UCCJEA Section 152.105(c) Requires Evidence Before Final Custody Order | Mugisha v. McLeod (2025)

Joseph Mugisha v. Brianna McLeod, 03-25-00311-CV, May 29, 2026.

On appeal from 425th Judicial District Court of Williamson County

Synopsis

Texas Family Code section 152.105(c) is not a shortcut around the UCCJEA’s foreign-country provisions. In Mugisha v. McLeod, the Third Court held that before a Texas court may refuse to treat a foreign nation as a “state” under the UCCJEA on human-rights grounds, the record must contain sufficient evidence that the foreign country’s child-custody law violates fundamental principles of human rights; without that evidentiary basis, the court cannot bypass sections 152.204(b)–(d) and 152.206 and enter a final custody order.

Relevance to Family Law

For Texas family litigators, this opinion matters most in international custody and divorce cases where one parent invokes emergency jurisdiction and the other is already proceeding abroad or intends to do so. The case makes clear that a Texas court cannot convert a temporary emergency foothold into a final conservatorship order merely by reciting section 152.105(c); if the court is dealing with a foreign country, counsel must build an evidentiary record on foreign law, human-rights concerns, and the UCCJEA’s mandatory coordination provisions. In practice, this affects pleading strategy, evidentiary preparation, default prove-ups, parallel proceedings, and how aggressively counsel should insist on communication with the foreign tribunal under sections 152.204 and 152.206.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The parents had an unusually international history. Mugisha, a Ugandan citizen, and McLeod, a U.S. citizen, met in Seattle, lived in Dubai, married in Las Vegas, and then relocated to Uganda. Their two children had lived abroad for years—one born in Dubai, the other born in Kenya while the family resided in Uganda. In December 2023, McLeod brought the children from Uganda to Texas for what was represented as a visit to her sister, but she did not return to Uganda. Instead, she filed a Texas SAPCR in January 2024.

At the outset, the Texas trial court entered temporary orders appointing McLeod temporary sole managing conservator and Mugisha temporary possessory conservator, and it ordered child support. The temporary orders cited Texas Family Code section 152.204, the UCCJEA’s temporary emergency jurisdiction provision, and Hague Convention article 13(b). Mugisha then filed a divorce and custody proceeding in Uganda and, in Texas, filed a special appearance and a plea to the jurisdiction. He argued that Texas was required to proceed within the limits of section 152.204, stay as necessary, and communicate with the Ugandan court because of the parallel proceeding.

At the hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction, counsel advised the Texas court that evidence could be offered on UCCJEA jurisdictional issues, but no evidence was actually taken. The court instead asked for briefing. Later, the trial court issued findings stating that Uganda’s child-custody law violated fundamental principles of human rights and, on that basis, purported to decline application of sections 152.204(b)–(d) and 152.206 under section 152.105(c). After Mugisha’s counsel withdrew and Mugisha did not appear at final trial, the court entered a default final SAPCR order appointing McLeod sole managing conservator, limiting Mugisha to supervised possession, and awarding support and arrearages.

On appeal, the Third Court addressed both the support rulings and the custody rulings. The portion most important for family-law jurisdiction was the court’s conclusion that the record lacked sufficient evidence to support use of section 152.105(c) as a basis to sidestep the UCCJEA’s foreign-country and simultaneous-proceedings framework.

Issues Decided

The court decided the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Mugisha to enter child-support orders.

2. Whether the evidence sufficiently supported the trial court’s calculation of Mugisha’s net resources for child-support purposes.

3. Whether the trial court had a sufficient evidentiary basis to invoke Texas Family Code section 152.105(c) and refuse to apply UCCJEA provisions governing foreign-country treatment, temporary emergency jurisdiction procedure, and simultaneous proceedings.

4. Whether, absent that evidentiary basis, the trial court could enter a final conservatorship and possession order.

Rules Applied

The court applied the following statutory framework and appellate principles:

• Texas Family Code section 152.105(c), which permits a Texas court not to apply the UCCJEA if the child-custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights.

• Texas Family Code section 152.204, governing temporary emergency jurisdiction, including the obligations imposed by subsections (b)–(d) when another state or foreign-country custody determination may exist or when a custody proceeding has been commenced elsewhere.

• Texas Family Code section 152.206, addressing simultaneous proceedings and limiting when a Texas court may exercise jurisdiction if a proceeding has been filed in another state, including a foreign country treated as a state under the UCCJEA.

• The UCCJEA’s foreign-country treatment provisions generally requiring Texas courts to treat foreign countries as if they were U.S. states for purposes of applying the Act, unless section 152.105(c) is properly invoked.

• Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a concerning special appearances and waiver principles as to personal jurisdiction.

• The general appellate principle that factual findings or jurisdictional determinations requiring evidentiary support cannot rest solely on attorney argument, factual assertions in briefs, or unsupported judicial recitations.

The opinion also acknowledged the unresolved Texas-law debate over whether UCCJEA defects are truly subject-matter jurisdictional, citing In re D.S., while proceeding to analyze the custody ruling under the UCCJEA framework.

Application

The court treated the custody question as a record problem first and a statutory problem second. The trial court had before it an international child-custody dispute in which the children had lived in Uganda, the mother unilaterally remained in Texas after a purported visit, and the father filed a custody-related proceeding in Uganda almost immediately after temporary Texas orders were entered. Under those facts, section 152.204 did not authorize a free-standing final custody adjudication unless the statutory steps for emergency jurisdiction, coordination, and duration were properly handled, and section 152.206 became relevant once the foreign proceeding was filed.

The trial court attempted to solve that problem by invoking section 152.105(c). If Uganda’s child-custody law truly violated fundamental principles of human rights, then Texas would not be required to treat Uganda as a UCCJEA “state,” and the simultaneous-proceedings and foreign-country provisions could potentially fall away. But the appellate court focused on the absence of evidence. Although McLeod had attached affidavits and selected materials about Uganda to her petition, and although the parties later submitted briefs, the record reflected that no evidence was taken at the jurisdiction hearing where the court made the critical human-rights determination. Counsel’s statements that evidence existed or could be offered did not substitute for proof. Nor could post-hearing briefing fill the evidentiary gap.

That distinction mattered because section 152.105(c) is an exception of consequence, not a presumption. It allows a Texas court to disregard the UCCJEA’s usual treatment of a foreign nation only upon a sufficient showing that the foreign country’s child-custody law itself violates fundamental human-rights principles. The Third Court held the record did not contain that showing. Without it, Uganda had to be treated within the UCCJEA framework, which meant the trial court could not simply decline to apply sections 152.204(b)–(d) and 152.206 and proceed to final conservatorship and possession orders.

The court therefore left intact the notion that Texas may act on support if personal jurisdiction and UIFSA requirements are satisfied, but it separated that authority from the custody adjudication. The result is a practical reminder that a court may have adjudicative authority over support while still lacking a proper basis to render a final custody determination under the UCCJEA.

Holding

On the UCCJEA issue, the court held that Texas Family Code section 152.105(c) permits nonapplication of the UCCJEA’s foreign-country provisions only when the record contains sufficient evidence that the foreign country’s child-custody law violates fundamental principles of human rights. Because the record here did not contain sufficient evidence to support that determination, the trial court erred in invoking section 152.105(c) to bypass sections 152.204(b)–(d) and 152.206.

The court further held that, absent that evidentiary basis, the trial court could not render a final custody order addressing conservatorship and possession. Those portions of the final order were therefore vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the UCCJEA.

Separately, the court held that the trial court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Mugisha for purposes of child support, but that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s findings regarding his net pay. Accordingly, the support rulings were not left wholly undisturbed, even though the principal family-law significance of the case lies in the custody-jurisdiction analysis.

Practical Application

This case should immediately change how Texas family lawyers handle international custody disputes at the temporary stage. If your client is asking a Texas court to retain and finalize custody after the children arrive from a foreign country, you cannot assume that broad allegations about the foreign legal system will justify ignoring the UCCJEA’s foreign-country rules. You need admissible evidence directed specifically to the foreign country’s child-custody law and specifically to why that law violates fundamental principles of human rights. Generalized concerns about corruption, inconvenience, safety, or gender bias may not be enough, and unsworn attorney argument definitely is not enough.

The opinion is equally important for respondents. If the opposing side tries to convert a temporary-emergency case into a final custody case without a developed record, Mugisha gives you a clean appellate theme: section 152.105(c) is evidentiary, exceptional, and cannot be presumed. That means practitioners should press for an evidentiary hearing, object to reliance on briefs as proof, request findings tied to actual admitted exhibits or testimony, and insist that the court comply with sections 152.204 and 152.206 before entering a final order.

The decision also has implications in divorce litigation. In international divorce cases, custody and support may travel on different jurisdictional tracks. A Texas court may have personal jurisdiction sufficient for support while lacking authority to render a final custody adjudication under the UCCJEA. Litigators should therefore avoid blending those analyses. On the pleading side, separate the jurisdictional grounds for support, conservatorship, and possession. On the appellate side, preserve them separately as well.

In default settings, the case is especially useful. A default does not relieve the petitioner of the burden to establish the jurisdictional and evidentiary predicates for a final custody order. If the record is thin on foreign law, human-rights proof, or simultaneous-proceeding compliance, the resulting custody decree is vulnerable.

Checklists

Building a Section 152.105(c) Record

• Identify the precise foreign child-custody statutes, procedures, and decisional law at issue.
• Offer admissible evidence of foreign law rather than relying on pleadings or attorney argument.
• Use expert testimony or a properly supported affidavit from a qualified foreign-law expert when possible.
• Tie the evidence to the statutory standard: violation of “fundamental principles of human rights.”
• Distinguish criticisms of a foreign forum from proof about the foreign country’s child-custody law.
• Obtain clear rulings admitting exhibits and testimony into the record.
• Request express findings identifying the evidence supporting the section 152.105(c) determination.

Handling Temporary Emergency Jurisdiction Correctly

• Determine whether Texas is proceeding under section 152.204 only.
• Ascertain whether a foreign custody order already exists or whether a foreign case has been filed.
• Ask the court to set a duration-limited emergency order if final jurisdiction is unresolved.
• Request court-to-court communication where section 152.204(d) or section 152.206 calls for it.
• Make sure the record reflects whether the foreign country is being treated as a UCCJEA “state.”
• Object if the court attempts to leap from emergency orders to final conservatorship orders without satisfying the statutory prerequisites.

Opposing an Improper Final Custody Order

• Challenge any reliance on section 152.105(c) if no evidence was admitted.
• Object that briefs, factual summaries, and counsel’s statements are not evidence.
• Preserve complaints that sections 152.204(b)–(d) and 152.206 were not followed.
• Request findings of fact and conclusions of law after any jurisdictional ruling and after final judgment.
• Separate custody-jurisdiction complaints from personal-jurisdiction or support complaints.
• If a foreign proceeding is pending, place certified pleadings or orders from that proceeding into evidence.

Preparing a Default Prove-Up in an International SAPCR

• Do not assume default cures UCCJEA defects.
• Present evidence of the children’s home-state history and foreign-country residence.
• Present evidence, if applicable, supporting emergency jurisdiction and the need for temporary protection.
• If invoking section 152.105(c), prove the human-rights exception with competent evidence.
• Address any foreign-filed proceeding expressly and document the court’s response.
• Build a support record separately, including reliable proof of net resources.

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Party’s Problems

• Do not rely on the court’s invitation for briefing as a substitute for an evidentiary hearing.
• Do not assume attachments to a petition automatically become admitted evidence.
• Do not let the record remain ambiguous about whether evidence was offered and admitted.
• Do not conflate concerns about the facts of the family dispute with proof about the foreign nation’s custody law.
• Do not permit a final order to recite human-rights findings unsupported by the evidentiary record.
• Do not overlook the appellate significance of findings entered after a non-evidentiary hearing.

Citation

Joseph Mugisha v. Brianna McLeod, No. 03-25-00311-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.—Austin May 29, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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