. WSP USA, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. dism’d), and it reiterated that appellate courts consider the pleadings and evidence of the type permitted under Rule 166a.

Most importantly, the court treated the step-one inquiry as a gravamen analysis: what was the stalking claim really targeting? If the target was threatening and harassing conduct rather than protected expression or petitioning, then the TCPA did not apply.

Application

The court’s reasoning appears to have turned on the distinction between communications merely connected to litigation and communications that are themselves the actionable threatening conduct. Lartigue tried to characterize the entire dispute as one arising from her efforts to obtain information and defend herself in the UPLC litigation. From that premise, she argued that her emails and calls were exercises of free speech or petitioning because they concerned a pending legal dispute.

The court rejected that framing. The stalking claim, as pleaded, was not premised on a legitimate request for information, advocacy in court, or a communication seeking governmental redress. It was premised on repeated direct contacts, threats, abusive language, implied physical confrontation, and conduct that allegedly placed Farias in fear and disrupted her work. In other words, the legal injury asserted by Farias did not arise because Lartigue had spoken about a legal controversy; it arose because the content and manner of the communications constituted alleged stalking.

That distinction is critical. The TCPA does not attach simply because a threatening statement happens to mention pending litigation, a complaint file, law enforcement, or legal theories. The court appears to have focused on the operative conduct and the basis of the pleaded claim, not the broader dispute in which the communications occurred. Because the stalking claim targeted non-protected threatening conduct, step one failed. Once that happened, the court had no reason to evaluate whether Farias made a prima facie Chapter 85 case or whether Lartigue had affirmative defenses.

The opinion also underscores a practical appellate point: evidentiary objections may become immaterial where the appeal can be resolved at the threshold applicability stage. The court expressly noted it did not need to address objections to affidavit material because its resolution did not depend on the challenged evidence.

Holding

The court held that the TCPA did not apply to Farias’s Chapter 85 stalking claim because the claim was not based on, related to, or in response to any exercise of a protected TCPA right or act. The gravamen of the claim was threatening, harassing conduct, not protected speech or petitioning activity.

The court therefore affirmed the trial court’s interlocutory order denying the motion to dismiss. Because Lartigue failed at the threshold applicability stage, the court did not reach the second-step prima facie inquiry or the third-step affirmative-defense analysis.

Practical Application

For family lawyers, Lartigue is a useful anti-TCPA case when the opposing party tries to sanitize intimidation as “litigation conduct.” In divorce and custody cases, the same pattern appears constantly: one party sends menacing texts about showing up at the other spouse’s residence, floods opposing counsel with direct communications after being told to stop, calls office staff repeatedly, threatens criminal exposure to force concessions, or weaponizes litigation rhetoric to create fear. After Lartigue, you have a stronger basis to argue that a stalking, injunctive, harassment, or protective-order-style claim is directed at coercive conduct, not protected participation in government.

The case is equally useful when the threatened person is not just the opposing spouse but counsel, staff, amicus, custody evaluator, therapist, or a third-party professional involved in the case. A common defense theme is that every communication in a pending family matter should be treated as petitioning. Lartigue undercuts that overreach. A communication can be litigation-adjacent and still lose TCPA shelter when its legal significance lies in its threatening or stalking character.

Strategically, this case also helps in drafting. If you represent the claimant, plead the gravamen carefully. Emphasize repeated unwanted contacts, threats, fear, disruption, escalation, in-person appearance threats, and the coercive purpose of the conduct. Do not let the pleading read like a defamation or “bad statements in litigation” case if your actual theory is stalking or harassment. Conversely, if you represent the accused communicator, Lartigue is a warning that merely linking communications to a pending suit will not satisfy step one. You will need a disciplined record showing that the claim actually targets protected petitioning or protected speech, not intimidation.

In temporary-orders practice, Lartigue may also support requests for communication protocols: counsel-only communication, parenting-app restrictions, no-contact provisions except for child logistics, and office/home nonappearance restrictions. If later challenged under the TCPA, the record should frame the issue as safety and anti-harassment relief, not speech suppression.

Checklists

Pleading a Family-Law Harassment or Stalking Claim

• Identify the specific conduct that caused fear or disruption, not merely the subject matter of the parties’ dispute.
• Quote the threatening language verbatim where possible.
• Plead repeated contacts, escalation, refusal to stop after notice, and any implied or express in-person confrontation.
• Tie the conduct to concrete effects: fear, disrupted exchanges, inability to work, changed routines, office security measures, police reports, impact on children, or interference with parenting time.
• Distinguish between legitimate litigation communications and conduct that is threatening, abusive, or coercive.
• If the conduct involves counsel or staff, explain why those contacts are relevant to the stalking or injunction theory.

Defending Against an Overbroad TCPA Motion

• Start with step one and force the movant to identify the exact protected right allegedly implicated.
• Argue the gravamen of the claim, not the backdrop of the case.
• Emphasize that threats, intimidation, repeated unwanted contact, and implied physical confrontation are not transformed into protected conduct just because litigation exists.
• Point out when the claim seeks relief from conduct rather than from viewpoints, opinions, or court filings.
• Preserve the argument that the court need not reach prima facie proof if the movant cannot establish TCPA applicability.
• Use the movant’s own communications to show coercive purpose and non-protected character.

Building the Evidentiary Record in Divorce or Custody Cases

• Save all texts, emails, voicemails, call logs, and parenting-app messages.
• Preserve metadata, screenshots, and native files where feasible.
• Document requests to stop direct contact and any refusal to comply.
• Gather staff declarations if office calls or appearances occurred.
• Collect police reports, incident reports, building-security logs, or Ring-camera footage if available.
• Create a chronology showing escalation across dates and platforms.
• Show how the conduct affected possession exchanges, school pickup, counseling, mediation, or child-related decision-making.

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Party’s Mistake

• Do not assume that every communication touching a legal dispute is protected by the TCPA.
• Do not rely on generalized assertions that the statements “related to” another lawsuit.
• Do not ignore tone, repetition, timing, or threats of physical presence.
• Do not continue direct contact after being instructed to route communications through counsel.
• Do not send statements that can reasonably be construed as threats, intimidation, or stalking behavior.
• Do not build a TCPA motion around the background controversy while ignoring the actual conduct alleged in the live pleading.

Drafting Protective Relief Requests in Family Cases

• Request narrow, behavior-focused relief rather than broad speech restraints.
• Specify no-contact channels and exceptions for emergencies or child logistics.
• Seek office, residence, school, and exchange-location stay-away provisions when supported by the facts.
• Ask for parenting-app communication protocols where direct texting has become abusive.
• Include relief protecting counsel, staff, therapists, and other case participants when warranted.
• Make the requested relief proportional and directly tied to safety and case administration.

Citation

Lartigue v. Farias, No. 01-24-00755-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 30, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

Family Law Crossover

This ruling can be weaponized effectively in Texas divorce or custody litigation in two very different ways. First, if you represent the threatened spouse, parent, lawyer, or third-party professional, Lartigue gives you a framework to defeat a TCPA motion at the threshold by characterizing the case correctly: the suit is about stalking, intimidation, coercive control, or harassment—not about punishing someone for speaking on a public issue or participating in litigation. That framing can preserve claims for injunction, stalking relief, or ancillary tort theories and can reinforce requests for temporary restraining orders, communication limits, supervised exchanges, or geographic stay-away provisions.

Second, if you represent the accused party, Lartigue is a cautionary map of what not to do. In family cases, clients often believe that because divorce or custody litigation is pending, they may barrage the other side with accusatory messages, threaten to “show up,” contact law-office staff, or invoke police, CPS, or criminal allegations as leverage. This case shows that those facts can move the dispute out of TCPA territory and into a stalking or injunctive posture very quickly. For family litigators, the strategic lesson is simple: define the gravamen early, build the record around conduct rather than mere content, and expect courts to distinguish advocacy from intimidation.

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